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Summary
The main objective of this thesis is to provide some simple theoretic insights that could 
help to design a technology policy for a "latecomer" country such as Spain. The thesis 
focuses on two major topics that can be considered as central for these countries: the 
acquisition of foreign technology through licensing and other contractual means and the 
adoption and diffusion of new process technologies.
The thesis is divided in four major parts. The introductory part is dedicated to the 
discussion of the main characteristics and technological profile of these kinds of countries. 
This is done in order to provide stylized facts which can help to build up the most suitable 
analytical framework for the study of these countries.
The second part of the thesis is dedicated to the study of two major issues concerning the 
licensing of innovations in an international context. It examines questions relative to the 
impact of ex-ante licensing on the incentives for technologically different firms to carry out 
R&D and on the rate and direction of technological change. Particular attention is paid to 
the consequences derived from differences between the private and the social value of the 
licenses. The study of these questions reveals the existence of important market failures 
that arise in the international transfer of technology.
The third part deals with the relative incentives for the introduction of a process innovation 
in countries with asymmetric cost structures. The impact of different directions of 
technological change, sequences of innovations and different forms of market competition 
is taken into account. This part includes some consideration of international trade and 
supply-side issues.
The conclusions of the analytical chapters are discussed in chapter IX.
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Chapter I: Introduction
1.1. Aims and Motivation ok The Thesis
The main objective of this thesis is to provide some simple theoretic insights that 
could help to design a technology policy for a "latecomer" country, i.e. a country that has 
reached a certain stage of development in its process of industrialisation. It is common 
knowledge that technological competition is a major element determining the privileged 
economic position of countries such as Japan, the USA or Germany. But for the long list 
of countries such as South Korea, Spain, Brazil or Mexico, which have achieved a certain 
degree of industrial development, but lag still behind the levels of the world leading 
countries, technology is also of the greatest importance to maintain and consolidate their 
processes of industrialisation.
This research is limited to just a few selected issues that, in my personal opinion, 
are relevant for these kinds of situations. The ultimate objective of designing a global 
technology policy for one o f these latecomer countries is a complex endeavour which is not 
within reach of the isolated effort of one doctoral dissertation. Consequently, a choice had 
to be made at the outset of this research about the methodological approach to follow. 
One possible alternative was to imitate some previous exercises that, based on empirical 
observations, have produced fairly detailed recipes about how to tackle such a complex 
undertaking. Excellent examples of these kinds of exercises are the periodical innovation 
surveys carried out by the OECD for various countries. The utility of these studies is out of 
question. Nonetheless, I think that little essentially new can be added along those lines.
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Instead, it was considered that this thesis could make a more fruitful contribution 
by providing a better understanding of the theoretical basis required to guide in a sensible 
and rational way public polity interventions in such situations. This second alternative 
implies limiting the scope of the thesis to just a selection of theoretic problems, which are 
relevant for the design of technology policy in those countries that are still completing their 
industrialisation processes.
Technology policy can be defined as a "set of policies involving government 
intervention in the economy with the intent of affecting the process of technological 
innovation"1. But in order to obtain normative rules, one must have detailed knowledge of 
what are  the positive aspects of the problem that justify public policy intervention. This 
observation, which was already present in the thesis proposal prepared a long time ago, has 
been decisive in the definition of the objectives and contents of this research.
Contrary to what happens in the case o f  countries at the leading edge of 
technological development, the study of market failures and market imperfections that may 
arise in the process of technological development of the so-called latecomer countries, has 
seldom been the subject of analytical research of the type presented here. In the late 
seventies and early eighties, several complex models were developed with the purpose of 
determining which is the best market structure to produce the optimal rate of technological 
change. However, even today there are only a few models that can help us to answer the 
most simple questions concerning technology policy for latecomer countries in an open 
international context.
Fortunately, and probably spurred by events such as the debate on intellectual 
property rights in the Uruguay Round and the solid economic progress of countries like 
South Korea and Taiwan, the second half of the eighties has produced several interesting
1 See  Stoncm an (1987), chapter I , page 2.
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pieces of research that have opened new horizons. Nevertheless, very simple but non-trivial 
questions such as what kinds of innovations would be pursued more intensively by certain 
countries or whether imperfect markets will produce too much or too little international 
licensing from a socially optimal perspective, remain unanswered.2
For these reasons, by concentrating on such questions, this study can perhaps make 
a m ore fruitful contribution to the understanding of these economic processes, and in that 
way, provide a better foundation for the definition of the basic guide-lines for public policy 
intervention.
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that this decision in favour o f tackling the 
more basic theoretical questions, did not imply a change of direction in the aims of the 
research. It is true that this thesis does not include a detailed outline for technology policy 
intervention, but it is also true (or at least so I hope), that it provides some basic and 
robust propositions that give better theoretical support to some policies already 
implemented in such countries. It is my contention that when the nature o f market failures 
occurring in these situations and the basic strategic responses of firms facing them are 
better known, technology policy can be designed in a more secure way.
Of course, this does not imply that this kind of research should be considered as a 
guarantee of success for technology policy. One must be conscious of the limitations of the 
theoretic models presented here below, but one must also be aware of the pressures that 
urge policy makers to take decisions concerning technology matters. Technology issues are 
acquiring an ever increasing importance in public policy and policy decisions require both 
rational foundations and a good understanding of what can be expected to be the result of 
the free action of market forces when they are left to work on their own. For these
2 Ai least to the best of my knowledge, at the time when the agenda for this research was dosed in of 1990.
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reasons, propositions like those included in this thesis can be of potential utility for public 
policy. Perhaps an example can help to clarify this point.
Since 1973, industrial regulations in Spain compelled companies to submit any 
contractual form of technology acquisition from abroad for government approval. This 
regulation required that the companies involved should provide quite a detailed amount of 
information to public authorities who could, in principle, control the process of technology 
transfer, either by rejecting the deal or by requiring some modifications. In 1984, an 
interesting study3 on the economic impact of this procedure was carried out in the context 
of a revision of this regulation by the Spanish Government. This study recommended the 
relaxation of the very strict and complex norms, which had permitted a high level of 
intervention for the Spanish authorities until then.
According to the authors of that report, the "quasi-policing" approach adopted in 
the regulation was based on the implicit assumption that the acquisition of technology 
implied "higher social than private costs".4 This resulted in a complex series of bureaucratic 
controls, which after more than ten years of the enforcement of the regulation, had very 
seldom resulted in the rejection of contracts submitted for approval. This paradoxical 
outcome is not explored in detail in the report, but some comments included in it such as 
the disregard by the Directorate General for Industrial Innovation of this powerful 
instrument for intervention and the priority given in the process to "purely and almost 
police-like bureaucratic obsession", seem to indicate the simple truth of the matter: the 
administrative authorities in charge of a very powerful instrument for technology policy did 
not have much information about the best way to use it. Whenever the authorities actually
3 Martín González, C. and Rodríguez Romero, L. “La Transferencia Contractual de Tecnología en la 
Economía Española', Programa de Investigaciones Económicas, Fundación Empresa Pública, Documento de 
Trabajo 8401.
4 Martín C. and Rodríguez L., (1984) page 10 and 11.
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raised some objection to a given contract, it always concerned its ancillary clauses, and 
even in such cases, the decisions did not seem to be based on any solid economic rational.
In its conclusions, the final report recommended the simplification of the 
administrative procedures on the grounds that they resulted just in a waste of time and 
effort for the companies without any economic policy rational to justify them. However, the 
report did not inquire at all into what was, in the opinion of the authors, the implicit 
assumption behind the regulation: the difference between social and private costs in the 
process of international technology transfer.
This is the  subject of a good part of the first half of this thesis. There, some insights 
into the kinds o f effects acting upon the private and social costs and benefits of technology 
transfer are provided. As it was said before, one must be fully aware of the limitations of 
the results presented here, which have been obtained in a highly simplified context. It is 
probably true that, in the light of these results, the proposals contained in the above 
mentioned report are still the appropriate ones. However, some analysis like the one 
presented below, could have been of some utility for the preparation of a report of this 
nature: firstly, because it could have helped to produce a more precise evaluation of the 
application of this instrument of technology policy in the past; and secondly, because it 
could have helped to devise more useful regulations for the future. It is with this conviction, 
but also with this hope, that the research which is the subject of this thesis has been 
undertaken.
As it was said before, only a selection of theoretic issues will be dealt with in the 
thesis. They have been chosen after an examination of the main characteristics that are 
present in the Spanish case. This choice has also been influenced by a series of 
assumptions and boundaries of the research defined and discussed in chapter two. On the 
basis of all these elements, two main themes are addressed in the thesis:
15
1. - The first one is licensing of a new process technology in the context of
asymmetric oligopolistic competition. Latecomer countries often have to 
obtain their technology through contractual means from foreign countries. But 
the market for technology is a complex one, with important information 
asymmetries. In the context of an asymmetric cost structure, both in the 
production of goods and new technologies, two basic topics concerning 
licensing will be analysed. The first one will be the impact of the possibility of 
ex-ante licensing on the incentives for the latecomer country to develop 
technology independently o r to  acquire it from abroad. As we will see later on, 
this possibility will have an important induced effect on the general rate and 
direction of technological progress. The second basic topic concerning 
licensing will be the analysis of the impact that licensing from abroad can have 
on social welfare when the industry using the new technology has an 
oligopolistic structure.
2. - The second main topic o f the dissertation is the study of the relative
incentives that firms located in two different countries and with different cost 
structures have to introduce a new process innovation. This analysis is carried 
out in a general framework in which firms bid for getting the new technology 
(or a sequence of them), in competition with their rivals in the market of a 
final good produced with the new technology. Although this type of analysis 
has often been used to analyse patent race situations, the lack of endogenous 
consideration of the conditions under which the new technology is produced 
makes them more suitable for the study of adoption decisions. In my opinion, 
the analysis of innovation decisions could give useful insights about the 
structural conditions affecting technological change in these kinds of 
economies in process of development. Special emphasis is given here to the 
competitive conditions prevailing in the markets for the final good and their
16
influence on the incentives to innovate. Finally, some trade issues are also 
considered.
This introductory part of the thesis is dedicated to discussion of the type of 
situation that will be modelled later on. This is done in order to provide an analytical 
framework that suits the reality that will be studied here in the best possible manner. For 
that purpose, the next section will deal very briefly with the characteristics of a "latecomer" 
country that has reached a certain level of economic development and faces some 
important choices as regards to its technology policy. In order to  provide a more specific 
description of this problem, a brief account of the main elements, from the technology 
policy point of view, that are present in the Spanish case is given later in this chapter. In 
the next one, the two main assumptions that are made almost throughout almost all the 
chapters of this thesis will be examined and their degree of realism assessed. Finally, in 
order to complete the presentation of methodological approach o f the thesis, some of main 
boundaries defining its contents are discussed before presenting the theoretic models that 
are the core of the research.
1.2. Late industrialisation and technology: Some stylized facts from the 
Spanish case.
1.2.1. Late  industrialisation
The concept of "latecomer" industrialisation has been present in the Economic 
History literature for a long time. It has often been used to identify countries which, after 
experiencing a certain process of economic development, still maintain a relative economic 
backwardness with respect to the leading industrialised countries in the world. This term 
was applied to countries such as the USA , Germany and Russia at the end of the last
17
century. Later on, it was used to designate Japan, Italy or Spain. Nowadays, the term Newly 
Industrialised Countries o r NIC, has become more popular, but it still applies to countries 
experiencing similar economic transformations to those of the countries mentioned before. 
Although the economic environment and the prevailing technological paradigm has been 
changing over the years, som e patterns have been common to all these cases.
In spite of some criticisms, Balassa’s 'stages theory of comparative advantage"5 
remains a useful theoretic framework to explain the process of transformation that these 
countries have undergone. This theory views the shifting industrial structure of countries 
at different stages of economic development as a reflection of their comparative 
advantages. In its basic structure, the theory has an undeniable appeal: countries start 
producing relatively primary commodities in the earlier stages of their process of economic 
development, as these do not require skilled labour and they are not capital-intensive 
goods; when unskilled labour becomes relatively scarce, continuation in the process of 
development requires moving into more capital-intensive economic activities requiring 
more skilled labour.
Alongside this fairly simple description of economic development, the technological 
basis of countries undergoing processes of economic development experiences substantial 
modifications which are essential for the sustainability of the process: if the technological 
basis needed for the next stage of economic development is not readily available, the whole 
process can be aborted. Only if technology is constantly upgraded, will the productivity 
gains that are essential to maintain growth and international competitiveness be achieved.
But technological change is important for economic growth not just for maintaining 
high levels of productivity. Technological change is essential to avoid increases in wage 
costs strangling the growth process. There is a wide-spread but simplistic belief about the
5 See Balassa, B. (1977) "A Stages Approach to Comparative Advantage", World Bank Staff Working
Paper, n.256, Washington D.C., The World Bank.
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negative impact of labour costs upon the international competitiveness of countries. As 
economic development progresses in a country, wages and salaries tend to increase. If this 
were all that happened, other countries with still low wages could become more 
competitive and growth could be stopped. However, empirical evidence shows that those 
countries enjoying the highest rates of growth o f  their GDP and exports are those that have 
experienced the highest increases in their unit labour costs. This phenomenon, which is 
known in the literature as the Kaldor paradox, has been explained recently by Fagerberg 
(1988). His research has shown that despite the negative impact of labour costs on 
international competitiveness, technological knowledge and the country’s capacity to 
deliver (in which technology is an important factor too), are capable of more than 
offsetting this negative impact. Therefore, technological innovation seems to be crucial not 
just to achieve international competitiveness but also to maintain external market shares 
and, at the same, relatively increase payments accruing to labour.
One of the commonalities that appears in all cases of latecomer industrialisation is 
the reliance on imported technological knowledge. This has been presented as an 
advantage by many authors6, because borrowing technologies from more developed 
countries allows countries undergoing industrialisation to economise on resources needed 
for other investment purposes. Dependence on foreign technology can save costs in terms 
of:
1. the uncertainty associated with innovation, because the purchased 
technologies have already been tested elsewhere, hence reducing although 
not eliminating completely the uncertainty about their performance, real 
costs, etc;
2. rivalry in R&D processes often results in excessive social costs as 
the companies taking part in the R&D race duplicate efforts in their search
6 See for instance Krngman (1979) and its follow-ups by Dollar and several contributions by Thursby and
Jensen.
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for the new technology. If already available technology is acquired from 
abroad and there is no R&D race, the country will avoid the inefficiencies 
due to such duplication of efforts.
However, as countries progress in their process of economic development, they 
require a more sophisticated technological basis which is harder to obtain by means of 
technology transfer. The USA in the early decades of this century, Italy in the fifties and 
sixties and Spain in the seventies and early eighties are just some examples of this sort of 
technological transition. Currently, countries like South Korea and Taiwan are facing the 
same type of experience7. However, there are reasons to believe that in recent years, it has 
become increasingly more difficult for all countries, whatever their stage of development, 
to rely on foreign technology. The following reasons have contributed to reduce the 
profitability of using foreign technology:
1. The most industrialised countries in the OECD area have started to tighten 
up the international enforcement of intellectual property right protection. The 
Uruguay Round has provided the scenario for this. The position of the G7 
countries can be best summarised in the statement of a form er US negotiator in 
this Round who stated that "the negotiations on trade-related intellectual property 
rights is the one area of the Uruguay Round in which protection is the solution, not 
the problem"8. The creation in the UK of the Federation Against Software Theft 
(FAST) and the already historical rulings in the patent cases in favour of Texas 
Instruments and Mr. G. Hyatt after twenty years in court are  just some reflections 
of this trend.9
7 Sec for instance Ernst D. and O’Connor D. (1989).
8 Schott J J . (1990), page 32.
9 "The Point of Patents', The Economist, September IS, p. 17
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2. Nowadays, technological change presents some new characteristics that 
make it more difficult for countries to obtain new technologies from abroad. In first 
place, the rate of technological change in some key enabling technologies such as 
information technologies, is much higher today than ever before. Furthermore, the 
life cycle of new products is getting shorter at an increasingly faster pace. The case 
of DRAM generations epitomises this phenomenon.10
3. It is becoming increasingly apparent that technological progress is heading 
towards a greater integration of technologies. As the cases of telematics and 
facilities management show, the frontier of innovation has reached a certain point 
where many of the future advances will require the combination of different sorts 
of technological knowledge. The present upsurge in the number of international 
strategic alliances between companies coming from many different countries and 
industrial sectors is, to a certain extent, the result of these firms’ search for firm 
specific technological knowledge, which is hard to transfer.11 The diffusion of these 
types of innovations on an international scale will probably prove to be more 
difficult than in the past.
All these phenomena pose new problems for countries in the ’catching-up’ process,
for they can no longer proceed along the traditional routes. Nevertheless, this new situation
may also open new opportunities to advance more rapidly in the process.
a) Firstly, shorter life cycles can make it possible for these countries to jump 
stages in the process, hence by-passing earlier starters. DRAM production in Korea 
is a good example o f this possibility. However, this will require a change in the 
strategy that these countries have used in the past to acquire technological 
knowledge.
10 See E m a and O'Connor (1991).
11 Sec Jordc T.M. and Tcccc D  J .  (1990).
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b) Secondly, at the present time, the  number of potential sources of foreign 
technology for a developing country a re  more diverse than several decades ago. 
Countries in intermediate stages of economic growth can benefit from the present 
competition among the three technological leaders of the world, i.e. Japan, the 
USA and the European Community. The less developed country will be in a better 
situation to benefit from competition among the alternative suppliers of foreign 
technology if:
it is relatively big,
it has reached a relatively high level of economic development and 
its domestic market represents an  important stake for these competitors, 
and/or
the country has a strategic position that could be used as a 
spearhead to enter certain major economic markets. This could be the case 
of Portugal or Spain with respect to the European Community or Mexico 
and the Dominican Republic with respect to the USA.12 *
c) In the past few years, we have witnessed the proliferation of new forms of 
acquisition of foreign technology. Direct investment from abroad, the import of 
capital goods incorporating technological knowledge and the acquisition of licenses 
over patents or know-how no longer exhaust the possibilities of having access to 
new technologies. Under the form of jo in t ventures, strategic alliances or trans­
national projects of cooperative R&D, countries can now overcome the existing 
technological barriers to entry into new markets. The most interesting 
characteristic of this new possibility is that it allows countries to have access not just 
to already existing technologies but also to  conducting R&D projects. In this way,
12 A  more sophisticated example of this has been the strategy of the Canadian telephone company.
Northern Telecom, that has exploited its presence in the USA to benefit from Japanese concessions to the US in 
their bilateral trade disputes and consequent agreements.
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firms entering these agreements can, not only learn new technologies, but they can 
"learn to learn" too.13
d) Finally, the high current rate of technological change has raised the costs 
necessary to enter an R&D race. But it has also created some new market 
opportunities which do not require high entry costs. The many new combinations 
that new technologies offer allow firms to enter some new and fast growing 
markets, like the market for personal computers, which do not require high initial 
investments. Furthermore, new information technologies can be used to improve 
productivity and reduce costs in traditional sectors, hence expanding the maturity 
period. In this way, countries that have achieved a certain stage of development can 
maintain their competitiveness vis a vis less developed countries with lower labour 
costs but a less developed technological basis. Good examples of this way of 
benefiting from technology are the shipbuilding industry in South Korea or the 
automobile industry in Spain.
This last point brings us to the basic alternatives that developing countries have to 
face in the design of their technology policy. For instance, countries can specialise in new 
market opportunities created by the latest technologies, but which are not fully exploited by 
technologically leading countries14, thereby becoming followers in those markets. 
Alternatively, countries can use those new technologies to upgrade traditional industries.
But the ’technology choice’ par excellence has been, and will probably still be in the 
future, the choice between developing technology domestically or acquiring it from abroad. 
In the early stages of this research, a simple optimal control model was developed with
13 On how lo benefit from cooperative RAD see Tcece (1986) and on the importance of learning to I cam 
sec Stiglitz (1987).
14 This can be due to limits in the investment capacities of those more advanced countries or to the low 
profitability of those market segments.
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foreign technology and domestic R&D as the two instrumental variables that increase the 
control variable, consumption, so as to maximise social welfare. The results of that model 
were not very surprising: each instrumental variable should be used up to the point at 
which their marginal contribution to social welfare was the same.
This result provided the basis for one of the main assumptions underlying 
throughout this research: it is not possible to consider the domestic development of 
technology and the acquisition of foreign technology as an either/or choice. Both 
instruments have to be used jointly in the process of technological development. In the 
early stages, foreign technology is the only real alternative for "taking off". Later on, even if 
’indigenous R&D’ does not win any patent race, its contribution is essential to facilitate 
reverse engineering and technology transfer. Even in the later stages, when the country has 
succeeded in finding a niche of industrial specialisation and is technologically mature, 
foreign sourcing of technology remains necessary15. If we look at the most successful case 
of technology policy, Japan , we can see how now in the nineties, its firms are still trying to 
get foreign technology through strategic alliances such as the Toshiba-Motorola and the 
Hitachi-Intel agreements in the semiconductor field or through international cooperative 
R&D projects such as the Integrated Manufacturing Systems initiative. Therefore, the 
choice between "buying technology from abroad" or "developing it domestically" can be 
justified and maintained for analytical purposes only.
Nowadays, it is not conceivable to think of technological self-sufficiency. What we 
may find in the real world is a variety of degrees of technological dependence from abroad 
as expressed by different values of the ratio between the technological balance of payments 
and the domestic expenditure in R&D. But even this cannot give us a complete picture of 
the technological situation of a certain economy. Although it is hard to subscribe fully to
15 In a recent paper presented at the Technology Economy Programme of the OECD, it was reported that 
in a survey to  USA multinational corporations, the most mentioned cause for opening R&D laboratories abroad 
was foreign sourcing of technology. For a more analytical approach sec Mowcry (1989).
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the so called ’national systems of innovation’ approach proposed by Freeman (1982) and 
Lundval (1988) as an analytical tool, because it relies almost completely on a totally 
institutional and descriptive basis, nobody can deny that the national specificities of each 
case must be born in mind in any normative analysis of technology policy.
In order to provide that minimum framework of reference, it is necessary to 
present some stylized facts drawn from some real world situation. For that purpose, the 
Spanish experience, which after all has been the situation driving all this research from the 
begging, has been chosen. The next few pages give a very summarised panorama of the 
technological evolution of Spain in the last few decades. Once again, by approaching a 
certain particular example the analysis may lose some generality. But that is usually the 
price that has to be paid to gain some realism in our assumptions and relevance for our 
propositions.
122. Some basic facts about the technological evolution o f Spain in the last decades.
The purpose of this section is to provide a condensed profile of the technological 
evolution of a prototypical latecomer country: Spain. In 1986, Spain joined the EEC and 
this event produced an important structural shock for the Spanish economy. It opened a 
process of adjustment that has produced serious disruptions in many economic indicators. 
For this reason, we will try to avoid making reference here to the period after 1986.16
The Spanish economy experienced a spectacular process of growth between the 
early sixties and 1975. While in 1963 the Spanish GDP was just 6.5% of the Euro 12 total 
GDP, that percentage rose to 9.2 in 1975. Over the same period, comparable economies 
such as Greece, Portugal or Ireland did not experienced any substantial increment in their
16 For an analysis of developments in this area after 1986 see Caballero (1991).
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share of European GDP. GDP annual rates of growth close to 10%, almost twice as big as 
the European average and dose to "Japanese standards" were not unusual during the 
sixties. But the Spanish economy suffered more deeply the economic crisis of the seventies 
and growth fell below the European rate during that period. The process of rapid growth in 
labour costs initiated in the sixties stopped in the early eighties and the economic boom of 
the last decade has not produced any substantial increase in labour costs.
During this period, Spanish industry has undergone important structural changes. 
The UN index of structural change in manufacturing, -a measure of the degree of 
correlation between the value added shares in 1965 and 1980- shows that only Brazil and 
Korea suffered comparable transformations in their industrial structures. However, 
Spanish industry developed patterns of specialisation quite different from those of Far- 
East Asian NICs or Brazil. If we use the OECD classification of high, medium and low 
technology products based on the percentage of R&D expenditure over the value of 
output, we can see that, taking OECD Countries as a reference, Spain has developed a 
comparative advantage in medium and low intensity products.17
The "technology restriction" has been an important constraint on the process of 
economic growth in Spain. The effects of this constraint have been twofold:
a. - Unlike Korea, the Spanish economy has not been able to develop a 
comparative advantage in high technology products that are usually "strong demand" 
products.18
b. - On the other hand, Spain relied heavily on foreign sources to obtain new 
product and process technologies. The domestic generation of technology has been the
17 See OECD STI (1986), R&D, Invention and Competitiveness, Paris, page 71.
18 This has been studied recently in some depth by C. Martin (1990).
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exception and not the rule. In the sixties, this had substantial implications for the balance 
of payments: any increase in internal or/and foreign demand was followed by an upsurge in 
the imports of capital goods.
Figure 1.1.
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More recently, the implications of this technological dependence have adopted the 
form of slow diffusion of new information technologies and high presence of MNCs. 
Spanish expenditure on R&D has been traditionally one of the lowest in the OECD area, 
quite often below that of countries such as Turkey or Ireland. Despite showing two digit 
growth rates in the eighties, the Spanish gross expenditure on R&D was just 0.72 % of the 
Spanish GDP in 1989. In industrialised countries like France, Germany, the U.K., Japan 
and the USA, that percentage has been consistently well above 2%. The number of R&D 
personnel per thousand labour force in Spain compares to the Portuguese level (2.3 in 
Portugal and 2.8 in Spain in 1986), and is well below the Irish and Italian levels, 4.8 and 5% 
respectively. Such a poor record of technological effort as measured in terms of inputs into
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the R&D process, has its reflection in terms of technological output. During the eighties, 
domestic patent applications have remained practically unchanged, while the number of 
patent applications from foreign sources has multiplied by a factor of three.
Figure 1.2.
But these differences between the technological patterns of Spain and its two main 
frameworks of reference, OECD and EEC countries, are not limited to the quantitative 
measures of technological efforts. Spain shows remarkable differences from those 
countries in qualitative terms too. The sectoral breakdown of the business enterprise R&D 
expenditure can give a good insight of the special characteristics of the Spanish R&D 
effort. Between 1979 and 1987, the sectoral structure of private expenditure in R&D 
changed considerably. Figure 1.1. shows how R&D in services increased remarkably as it 
also did in the transport and the machinery sectors. The importance of the service sector is 
linked to the high weight given to the National Telephone Company and the electrical
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oligopoly which are  included in the definition of this sector. These companies increased 
significantly their R&D expenditure in the eighties. Also included in this sector are 
engineering services that experienced a high increment in R&D spending towards the end 
of the period. Particularly remarkable too is the case of transport, which accounted for 
28% of total business R&D expenditure in 1985. The "motor vehicles" subgroup, where 
almost all the firms are MNCs, was responsible for most of that increase. On the other 
hand, the electrical and chemical related groups lost considerable ground. The increment in 
the machinery group takes places simultaneously in non-electrical machinery and in office 
automation and data processing.
Figures 1.1. and 1.2. compare this sectoral breakdown in Spain with that of the main 
framework of reference for Spanish industry, the European Community. The differences 
are quite remarkable. First of all, the panorama for Europe is almost totally stable, with 
minimal variations over the period considered, while in Spain, R&D expenditure in certain 
subgroups shows ups and downs. Secondly, the European R&D expenditure is much more 
concentrated in manufacturing as opposed to services, about 95%, and reaches maximum 
values in the electrical and chemical subgroups. It is precisely there that the maximum 
increments take place. Finally, unlike what happens in the Spanish case, in Europe as a 
whole, the transport sector maintains its relative importance over time.
If we compare the technological intensity19 of different manufacturing sectors in 
Spain with the average of the OECD, we can confirm the low-tech profile of the Spanish 
economy. In the high technology sectors, only in aerospace does Spain show a similar 
technological intensity to that of its OECD partners. In all the other high-tech sectors, 
Spain has a much lower technological intensity. We have to go down to some low 
technology sectors such as ferrous metals and fabricated metals to find similar R&D 
intensities in Spain and in the OECD. It is worthwhile mentioning that the technological
19 Measured as the percentage of BERD over total output in that sector.
29
intensity of some low technology sectors such as other transport and shipbuilding have 
higher intensities than medium-tech sectors.
Technological Intensity in High, Medium and Low-Tech Sector 
Spain  and  Average OECD
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Figure 13.
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Even in medium-tech sectors, where Spain has a comparative advantage similar to 
the average of the OECD countries, Spain lags behind in technological effort. This is a first 
indication that the Spanish comparative advantage in those sectors is based on imported 
technology. As a matter of fact, this is the most remarkable feature of the Spanish 
technological profile.
Over time, the Spanish technological balance of payments (TBP) has been 
deteriorating constantly. The Spanish TBP deficit has been multiplied by a factor of four in 
the last fifteen years (see figure I.3.). The two main indicators of foreign technological 
dependence, the ratio of technology payments over national BERD and the TBP coverage 
ratio are shown in figure I.4.. The technological dependence index shows a declining trend 
during the period under consideration, and in particular in the last seven years. On the
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contrary, the  TBP coverage ratio remains practically unchanged over the whole period. As 
technological receipts have not increased significantly in the period considered, this pattern 
seems to indicate that the increase in BERD has been, to a certain extent, complementary 
to the importation of foreign technology.
Figure 1.4. also shows the same technological dependence indexes for the Japanese 
case. It is interesting to see how Spain and Japan show very different patterns. The 
Japanese index of technological dependence has been close to zero in the seventies and it 
has started to  increase only in the eighties but keeping very low values. On the contrary, 
the Japanese TBP coverage ratio shows a consistent upward trend between 1974 and 1988.
Studies of the Spanish acquisition of foreign technologies have provided some 
interesting qualitative information. The most interesting observations are  the following:
IndM  of Technological D ependence  
and TB P  Coverage Hello
—  Japan Dee tod. Japan TBP OJL
32
a. - USA, Germany and, to a lesser extent France, obtained most the patents 
granted in Spain to foreign firms. Japan accounted for a minimum in the number of 
patents granted in Spain to foreign firms.20
b. - If we split the technological payments into payments for technological 
assistance and for licenses, we can see that the former have increased their 
importance at the expense of the later. In the eighties, technological assistance 
accounted for approximately 80% of the payments and the other 20% went to 
patents. In 1974 those percentages were 42% and 58% respectively.21
c. - Approximately 60 firms accounted for more than 70% of the technology 
payments in the early eighties. In 1990, the first 60 firms still accounted for 62,34 % 
of the total of technology payments.22
d. - Technology payments are highly concentrated by sectors. In 1984, 22,4% of 
the payments corresponded to motor vehicles. That same year, five sectors 
accumulated more than 55% o f the payments.23
e. - Most of the contractual agreements of technology transfer include a 
combination of bundled services such as licensing of patent or trade mark, technical 
assistance, know-how transfer, etc.24
20 Sec Martín C. and Rodríguez L. (1985) page 71
21 Sec Manín C. and Rodríguez L. (1985) page 86.
22 Sec Sanchez P. (1984). This percentage has declined consistently in the eighties. Sec Puech (1991).
23 Sec Martín C. and Rodríguez L. (1985) page 98.
24 Marlin C. and Rodríguez L. (1984) page 41.
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{.- Licensing contracts indude a fixed fee, in many cases complemented by a 
royalty fee.
g. - Most of the Spanish companies acquiring foreign technology are directly or 
indirectly linked with the foreign firm supplying the technology.
h. - Almost all the companies acquiring technology from abroad (>91%) carry 
out complementary R&D activities in Spain.
Although it is not possible to complement this vision of technological dependence 
with information on other ways of acquiring foreign technology, -i.e. foreign direct 
investment of MNCs and the import of capital goods with incorporated technological 
change25- this condensed technological profile of the Spanish economy suggests the 
following stylized facts which will underlie the modeling throughout this thesis:
1. - Latecomer industrialisation requires foreign sourcing of technology, which 
will need complementary R&D. These are not mutually exclusive activities.
2. - Latecomer industrialisation is based on the exploitation of comparative 
advantages of the developing country, which usually competes in world markets 
through price competition on more or less standardised products.
3. - Licensing of foreign technology, imports of capital goods with embodied 
technological change and diffusion of new technologies are usually parts of the 
same process.
25 All evidence seems to point out that these activities arc often carried out as complements and not as 
substitutes of contractual forms of technology transfer. Consequently, the total picture should not differ 
substantially from the partial one presented here.
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4. - Licensing of foreign technology very often involves other forms of 
contractual transfer of technology.
5. - Licensing contracts usually combine different forms of payments, but they 
almost always involve the payment o f a fixed fee.
I 2 J .  Plan of the thesis.
The thesis is divided into four distinctive parts. The introductory part, chapters I 
and II, are dedicated to the presentation of the objectives and motivation for the thesis, the 
discussion of some methodological issues and to the justification and discussion of the 
realism of the assumptions that will be maintained throughout most of the  following 
chapters. Some empirical evidence from previous studies on issues such as the 
international differences in the prices of factors of production and cost structures is also 
included, thus going beyond the Spanish case that has been at the centre of the discussion 
in this chapter.
The second part of the thesis is dedicated to the study of two major issues 
concerning the licensing of innovations in an international context. Chapter III examines 
the impacts of differences across countries in both production costs and in R&D costs on 
the possibility of ex-ante licensing. In that chapter, some conclusions about the potential 
consequences of these differences for the rate and direction of technological progress are 
drawn.
Chapter IV addresses several questions about the social welfare implications of 
international licensing in an oligopolistic context. It is shown that under certain conditions, 
the number of licenses sold and the price paid for each one of them will be above their 
socially desirable levels for those variables.
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The third part includes chapters V, VI, VII and VIII and deals with the second 
major topic of the dissertation: the relative incentives for the introduction of a process 
innovation in countries with asymmetric cost structures. Chapter V inquires into the 
problem of the inter-relationships between technological change and market structure. 
Taking a simplified version o f a model developed by Vickers (1986) as a benchmark, we 
study different alternative set ups to inquire into the possibility of generalising his 
conclusions. We also analyse what is the influence of the game structure used in these 
kinds of models on their conclusions.
Chapter VI presents a simple game theoretic structure for studying the relative 
incentives that firms which face different production costs will have to adopt new process 
technologies. This analysis is carried out under Bertrand and Cournot-Nash conjectures, 
which allows us to consider the problem of the influence of oligopolistic conditions in the 
downstream markets upon the diffusion process. In this chapter two additional extensions 
are included: the impact of the supplier’s behaviour on the pattern of diffusion and the 
impact o f international trade and policy on the incentives to adopt new technology.
In chapter VII a traditional model of international trade is used to prove that, 
even in that context, the existence of induced effects influencing the direction of 
technological change can transform free trade into a sub-optimal strategy from the point of 
view of dynamic efficiency.
As an appendix to the third part of the thesis, chapter VIII considers very briefly 
the possibility of collusive behaviour between the supplier of a cost-reducing technology 
and one of the two potential adopters of that technology. We consider how the collusive 
behaviour of supplier and user of the technology can delay adoption by the second 
potential adopter (and is the only chapter in the thesis in which ’time’ is the strategic 
variable).
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Finally, chapter IX puts together the main conclusions developed in the thesis with 
some other results already available in the literature tying them up with the policy 
problems presented in the introductory part of the thesis. Here, particular attention is paid 
to the differences between social and private incentives to carry out R&D domestically and 
to license foreign technology. This problem is considered in the context of international 
oligopolistic competition, which introduces new elements for the design of technology 
policy that cannot be considered in the analysis of the closed-economy case.
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Chapter II: Assumptions and Methodological Considerations
II.1. Introduction
Throughout this thesis, a series of basic assumptions have been maintained 
because, in my opinion, they reflect well som e fundamental characteristics defining the 
economic environment surrounding R&D and diffusion phenomena in latecomer 
industrialisation. In this chapter, the suitability of these assumptions to the kind of 
situation described in the previous chapter is discussed in some depth. The degree of 
realism of these assumptions is also assessed. T he two major assumptions can be stated as 
follows:
1. - there are differences in cost conditions across economies, particularly in 
economies with different degrees of technological development, and
2. - there is a common global m arket represented by a "world" demand function.
Differences in the abilities of countries to carry out R&D or to adopt new 
technologies will both be considered as part o f the  different cost conditions. Although this 
assumption will not be discussed in depth here, it is based on the personal conviction that 
production and innovation decisions within the  firm can be separated only for analytical 
purposes. In the real world, the boundaries between both types of activities is becoming 
increasingly blurred, and the traditional "blueprint shops" of our old textbooks, in which 
firms look for the best technology available at any point in time, are no longer in business.
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But apart from these two main assumptions, many o ther decisions had to be taken 
to  define the limits and the framework of reference of this thesis. The first one concerned 
th e  methodological approach to be taken. Except in one case, all the models included here 
a re  a sequence of relatively simple game theoretic situations. The suitability of this 
approach does not need justification, for it is the predominant approach in the literature 
on  industrial organisation and theoretic models of technological change26. The simplicity of 
the  models presented below finds its justification in the fairly complicated situations that 
a re  tackled here. The use of linear demand and cost functions is a direct consequence of 
th e  assumption of asymmetric cost conditions, which are  tractable, without excessive 
complexities, only in examples like those used in the following chapters.
Games involving technology have not been modelled here as timing games. Timing 
games are certainly more suitable for patent races than for the  type of problems that arise 
in the context of technology policy in latecomer industrialisation. These problems are of a 
m ore structural nature, and variables such as the evolution of market structure, the 
influence of the trade regime on the speed of diffusion or the number of licensees 
acquiring a new technology, do not necessarily call for the explicit consideration of time.
Besides these general methodological considerations and a discussion on the main 
two assumptions of the thesis, the last section of this chapter includes a discussion and a 
definition of the boundaries of the thesis.
I I .  1 . A ssu m p t io n  l :  D iff e r e n c e s  in  p r o d u c t io n  c o s t s .-
Despite the often alleged disappearance of the "nation state" and its replacement by 
the "globalisation" of economic activity, there is clear evidence that national borders still 
m atter as determinants of the conditions under which production is carried out. In the
26 See for instance Rcinganum ( 1989).
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models included in this thesis, it is assumed that ’conditions of production’ are  the main 
element differentiating one country from the rest. Even in today’s highly internationalized 
world, production conditions differ widely from one country to another and the present 
trends seem to indicate that the likelihood of narrowing those gaps is low.
These differences in ’conditions of production’ include the following components:
a. - Differences between countries as regards production technologies effectively
used by firms located in each one o f them. Countries do not have access to the 
same technologies under the same conditions. Firstly, countries do not have the 
same technologies available to them because technological knowledge is not a 
free good. As a commodity, technological knowledge is expensive to obtain and 
difficult to trade. Property rights over technological knowledge or simple 
secrecy limit access to technology. But even if all countries could have free 
access to technological knowledge, the ability to use it would remain different 
from country to country. Using new technologies often requires the joint 
utilization of skills, which are not evenly distributed across countries, because 
there are substantial differences in the stock of technological knowledge that 
they have accumulated over time.27
b. - Countries also differ in their availability of natural resources and in their
endowments o f primary factors of production. Factors of production do not 
have the same degree of mobility and this is reflected in production conditions 
in each country. The availability of natural resources that can only be exploited 
on the spot a re  the most obvious and traditional example o f this.
27 See Tccce (1981) for an excellent explanation of these differences.
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c. - Countries also differ in their supply of man-made elements such as
transportation infrastructure, communications, public services, human capital, 
etc. which by their own nature, are country specific. Most of these elements 
have many of the characteristics of a public good, whose benefits can be 
enjoyed only in certain places. These elements cannot be traded because they 
are not mobile at the international level. For this reason, they are crucial as 
determinants of the economic environment of countries. They may be the result 
of specific public policy measures, but they can also result from the 
accumulation over long periods of time of certain patterns of economic 
activities or behaviour. In a recent study, Aschauer (1989) has measured their 
impact on country productivity. The results of this study urge higher awareness 
of the importance of these elem ents as determinants of the ’competitiveness’ of 
countries.28
d. - Public policy interventions in products and factor markets, particularly in the
labour markets, introduce all sorts of distortions in prices. These price 
distortions introduce factor price differentials not just across countries, but also 
across industries within the sam e country.29 Macroeconomic policy measures 
also modify substantially the economic environment for agents as we will see 
further below. But industrial regulations and policies also introduce distortions 
in the local prices of inputs and outputs.
The main consequence that derives from these differences in the economic 
environment of countries is the existence o f substantial cost differences between firms 
operating in different countries. As it was pointed out above, differences exist even when
28 See Aschauer (1989).
29 For an exposition of the traditional literature dealing on this subject sec for instance Chacholiadcs 
(1978) chapter 20.
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countries have similar conditions of access to the same technologies. Different conditions 
of production imply the following asymmetries across countries:
a. - Producers have to pay different prices for the factors of production that they
buy in different countries. Be it because it is not possible to find in the real 
world the conditions that are theoretically required for factor price 
equalisation, or be it because remaining obstacles to trade and/or factor 
mobility do not allow it, the truth of the matter is that factor prices differ widely 
across countries. As we will see below, empirical evidence shows that 
substantial factor price differentials remain even between industrialized 
countries with similar technological capabilities.
b. - Given different factor-price vectors, firms make different choices of production
techniques, even when they face the same production possibility set. As a result, 
the input mix is expected to differ according to the location of productive 
facilities. Therefore, we can expect that the cost structure of similar companies 
producing the same goods will be different across countries. For this reason, the 
adoption of the same new process technology can be expected to produce:
i) different new costs of production for a given output level, as firms face 
different input prices.
ii) different cost reductions in relative terms, as the initial and final cost levels 
are different.
c. - Differences in the 'conditions of production’ will also have an impact on the
incentives that firms located in different countries will have to develop new 
process technologies, that reduce the utilization o f those inputs which are 
relatively more expensive in their respective countries. Despite having a long
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history30 in economic theory, induced innovation seems today relegated to  a 
secondary position in the literature on technological change. The incentives to 
innovate are proportional to the payoffs that firms can derive from innovation, 
but the latter are not independent o f the direction of technological change. This 
is particularly so when one considers the influence of previous sequences of 
technological advances on today’s decisions: the cumulative effect of a series of 
innovations can determine what will be the next one.
Although the issue of induced investment is only specifically included in chapter 
v n i ,  the question of different countries’ preferences over possible alternative 
R&D projects will be a constant theme throughout this thesis.
d.- Finally, different factor prices also influence the R&D process. The generation 
of new technologies should also be considered as a production process itself, 
although not independent from other production activities within the firm. As 
such, all the international differences mentioned in the previous paragraphs 
also affect the R&D process. This results in different production costs of new 
technologies for firms located in different countries. The requirement of very 
specific factors of production for this special production process, makes 
differences in countries’ capabilities to produce new technologies particularly 
large.
The activities of multinational corporations could be viewed as a way of 
reducing those differences. However, authors like Freeman or Lundval agree in 
pointing out that the special inputs needed for the R&D process are country
30 Binswanger and Ruttan (1978) is an excellent milestone in the literature on this subject which has not 
had many high quality follow ups. It is worthwhile noting here that the famous 1962 NBER 1st conference on 
technological change was titled "The Rate and Direction of Innovative Activity". Much of the work that followed 
that conference was centred on the "Rate" of technological change, and very little attention has been paid to  its 
direction. More recently, economic historians such as Paul David and Brian Arthur have stressed this point in their 
study of the choices between alternative technologies.
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specific instead of firm specific. They refer to the existence of ’national systems 
of innovations’ as complex mechanisms involving all sorts of historical, 
institutional, social and educational variables, which are inherent to nations and 
are the ultimate determinants of their technological performance. Pavitt and 
Patel (1990) have recently provided some empirical evidence on this subject.
The discussion of these theoretic questions is beyond the objectives of this 
chapter. As it is usually done in many other similar models, it will be assumed 
here that the cost of developing new technologies is different across countries, 
because both primary inputs as well as specific inputs for the R&D process 
have different prices and are available in different degrees from one country to 
another. Nevertheless, I would like to stress here that very little is known about 
the micro-micro aspects of the R&D process. Important questions such as how 
do differences in the cost of capital for R&D purposes influence the behaviour 
of firms or the internal organization of the R&D departments, deserve much 
more attention in the future. In this regard, our black box is still quite dark. 
However, as we will see in several chapters below, the configuration of the 
R&D production process and the strategic behaviour of suppliers of new 
technology plays a central role, not just in patent races but also in the diffusion 
and licensing on innovations. For that reason, it is difficult to assess the 
acceptability of the assumptions that will be made in the following chapters 
about some supply-side aspects of these processes.
All the elements listed above have been taken into account in the design of the 
models presented in the thesis. In the early stages of this thesis, they were adopted to a 
certain extent as axioms which seemed reasonable and acceptable in view of the discussions 
of these issues existing in the literature reviewed at that time. Fortunately, recent research 
work has provided some supporting empirical evidence. The degree of realism of the first
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one of the two basic assumptions, i.e. the existence of differences in factor prices and in 
cost structures across countries, can therefore be assessed.
II.2.1. Differences in factor prices.
According to traditional trade theory, free trade should guarantee, in the absence of 
significant transportation costs, factor price equalization among trade partners. However, a 
quick look at modem trade theories indicates quite clearly that factor price equalization is 
one of the first "well established results" o f traditional trade theory that crumbles when 
international markets are not perfectly competitive as the Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson 
model predicted.
For instance, when production takes place under increasing returns to scale, 
preferences are equal, and two countries have the same factor structure, the existence of 
differences in the size of the country will imply different market shares for producers in 
each country. In the trading equilibrium, they cannot have the same market shares, for in 
that case the marginal revenue for producers would be the same due to the existence of the 
same factor prices in both countries. But if factor prices were the same, they would 
produce the same quantities of goods in full employment. Therefore, factor price 
equalisation is not possible in this case.31
From a theoretical point of view, there are reasons to believe that, even when 
spatial costs are not important, factors are mobile and "nationalism has not reared its ugly 
head" as Samuelson put it, market imperfections and failures will preclude the existence of 
just "one real wage and one real rent". But let us look at the empirical evidence.
31 In their excellent textbook, Dixit and Norman (1979) show the difficulties for factor price equalisation.
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In the context of the recent debate about the loss of competitiveness of American 
industry, the issue of differences in the real cost o f capital for the American economy vis-a- 
vis countries such as Japan or Germany, has been raised as one of the major factors 
hindering the maintenance of the US industry’s hegemonic position. The recent report of 
the MIT on US Productivity and Competitiveness has highlighted the importance of this 
burden for the US economy. Also in a world in which maintaining technological leadership 
is of crucial importance, international differences in the cost of capital for R&D 
investments are bound to be of upmost importance for global competition.
112. /. /.- The cost o f capital
Recent empirical work by Ando and Auerbach (1988) and particularly McCauley 
and Zimmer (1989) at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, have shown different 
degrees of divergence in international comparisons of the cost of capital for investment 
projects. These studies calculate the cost of capital using different methodological 
approaches. In the case of the very influential study by McCauley and Zimmer (1989), the 
cost of capital for corporations is defined as the ’minimum before-tax real rate of return 
that an investment project must generate in order to pay its financing costs after meeting 
its tax liabilities’. Therefore, these studies take into account not just differences in real 
interest rates across countries, but also variables such as debt/equity ratios, leverage ratios, 
tax structures and fiscal incentives and a long list of other institutional and regulatory 
elements defining the financial environment of firms operating in the countries under 
consideration. In McCauley and Zimmer (1989)32, the following variables enter into the 
definition:
32 This particular paper has been criticized by Marsh P. (1990) on the grounds that it measures the cost of 
equity as the inverse of the price-earnings ratio, hence ignoring the effect of future growth opportunities that seem 
to have played an important factor in the Japanese case in particular. Measuring this and other components of the 
cost of use of capital presents many methodological difficulties that have been sorted out in different ways. For an 
in-depth discussion about these differences in methodology see Poterba (1991). However, we shall retain 
McCauley and Zimmer's results as Potcrba's survey shows these results are not far away from those obtained in
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Nominal interest rates 
Inflation rates.
Financing ratio: Debt/Equity,
Investment tax credits.
Tax redactions on corporate interest payments,
TableILL
EXAMPLES OF ESTIMATED COST OF CAPITAL FOR VARIOUS PROJECTS
Equipment and machinery with physical life of 20 years
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1963 1986 1967 1988
USA 1L2 11.7 112 115 135 115 10.6 113 •11 9.1 102 112
Jap«. 5.9 4.9 74 82 82 85 82 24 23 72 7 72
Germany 7.7 73 75 8.6 82 72 7 72 7.1 6.9 7 7
UK 8.8 10.8 92 12.7 103 10.7 102 »3 9.4 72 82 92
Factory with physical life of 40 years
1977 1978 1979 I960 1901 1962 1963 1964 1963 1966 1987 1988
USA 10 10.4 8.» »3 >2. 12.4 102 122 12.6 »3 9 102
Japan 2.8 42 5.1 62 6.8 6.6 7 63 6.1 52 42 5
Germany 55 55 52 7 72 63 5.4 5.7 55 52 5.4 5.4
UK *.7 95 « 122 7.7 27 82 72 23 81 86 7»
R & D  Project with 10 yrs payoff lag
1977 1978 1979 1900 190. 1962 1983 196« 1983 196« 1967 1988
USA 125 12» 11.9 12.4 S3 124 152 203 20 2 162 182 203
Japm. 3.9 5.7 65 73 8 83 8.7 7.7 92 9.4 8.4 8.7
Germany 13.4 138 13J 152 15.7 187 13.9 14.6 13.9 14.6 13.» 132
UK 18.2 28.4 21.1 33.4 242 295 292 24.4 25.4 12» 20.6 23.7
Expensed item with physical life of 3 years
1977 1978 1979 1900 1901 1962 1983 1984 1983 1966 1987 1988
USA 395 40.6 42.4 433 385 405 393 39.« 39.1 36.7 39.4 404
Japan 35 35.1 35.4 324 321 36 36 35.7 35.6 353 342 34.9
Germany 34.7 34.7 34.7 35.4 33.6 33.1 34.7 342 342 34.6 34.7 342
UK 39.4 40.6 4.4 425 405 40 39.6 38.4 37.7 36.1 37 37.4
t: McCauley and Zimmer (1989)
other studies, and furthermore, this study shows a variety of examples included in table II.1 that is not easy to find 
in other studies.
SI
Depreciation allowances,
Differential growth rates,
Employee retirement payments, and 
Propensities of firms to hold liquid assets.
The results o f this study for several types of projects are presented in table II. 1.. In 
the case of capital goods (machines with 20 years of physical life), the price of capital in the 
USA was approximately double that in Germany in the period under consideration. 
Furthermore, the two European countries do not show a common pattern, with the UK 
approaching the cost in the US, while Japan and Germany have quite similar profiles.
It is interesting to notice how the differences between countries are magnified by 
the cost structure o f the research projects. The low cost of funds gives a greater advantage 
to Japanese and German firms in long term projects.33 Therefore, one can expect that 
investment patterns will be highly sensitive to differences in the cost of capital.
Particularly important for technology policy are the results in McCauley and 
Zimm er (1989) concerning R&D investment. R&D decisions are essentially investment 
decisions. This study shows that for a 10 year pay-off lag R&D project, the required rates 
of return vary widely in the four countries studied. For instance, in 1980 this rate was 
estimated as 7.3% for Japan and 33.4% in the UK: a difference of over 26 points! Given 
the strong penalties for long R&D projects in those countries where the cost of funds is 
high, we can expect that among countries, their preferences for different R&D projects will 
vary according to the payoff lags of those projects. As for the reasons explaining these 
important differences in the cost of financing R&D projects, tax credits for R&D activities, 
that can reach rates as high as 20% of the total investment in Japan, must be added to the 
general reasons listed below.
33 This point was highlighted by the MIT Commission on industrial productivity in their final report.
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Among the causes pointed out by McCauley and Zimmer that account for these
differences in the costs o f capital we find the following:
a) Macroeconomic stability, which makes savers in Japan and Germany willing to accept 
lower returns to their investments due to the lower risk attached to those investments. 
This allows creditors to rely more heavily on short-term loans that can be renewed 
regularly, which results in lower costs of capital as compared to the cost resulting from 
long-term fixed-interest loans.
b) Factors affecting personal savings. Savings ratios are higher in Japan and Germany 
than in the US and the UK. Furthermore, Japanese and German savers get lower 
payments on their savings.
c) Relations between corporations banks and governments. This is a less obvious cause, 
although it might be not less important than any other. This is particularly so in Japan, 
where credit rationing places a heavy burden on credit to consumers and favours 
corporations.
d) The corporate and personal income tax structure does not have an important impact 
upon the final cost o f capital. However, tax credits in Japan and Germany for R&D 
investments reduce significantly the cost of capital for these kinds of purposes.
IL2,12. - The cost o f  labour
Despite its high international mobility, the cost of capital and financial capital in 
particular, still shows remarkable differences between countries. These differences are, to a 
large extent, the consequence of domestic micro and macroeconomic policies, whose 
effects are geographically limited. In the case of a much less internationally mobile factor
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of production such as labour, one should also expect substantial differences in its price 
across countries.
As a matter of fact, that is the case. International differences in nominal and real 
unit labour cost are remarkable, not just when we compare countries with very different 
economic environments. Even when we look at m ore or less homogeneous economic areas 
such as the OECD countries or the European Community, these differences remain 
important. This is one of the conclusions included in a recent report on the process of 
economic convergence in the European Community in the last thirty years34.
Table II.2.
REAL UNIT LABOUR COSTS IN NATIONAL CURRENCY (1972-100)
1975 1978 1981 1989
Belgium 107,4 109,6 111,7 97,7
Denmark 106,0 102,1 101,9 95,8
Germany 103,8 100,4 101,4 92,7
Greece 97.6 1073 113,1 113,4
Spain 102,5 103,4 102,2 87,6
France 107,3 107,0 109,4 98,2
Ireland 108,8 100,1 104,6 88,0
Italy 104,6 1003 1013 96,9
Luxbrg. 118,7 117,8 119,5 108,0
Netherlands 105,6 101,7 99,5 88,8
Portugal 129,7 111,8 110,0 89,1
United Kingdom 110,1 99,6 100,7 97,4
EUR12 1063 102,1 103,1 94,8
Source: Commission of the European Communities.
Table II.2. shows the evolution of real unit labour costs between 1972 and 1989 for 
the 12 member states of the European Community. Table II.3. shows the convergence of 
nominal unit labour costs, in terms of their annual percent change between 1961 and 1990.
34 See European Economy, no. 46, December 1990, pp-149 and ss.
54
Both tables give evidence of the limited impact of the Community policies in achieving a 
more homogeneous economic environment in Europe, at least as far as the labour market 
is concerned. After thirty years of policy coordination, the measures of dispersion in the 
annual percent change of nominal unit labour costs are higher today than in the sixties. It is 
interesting to note how divergence in the evolution of labour costs peaks in periods of 
economic crisis (1975 and 1978-81), while convergence is possible in periods of economic 
bonanza.35
Table II3.
CONVERGENCE OF NOMINAL UNIT LABOUR COSTS IN THE EEC
(Annual percent change)
Weighted Average Dispersion w.r.t.average Dispersion w.r.t. lowest
Eur 12 Eur 7 Eur 12 Eur 7 Eur 12 Eur 7
1961-49 3,9 4.0 2,4 2,0 53 3.6
1970-71 8,7 8,5 2,6 23 7,6 4,6
1972 7,1 63 13 1.4 2,4 2,1
1973 9.3 83 23 2,2 4.6 4.4
1974 163 12,9 43 3,8 8.6 5.6
1975 18,9 12,0 63 53 14,1 9,8
1976-78 10,0 6,2 4,6 2,9 8,8 53
1979-80 12,1 7,6 53 3,6 8,1 4.6
1981 11,6 7.4 53 33 9.8 5,4
1982-85 6,6 4.1 5,0 2,4 8.0 43
1986 43 23 2.7 1.1 4,0 1,7
1987 3,9 23 33 1,7 4,6 23
1988 33 0,6 33 13 5,0 2,1
1989 43 13 43 13 6,4 2,8
Source: European Commission
This evidence suggests that the evolution of unit labour costs in different countries 
is also highly sensitive to policy actions affecting those countries. D espite the coordination
35 This study also shows that convergence in the evolution of labour costs is higher for members of the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism excluding Spain, Italy and the UK (Eur 7).
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of policies in this group of countries, tied to each other by strong economic links, the 
impact of those policies in their respective labour markets produces very different effects 
in terms of direction and magnitude.
II.2.2. Differences in costs structures.
Given these differences in input prices, standard microeconomic theory would 
predict significant international differences in cost structures. In a recent study by the 
Commission of the European Communities, in which data from a data-base of accounting 
information of companies have been used, Laudy (1990) has provided some interesting 
evidence about the cost structure of manufacturing in seven European countries36 and 
Japan.
Table II.4.
COST STRUCTURE OF MANUFACTURING FIRMS IN EUROPE AND JAPAN
(Percentage over total turnover)
M ax Min Mean S.Dev. Range
Purchases of
intermediate inputs 74.5 (Japan) 66,6 (Nether.) 70,8 23 7,9
Pay-roll costs 26,6 (FRG ) 153 (Portugal) 19,8 33 113
Financial costs 4,8 (Portugal) U (FRG) 2.8 1.1 3.6
Capital maintenance 6.6 (Portugal) 3.1 (Japan) 5.0 1.1 33
Taxes 3,4 (Japan) 1.1 (Portugal) 2,1 0,7 23
Results after taxes 4.7 (Nether.) 23 (Japan) 3.7 13 43
Source: Commission of the European Communities
36 Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Portugal, Netherlands and Spain.
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Table II.4. shows that intermediate inputs account for the largest share of the 
turnover of manufacturing companies in all cases, with a mean value of 70.8%. Despite 
their smaller size, it is the significant volatility in the share of pay-roll costs, financial costs 
and the cost for maintaining the working capital, that m atter here.
The dispersion around the mean value in the percentage of turnover accruing to 
labour is particularly high. In that case, the standard deviation is largest and the range of 
values is more than 50% of the mean. Profits after taxes are also very variable, with a range 
of values around the mean far bigger than the m ean. As regards financial costs, the 
standard deviation is also significantly high (more than one third of the mean). The 
dispersion in the cost for maintaining capital is also large.
Table II.5.
COST STRUCTURE OF CHEMICALS INDUSTRY IN EUROPE AND JAPAN
(Percentage over total turnover)
Max Min Mean S.Dev. Range
Purchases of 
intermediate inputs 80,1 (Portugal) 66,9 (Germany) 71,9 4,1 13 3
Pay-roll costs 25,7 (Germany) «3 (Portugal) 16,4 4,9 173
Financial costs 6,4 (Portugal) 03 (FRG ) 23 1,6 5,6
Capita] maintenance 7.5 (Portugal) 33 (Japan) 53 1.1 33
Taxes S3 (Japan) 0,9 (Portugal) 2.9 U 4,4
Results after taxes V (Nether.) 2.7 (Portugal) 5,1 2,4 63
Source: Commission of the European Communities
One might argue that these differences could be the consequence of the different 
industrial structures in those countries: a different sectoral composition of manufacturing 
industry could explain these differences. However, the same study includes data about one
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particular case, the chemicals industry, which show that those differences are even larger 
for this industry, which uses a fairly homogeneous technology in all the  countries under 
consideration. Once again, the data show high volatility in the share of pay-roll costs, 
financial costs, maintenance costs and profits over turnover.
These results are due to the combined effect of different input prices and the 
subsequent input mix choices of firms facing different input price vectors. This study also 
includes some estimates of the relative importance of each one of these effects. The 
analysis included in the study shows that neither one of these effects can be neglected in 
explaining the variability in the cost structure shown above, despite some important 
differences between countries.
I I J .  As s u m p t io n  2 : w o r l d  d em a n d  f u n c t io n .
The second main assumption that will be held throughout the thesis is that of one 
single international market for all the products that are sold by oligopolistic competitors 
located in different countries. In the absence of any barriers to trade and when 
transportation costs are negligible, it will be assumed that any national or domestic market 
is equally accessible to firms operating at home as to firms operating from abroad.
In the first cases of industrialisation such as Great Britain, the  importance of 
internal demand for the sustainability of the process seems to have been more important 
than in the XX1*1 century export-led models of development like Spain, Japan or South 
Korea. But there are some other major reasons for choosing this assumption.
In the recent Technology Economy Programme at the OECD, one of the main 
conclusions included in its final report is the identification and characterisation of a new 
phase in the process of internationalisation of economic activities, a concept now often
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referred to as "globalisation* or "global competition". This term describes a "set of 
conditions in which an increasing fraction of value and wealth are produced and distributed 
world-wide within a system of interlinking private networks*37.
This new stage in the process of internationalisation of economic activity presents 
some characteristics that differentiate it from previous stages. Among the main new 
characteristics o f this stage are the following:
1. - As a result of several decades of internationalisation of economic activities, 
this new stage in the process is characterised by the formation of highly 
concentrated international supply structures. As the OECD TEP background 
report indicates "the erosion of earlier well entrenched domestic oligopolies has led 
in some instances to clearly recognisable forms of international or world oligopoly 
with quasi-cartel features. But in most industries, somewhat more complex supply 
structures involving quite strong forms of rivalry and competition prevail today.*38
2. - A second major feature of globalisation is the important role of technology 
in driving international competition. In world-wide competition, technology plays a 
central role. The development of new products and processes is a key element to 
achieve privileged positions in markets throughout the world. But technology also 
determines, to a large extent, the framework for new forms of competition and 
organizational structures of economic activities. The high pace of technological 
change is dramatically shortening the life cycle of new products. Furthermore, the 
development of these news products requires increasingly higher sunk costs of 
research and development. Finally, new information technologies allow new forms 
of internal organisation of the firms and their activities throughout the world.
37 OECD (1990a), Chapter 9, p.l.
38 OECD (1990a) chapter 9, page 19.
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These are the coordinates of new forms of market structure that, according to 
some, define the third main element of globalisation.
3.- In the Tokyo and Paris conferences of the TEP, there was an important 
discussion about the emergence of a new term, techno-globalism. This concept 
designates a new form of industrial organisation in which an enterprise establishes 
a full range o f operations at a world-wide scale, ranging from R&D to sales, which 
results in the loss of national identity of corporations.
From my own personal point of view, techno-globalism is as yet only a 
tendency, and, as it is suggested in the OECD (1990) TEP report, we risk here 
going faster in the definition of new concepts than the real world is realising them. 
However, one cannot ignore the emergence of new organisational forms, half way 
between the traditional hierarchical structure of corporations and the market 
organisation of economic activities. Particularly interesting is the necessity often 
expressed by firms of having access to new technologies or larger markets, which is 
driving them to expand the geographical scope of their activities. Strategic alliances 
with other companies who have those technological assets or who might be 
interested in marketing other firms’ products offer an excellent opportunity to 
achieve global scope without having to increase the internal dimensions of firms 
through internal or external growth. The development of this new form of co­
operation between firms will certainly modify competitive conditions in world 
markets and its economic consequences will have to be carefully analysed. But this 
is not the place to engage in a debate on the many interesting problems that these 
new developments pose to competition policy or to public policy toward MNCs.
This new framework for competition certainly does not apply in the same way and 
with the same intensity to all markets and nations. Not all commodities are internationally 
traded to the same degree and, not all nations’ economies are internationally open to the
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same extent. However, this global framework is the most relevant for the objectives of this 
research for two main reasons:
a.- Firstly, globalisation and more generally, the internationalization of 
economic activities, affects high technology industries most intensively. The table 
below shows measurements of internationalisation of some high-tech sectors in 
OECD countries between 1970 and 1985 and the average for manufacturing 
industry. As we can see, international trade has grown in these high technology 
sectors above the average growth rate o f manufacturing industry.
Table II.6.
MEASUREMENTS O F TRADE VOLUME IN OECD COUNTRIES IN 
SELECTED SECTORS (1970-1985)
1970 1978 1982 1985
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
382 Non-electrical machinery 17.4 20.2 22.7 27.2 253 28.7 28.5 273
383 Electrical Machinery 11.8 12.4 18.7 19.0 20.7 19.6 223 19.0
384 Transport Equipment 16.6 18.8 22.8 24.2 • 27.1 27.9 273 25.4
3 - Manufacturing 12.4 12.2 16.5 16.1 17.9 173 19.5 17.0
1 -  Import penetration ratio
2 -  Export Performance
Source: OECD Production and Trade Compatible database.
The importance of high-tech sectors in international trade, runs in parallel with 
their importance in foreign direct investment. A recent study by the Statistical 
Office of the European Communities39 has stressed the importance of industrial
39 See Spanncut (1990).
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sectors such as electronics and electrical equipment, alongside services, as a major 
component of intra-EEC FDI and FDI between Japan, the USA and the EEC.
b.- Latecomer industrialisation is heavily dependent on foreign markets, where 
competition must be faced from developed and industrialising countries.
In some cases, as in electronics in South Korea, the developing country 
protects its domestic market from foreign competition in the targeted sector. This 
might shed some doubt on the realism of the assuming just one single world 
demand function. However, it is usually the case that, as in the example mentioned 
above, domestic markets account for a minimum percentage of domestic 
production40, and the real battleground for economic success of these kinds of 
industrial policies are the export markets.
In some other cases, like Spain or Ireland, their economies are integrated in 
common markets, where despite some regional or national differences, competition 
is open in an international sense.
H.4.- Boundaries to the study.
As it is often the case, in the course of this research some decisions had to be made 
to define the limits of its contents. This section spells out those limits and discusses very 
briefly some of the reasons behind our decisions.
H.4.I.- Process innovation versus product innovation.
All the models included in the thesis are centred on process innovations, i.e. "new 
or significantly improved production methods involving changes of equipment or
40 As late as in 1988, the domestic market for the electronics industry in Korea accounted only for 37% of 
total production. Sec Houlder. V. T h e  Giddy Years have gone for the Electronics Industry”, Financial Times, 
November 16, 1990.
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production organisations or both, intended to produce new or improved products which 
cannot be produced using conventional plants or production methods, or essentially 
increasing the production efficiency of existing products’*41.
The emphasis is placed here on the possibility offered by technological change to 
reduce production costs instead of introducing new products. This is so for the following 
reasons:
a. - It has often been recognised in the literature that process innovation is a 
more general assumption than product innovation, although some of the 
characteristics of the latter can sometimes be modelled as process innovations (for 
instance improvements in the quality of already existing products), even if this is 
not always the case.
b. - A recent study by Kraft (1987) has provided empirical evidence of how 
process innovations are linked to product innovations. This research has proved the 
existence of a recursive model, in which product innovation leads to process 
innovation. However, the reverse implication cannot be proved. Therefore, this 
evidence seems to confirms that process innovation is a more general case.
c. - As we noted above, latecomer industrialisation in the case of Spain has 
relied heavily on the supply of traditional goods and services at lower prices. For 
this reason we think that, at least for this particular case, this is the most suitable 
assumption.
41 OECD (1990b) page 25.
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II.4.2.- M arket relationships: Multinational corporations as vehicles of technological 
change, Joint ventures, international technological cooperation and strategic alliances-
A large percentage of international diffusion of technological change takes place as 
the result of the activities of MNCs. However, this topic has been kept outside the 
boundaries of this study. The emphasis has been put here on the influence of market 
structure and market failures on the process of technological development of countries. 
The technological activities of MNCs are closely related to issues such as the internal 
organisation of corporations or their international strategy. Therefore, these technological 
activities are  not directly influenced by market conditions, and hence they fall outside the 
scope of our analysis. The importance of these activities in the technological development 
of countries is unquestionable, but their nature is essentially different from that of the 
phenomena considered in this research.
Furthermore, the nature of the public policy problems that these types of activities 
pose to policy makers are substantially different from those that arise in a world where 
there are no problems of ’identity’ relative to the nationality of the firm. The high flexibility 
of operations that multinational corporations have make pbsolete many of the traditional 
policy instruments available to policy makers in the past. For instance, the argument for 
public intervention to promote R&D spending that is based on the important differences 
between social and private returns to innovation becomes less consistent from a political 
point of view, if the beneficiary of public support is a multinational corporation that will 
spread the social benefits of innovation beyond national borders. The main question that 
arises in this context is who should be the subject of public policy intervention.42 But again, 
these kinds o f  questions are not of a different nature to those considered here, and for that 
reason they will remain outside the scope of the thesis.
42 See Reich (1990) for an interesting presentation of the questions involved in this issue.
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As it was mentioned before, new ways of acquiring foreign technology or 
developing innovations in a cooperative way, have experienced an important upsurge in the 
recent past. These have taken different forms, from bilateral strategic alliances between 
companies to publicly supported R&D programmes like Sematech in the USA or Esprit in 
Europe. On this subject, it is important to distinguish between:
1. - cooperative efforts that are pushed forward by national public authorities 
like the Eureka initiative or by international organisations like th'i ESPRIT 
programme, and
2. - R&D cooperative efforts that are the result of inter-firm agreements 
without any institutional framework supporting them.
In the second case, it is obvious that this is a situation similar to that of the 
technological activities of MNCs. Once again, we find that these activities take place 
outside the market environment, as they usually respond to the strategic needs of the 
corporations. Furthermore, the number of companies from technologically less developed 
countries involved in these kinds o f  operations is comparatively small.
In the case of international cooperative R&D programmes, the situation is quite 
different. The Spanish experience in the European R&D programmes has shown how 
difficult it is to reconcile the interest of the countries entering these agreements as 
partners, as these countries have very different technological needs and very different 
technological capabilities. For the  time being, these programmes reflect mostly the 
preferences and technological demands of countries at the technological frontier, which are 
involved in global competition with rivals of similar characteristics. Up to now, it is possible 
to claim that these programmes have not evolved to suit the needs of technologically less 
developed countries. Designing cooperative games involving not just ex-ante but also ex-
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post cooperation between the parts involved in the programmes is an interesting agenda 
for research, but these problems are of a different nature to the ones discussed here below.
In the following chapters a sequence of self-contained theoretical models based on 
the above assumptions is presented, with the objective of sheding some light on some of 
the questions that have been raised in these two introductory chapters. In order to preserve 
continuity throughout the thesis, the "down-to-earth" matters that have been discussed in 
these first two chapters will be left aside. These theoretic models are  based on the 
assumptions discussed in this chapter. The connection between these applied and policy 
matters and the results obtained from the models that follow will be established in the last 
chapter. The conclusions included in it should be the basis for the design of technology 
policy guide-lines.
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Chapter III: International Licensing Versus Domestic R&D and the Rate and
D ir e c t io n  o f  T e c h n o l o g ic a l  C h a n g e
I I I . l .  I n t r o d u c t io n .
Licensing is one of the most important means of international transmission of 
new technologies. Mansfield et al. (1979) estimate that the U.S. revenue from R&D would 
fall by one third if international licensing of technology were not permitted. But beyond its 
importance, for both the exporter and the importer, licensing is a peculiar way of 
international diffusion of technology, with very specific characteristics. These peculiarities 
and characteristics have an impact not only on the rate of international diffusion of 
technology but also on the incentives to develop new technologies. All these circumstances 
require a special treatment of this subject in this thesis.
New models of licensing have recently been developed by Katz and Shapiro 
(1985), Gallini and Winter (1985), Kamien and Tauman (1986). Shapiro (1985) offers a 
very good survey of these new developments. The results cover the design of optimal 
licensing contracts and the study of some information problems that arise in this context. 
Of particular importance for the subject of this thesis are some findings that relate to the 
frequency of licensing contracts and their effects on licensing incentives, or "ex-ante" effects 
as they are known in the literature.
Katz and Shapiro (1985) have concluded that if two part tariff licensing contracts 
(with a fixed fee and a per unit royalty rate) are possible, it will always be in the interest of
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both parties to reach licensing deals. Even when that is not possible and monitoring 
problems impede the utilization of per unit royalty fees, licensing agreements will be 
reached under certain demand elasticity conditions and when the innovations are relatively 
small.
However, these results are obtained for closed economy frameworks which do 
not capture the special circumstances that arise in international markets. Nevertheless, 
they seem to point out to a higher frequency of licensing in the international context than 
within domestic markets. As a matter of fact, there is empirical evidence supporting that 
hypothesis.43 The existence of transport costs and barriers to trade have been traditional 
arguments used to explain the high frequency of international licensing of technology.44 
One of the aims of this chapter is to try to identify some reasons for licensing of a strategic 
nature, as those pointed out by Shapiro (1985), but which are  specific to the conditions 
prevailing in the international context.
Gallini (1984) and Gallini and Winter (1985), have stressed the effects of 
licensing on development incentives. They have suggested that the possibility of licensing 
can be used by a firm in a patent race to deter a rival’s  R&D activity. These authors and 
Katz and Shapiro (1985) also suggest that the prospective benefits that the licensee would 
obtain from licensing could become a factor discouraging firms from trying to win a patent 
race.
In the legal literature on the international transfer o f technology, some authors 
have pointed out that patents hinder the international transmission of innovations. On the 
other hand, some of these new analytical models suggest that the existence of patents 
(which after all, make licensing possible) is a condition favouring the transmission on new
43 See Caves et al. (1983), Taylor and Silbcrston (1973) and Oppcnheim and Scoit(1970).
44 Sec Sahal (1982).
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technical advances. This point is confirmed in one of our models below, but the question 
that arises then does not refer to the rate of transmission of technical knowledge, but to the 
nature and characteristics of the innovations that are generated and transmitted in that 
context.
This part of the thesis consists of two basic models which are an attempt to study 
international licensing from two different perspectives. The first one is based on earlier 
models by M.T.Flaherty (1980) and Gallini (1984), and stresses the importance of 
differences in factor prices in the process of generation of new process technologies in 
countries with asymmetric levels of technological skills. The model in the next chapter is 
based on Arrow (1962) and Kamien and Tauman (1984).
Both models are expansions of a simple duopoly game in a final good industry, 
for which a new process innovation is discovered. In both of them, the existence of a 
previous game in R&D and the possibility of licensing the result of the R&D process 
introduce certain types of asymmetries in the otherwise symmetric Cournot-Nash game on 
the final good market.
III-2 . A  M o d e l  o f  l ic e n s in g  v s . d o m e s t ic  g e n e r a t io n  o f  R & D .
Let us assume two firms located in different countries, each of them producing a 
homogeneous final good that will be sold in an international market, without any kind of 
transportation costs. As each firm buys its inputs in a different national market, the input 
prices that they face will be different. This implies that the average cost of producing one 
unit of the final good, (which will be assumed to be constant for each firm), may be 
different from one country to another, even when both firms are using the same 
technology.
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Firms and countries will differ in the relative "level of scientific and 
technological development" of their research and development laboratories. This 
difference will be reflected in the different costs of developing the same new process 
technology in each country. This "level of scientific and technological development" is like a 
public intermediate good. Whenever a firm in one country undertakes a R&D project, it 
generates an externality because it will be contributing to increase the "level of 
technological development " in that country, but the effect of this increment on its own 
R&D costs for the next periods will be negligible.45
The new process technologies will be internally generated by the firms producing 
the final good, i.e. the sector is vertically integrated in that direction, and there is no 
possibility of entry in the R&D sector by any third firm. Thus, a firm can acquire new 
technology either by developing it on its own or by buying a license to use a new technology 
developed by its competitor.
A new process technology will be characterized by a shift of the isoquants 
toward the origin. As firms face different factor prices in each country, a certain new 
technology will not produce the same average cost reduction in both countries. This 
implies that, if there is no market for the technology, i.e. each firm is going to use a 
technology developed on its own, the R&D projects undertaken by firms in each country 
will not necessarily be the same. Each firm will try to reduce its production costs by saving 
in the utilization of inputs that are relatively more expensive in its own country. Obviously, 
this effort will be constrained by the physical and technical conditions of production in the 
R&D sector.
45 The difference in the technology level between two countries or “technology gap" as it is usually known, 
can make reference to two different things or, sometimes to both of them simultaneously. We can say that there is 
a technology gap between two countries whenever the technology used by the firms in one country is more 
advanced than the technology used by their competitors abroad, in the sense that the first firm can produce more 
sophisticated products or a certain product at a lower cost. However, some authors refer to the technology gap 
between countries whenever the stock of technology available to the firms in each country is not the same. Here, 
we shall say that the technology gap persists even in those cases where firms in both countries are using the same 
technology, but their ability to develop new technologies is not the same.
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In order to eliminate the influence of this kind of technical conditions, some 
type of "neutrality" will be introduced in the production of new technologies. We shall 
assume that for one firm, the cost of producing a new technology resulting in average cost 
combinations (cj,C2 ) for firms 1 and 2, that keep a constant Euclidian distance from the 
original average cost combination, (k1,k2), will be constant. In other words, if we define as 
ri = ri(cI*c2) total R&D cost function for firm i of producing a new technology that, 
given the initial average cost combination (k1,k2), will result in average costs (cj.t^), we 
shall assume that.
Assumption 1.- For all ( c , , ^  such that q  ^  k, , cj ^  k2 and 11 (k i.^ H ^ ,« ^ )  11 -  s°, 
then, r^Ci,^)®^0 , where s° and rj° are constants. Furthermore, we shall assume that 
(ÔTj/ÎCj) < 0 and (PrJ6c?) > 0  for ij  -  1,2.
Under assumption 1, the two duopolists will never pursue the same R&D 
project. Furthermore, patents are useful here as long as they can be sold to trade 
technological knowledge, i.e. patents are a pre-condition for licensing as they confer a 
property right to their holder, who can trade it in the market-place. In this model, the 
ownership of a patent right will not impede the rival firm from reducing its costs of 
production. As Arthur (1987) has suggested, at any point of time, there are multiple 
possible paths for research. If a firm obtains a patent for a new process to produce more 
cheaply a final good under certain conditions (input prices), a rival located in a different 
country and facing different market conditions, could look for a new process technology in 
a different direction. In that case, the patent awarded to the first producer would not 
protect him against a competitor who has reduced his production costs.46 Only if one firm
46 Of course, one could think of one firm undertaking all the possible R&D projects and deterring entry in 
the R&D sector by patenting all the possible new processes in all the future periods, but it is plausible to assume 
that, if the range of prospective innovations is large enough, the cost on doing this would be prohibitive.
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chooses to reduce its costs by acquiring a license from its rival, will that patent have any 
utility for the patentee.
We shall also assume that firm 1 has an initial technological lead over firm 2 
that is reflected in a cost advantage in production and another cost advantage in the 
generation of technological knowledge.
Assumption 2.- At the initial stage, firm 1 uses u technology and faces input prices allowing 
it to have lower initial average costs of production, i.e. ki < k2 , and,
Assumption 3.- The R&D costs of developing the same technology producing average costs 
(C|0,C20), will be lower for firm 1 than for firm 2; i.e. ri(ci°,C2°) ^  r2 (cl°>c20)-
Assumption 3 is justified on the grounds of the existence of a "technology gap" 
between the two countries, whose nature was discussed in chapter two. In this chapter, the 
different initial average costs introduced by assumption 2 could be due to: a) differences in 
the technology used by the two firms, or b) different input prices faced by the firms when 
the technology is the same.
The game will be formulated in the following way. There will be two periods of 
time only. At the beginning of the first period of time, both firms have to decide how much 
output they are going to produce during this period and what will be the technology that 
they will have available to use at the beginning of the second period of time.47
The technology game that both firms will play at time zero will be the following. 
The firm operating in the technologically advanced country -that we will identify as firm 1 
operating in country 1- will offer a license of a certain new technology that it will develop
47 In order to avoid discounting, we shall consider that the cost of a new technology will be accounted for in 
the period in which that technology will be used.
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during period 1 to  firm 2. This announcement will not entail any kind of pre-commitment 
by firm 1. Firm 2, can  then either to accept the offer or to reject it and develop a different 
new technology, in which case firm 1 will develop a different R&D project to be used only 
by itself. Finally, bo th  firms will choose a certain output level to produce and compete in a 
Coumot-Nash fashion in the final good market. Perfectness of the equilibrium will thus 
require Nash equilibria of all the sub-games.
F ig u r e  III .l.
Figure 111.1.
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The game in the final good market will be a standard Cournot-Nash duopoly 
game in which quantities are the strategic variables. Each i^-firm will fix its level of 
output, Xj, to maximize
(1) -  l P(XiJtj*) - Cil *i for i “ / - j -  1.2
where p(Xj,Xj) is the inverse demand function, c; is the constant average cost of producing 
the final good for firm  i, and Xj* is the output level for firm j that maximizes profits for firm
j-
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The solution for (1) will be characterized as a function of the average cost 
parameters, Cj and Cj, and can be written as follows,
(2) » ' ■ ( C j i j )  -  x '(»1'(c„c2) j i2‘ (Ci.C2)] -  lp ( X |V 2')  -  C|) i , ‘
(2 ') -  l^ i|* (c„ C 2)ji*(c ,iC2)] -  [p(x,\i2‘ ) - C j  x2‘
In the R&D game, firms will try to maximize their total profits, net of the results 
in the research sector. Each firm will have perfect information on the solutions to its rival’s 
optimization problem, so that they will know if  it is in their own interest to do R&D or to 
pay for a license.
In the R&D game, the technologically more advanced firm (firm 1), will offer a 
license to firm 2 to use a new technology developed by firm 1. This technology would imply 
constant marginal costs of production of Cj’ when used in country 1 and when used by 
firm 2 in country 2. Firm 1 will also set a lump sum royalty fee, 4, that firm 2 will have to 
pay for the right to use the patent held by firm  1. Therefore, firm 1 will offer to firm 2 a 
license contract that will consist of a vector (C |’, c w h i c h  summarizes the conditions of 
the licensing contract. The optimal contract must maximize profits for firm 1 and hence, 
the vector (c j\ C2 ’, <£) would be the solution to  the following problem,
(3) max V,' » »‘(Ci.^) - r ,(<:,,<*) + * 
C1,C2>^  > 0
s.t. Cj ^  kj and C2  £  k2
However, this solution must satisfy two additional constraints to solve the two 
stage game. Firstly, firm 1 will face the following constraint when setting the fee.
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(«> v 2’ - * a v 2*
a  *
1. e. the license fee is bounded from above by the difference in profits that firm 2 would 
make under licensing and under the alternative to accepting the contract. Thus, equation
(3) can be simplified as,
(3') max V,’ .  - r,(c1\c2') a x^q.C j) - + r ^ c / .o , -)
c ,’. <*• > 0
s.t. c, <. k, and C2  £  k2
If the licensing solution is achieved with average cost combination (cj’,©2’)» firm 
2 would be making the following profits,
(4) V2* -
Finally, licensing will occur if and only if it is Pareto superior to the independent 
development of the innovation by each competitor.
However, if firms find it more profitable to undertake individual R&D projects, 
the final solution will be the result of the following Coumot-Nash gam e where the (c ,,^ )  
levels resulting from a certain innovation will be the strategies open to the  firms,
(5) firm 1 max Vj* = x*(Cj,«^) - ri(ci,C2>
C|,C2 > 0
s.t. c, ^  kj and 0 2 £  k2
(6) and firm 2 max V2* = x ^ c ,,^ )  - r^Cj.c^
c\>c2 > 0
s.t. C( £  k] and £  k2
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with the following final solution for the industry
(7) (C|\C2*) = [min{c1(5),c1(6)},min{C2<5),c2(6>}]
where (c1(5),c2^ )  and (c1<6),c2W) are the solutions of (5) and (6) above.
Figure III.2.
It is important to note that only if rj() is a separable function, will the solution to 
these problems imply no cost reduction for the rival firm. Only in this case, can we assure 
thatc^5) = V-2  and c,(6> = kj.
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Figure III.2. shows the extensive form of the game.
The solution to the previous could imply the choice of certain cost combinations 
that would make the duopolistic market structure unsustainable. In order to avoid 
unnecessary complications, we shall assume that the solution to the R&D game will never 
imply a drastic innovation, in the sense that the duopolistic market structure will persist 
after this game is played, irrespective o f whether licensing happens or not. This will 
require the introduction of the following assumption,
Assumption 4.- The cost of firm j producing an innovation that results in a cost 
combination (c~i,c~2) such that xi(c~1,c~2 ) < 0  or p(c~|,c”2) < c ~i is high enough as to 
imply,
v j’ -  »*(<}> - < 0
where *j(Cj) are monopoly profits for firm j.
I I I .2 .I .-  T h e  c a s e  o f  "per fe c t l y  d if f e r e n t " c o u n t r ie s .-
The existence of differentiated input markets implies that the process 
innovation will not produce the same cost savings in the two countries. The difference in 
benefits that a certain innovation will bring to the two firms will depend on the nature of 
the innovation and on the degree of dissimilarity between the two countries. In principle, a 
new process technology could imply some positive cost savings in both countries. However, 
it is possible to conceive of situations in which the existence of innovations does not reduce 
production costs when applied in one country, while bringing positive cost savings in the 
other country. This could happen if there are factors of production that are not mobile 
between countries but specific to each one of them. A new technology that induces the 
substitution of a more expensive input for a cheaper one which is country-specific, would 
produce this result. Although this might be an unlikely possibility, it simplifies the analysis
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considerably. Another possible case that would bring us close to  this situation would be an 
innovation of the third, and often forgotten type, suggested by Schumpeter alongside with 
process and product innovations: an organizational innovation.
A more realistic approach with a more restricted feasible set will be studied in 
the next section of this chapter, where the results obtained in this section are generalised.
In order to obtain explicit solutions to the problems formulated in the last 
section, assumption 1 will be replaced with.
3. Thus, the cost function will be a section o f an elliptic paraboloid of the kind portrayed in 
figure III.3. The constant’m’ captures the steepness of increase in the R&D costs as we 
depart from the original average cost combination, (kt,k2). Parameters a and b indicate 
the speed of increase in the R&D cost as we move away from (k,,k2) in any direction in the 
(cb°l) plane. Hence, assuming that a > b implies that the cost of developing a certain 
innovation producing a cost combination (c^c^), will be higher in country 2 than in country 
1, such as assumption 3 states.
Note that this function is separable in the cost reduction variables. Therefore, if
each firm decides to undertake its own R&D project and there is no licensing, each firm 
will choose an R&D project that would not reduce costs in the o ther country. Only when
The cost function in the R&D sector will be
(8) r\{cx,o£) = (m/a2) [(c,-k,)2 + (c2-k2)2] for firm 1 and
(8’) r2(c,,C2 ) = (m/b2) [(c1-k1)2 + (c2-k2)2] for firm 2
with Ci ^  ki, C2  £  k2 and a > b where a, b and m are positive constants.
This is just a special case of assumption 1 and already incorporates assumption
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licensing occurs, one of the firms may be interested in reducing the production costs of its 
rival. This is due to the separability of the rj() functions. Technologies and cost conditions 
are assumed different in each country to the point that a new technology reducing c^  does 
not have to imply a lower Cj. The R&D costs of firm i will raise if it spends money in 
reducing c j . Only if firm i gets some revenue from the sale of the license to firm j, the 
optimal R&D project for firm i will reduce firm’s j costs.
The introduction of assumption 1’ transforms (3’) into, 
,  (Cr k,)2 + (C2-k2)2
(3”) max V j’ = (q .c ^  - m --------------------------+ <t>
cl >c2  > 0 a2
s.t. C] £  kt, C2 £  k2 and
+ r j t q ’.c / )  a  *
and (5) and (6) into
Solving (3”) with the second constraint as binding, we get the following first 
order conditions,
» l '( c l'.C2')  • 2 (m /a 2) (c , '.  k ,)  + i 2,(c1,^ 2')  -  0 
- 2 (m /a 2) (cj'* k2) » ^ ( c f . c j ’) -  0
which can be written as
(9) C,’ -  k, + m  ( t 1|(c1’,c2’) + ]
C2 =  k2 +  Ml [  T ^ C j ’.Cj ’)  +  ^ ( C j ’.Cz’)  ] •
with hi = a2 /  2m and x'j the partial derivative of iH with respect to 
First order conditions for (5’) and (6’) will be
» l1 - 2 (m/a2) (c, - k,) -  0
- 2 (m /al) (cj - kj) - 0
a 22 - 2 (m/b2)(c 2-k*) = 0
- 2 (m /b2) (c, - k ,) - 0
giving the following Cournot-Nash equilibrium for the non-licensing case.
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(10) Cl* -  k, + Ml » 'l i c T - O
C2* =  k2 +  M2 « S f a * « * * )
with M2  = b2 /  2m and mi as defined above.
As expected, when there is no licensing, if the two countries are "perfectly 
different", neither firm will choose a research project that could reduce the costs of its rival 
whenever it has access to the new technology. Therefore, we can conclude that the 
solutions to problems (3") and (5) and (6) will be given by the following proposition,
Proposition 1.- Under assumptions 1* to 4, the solution to the R&D and licensing games 
defined by (3"), (5) and (6) will be given by,
«T -  ki + (*lI » 'lfC iW ) + »Vci'.C î’) 1
<=2 -  k2 + )i| [ » ‘îlcr.Cî') + r22(‘ l'.c2 ) ]
and
c,* -  k, +  m i » W . O
c2* =  k 2  +  M2 t 22 (c 1*’C2*)
It is interesting to note already the similarity between the solutions to the two 
problems. For instance it is interesting to notice that, for firm 2, the difference between 
the licensing solution and the R&D solution will be a function of the difference in R&D 
costs captured by the terms a and b or Mi- If the R&D costs in country 2 grow much faster 
than in country 1 as we depart from ( k )^ ) ,  the licensing solution will be more biassed in 
favour of reducing production costs in country 1.
The particular cost structure introduced by assumption 1’ allows us to 
differentiate very clearly between the effects on the solution values of q, of differences in 
initial cost conditions captured by the k’s and differences in R&D abilities and costs in the 
two countries.
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III-2-1-1-- Nash equilibria Tor the entire game: existence, uniqueness and characterization.
From (9) and (10) we can construct functions Fj
(11) Cj’= Fj(ci\c 2 ’)  for ¡=1,2 and.
Cj*= Fj (c,*,C2*) for i - 1,2
0 2) F(c, \ c2*) -  (Fjicj’.Cj’i.F^Ci’.t^’)).
P ( c iW )  “ (Fi(c r .c2*).F2(C|*,c2*)).
Assumption 4 guarantees the persistence of the duopolistic structure, i.e., it 
restricts the values of (c/.c**) and (cj’.c^) within a feasible sets [c 'j.k j] x [ c '^ k j  where 
c~j are the critical values of Cj’ or Cj* that make output values in the solution equal to zero,
i.e. xj’ = 0 and Xj* = 0. Hence, functions Fj and F will be continuous under the usual 
assumptions of continuity and differentiability of the demand function.
The set defining the two feasible sets of our two problems, the Cartesian product 
[c~j,ki]x[c~2,k2], is a compact convex set by construction. Thus, Brouwer’s Fixed Point 
Theorem guarantees the existence of a solution for (12), and consequently for (9) and (10).
Finally, the solutions to the optimisation problems defined by (3"), (5) and (6) 
will be global if and only if the objective functions V’,. V*j and V*2 are strictly concave for 
the relevant values o f (cj,^). In that case, we can ensure that the equilibria for both types 
of solutions will be unique.
1112.12.- Analysis of results: Differences in R&D efforts between the two countries.
A simple look at (10) is not enough to know which firm will make a larger R&D 
effort when both firms develop their own technologies independently. The difference in 
R&D effort will be given by,
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(13) (k2-C2) - (ki-Ci) -  - M2 *^2 + Ml »*1
The value of this difference will depend on the relative values of v'y These 
values will turn out to be very important in our subsequent analysis. They indicate the 
change in the profits made by the firm in the final good market induced by a change in 
average costs to the firms. From equation (1) and making use of the first order conditions 
of that problem, we have,
(14) *i, = [p’a&Ci/ec,) * (Sxj/iCi)) - 1) X, + (&,/&)) [p - c j
-  [p '(« y & ))- ']* i + (a«!/*,) [p ♦ p v  c,) -
-  lp '(*s/fc()- 1 ]* (S 0
(15) -  [p'((Sx,/&)) + (tez/iCj)) - 1]X| + (5xj/Scj) [p - c j
-  t P '^ / * ) )  - 1) l | + (iXi/fcj) IP ♦ P»t - =.1 *
*  [p’(*ys<)) - lJXi a  o iff p ' s  S^/Sx,
Now, assuming that the demand for the final product is linear, we can show that 
the RHS of equation (13) will usually be negative. In fact, from (14) we have that
**i ■ Ip ’/ 3 -1) *i*
Having a greater effort in country 2 would imply that
(k2 - C2)  > (kt - c,) iff ^2X2* > p,x,* or 
O 6) (M2/M1) > (*lV*2*)
but hi > H2  by assumption, i.e. having a larger R&D effort in country 2 will require a 
reversal in the order of technological development in both countries, and still this will not 
be sufficient to ensure (16).
86
Figure III.4.
A normal solution to (10) is illustrated by figure III.4. Firm 1 produces an 
innovation that results in average production costs (cj'.k^, with research and development 
costs of rj*. indicated by the isocost curve Rj*. Meanwhile, firm 2 will produce an 
innovation resulting in unit costs of production (kj,C2*) of at a cost r2* indicated by isocost 
curve R2*. In the final good market, firms will face the average cost vector (Cj*,C2*).
Finally, we should bear in mind that the existence of the restrictions imposed by 
assumption 4 and the requirement that Cj kj will imply that under certain values for the 
parameters of our model, only one solution to the problem (either licensing or domestic 
development) will prevail. In those cases the next sections would become irrelevant. 
However, whenever the parameters allow for both types of solutions, we should examine 
whether one of the strategies will be dominant over the other. This is the purpose of the 
next section.
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III.2.1.3. Analysis of results: Dominance of strategies and sub-game Nash perfect 
equilibrium.
The question here is to determine whether licensing or developing technologies 
domestically will always be the solution to the overall game. In other words, we will check 
if there are any incentives for any player to deviate from one of these possible outcomes.
These two outcomes imply different types of solutions in terms of the role 
played by each player in the overall game: if licensing dominates, firm 1 will play a 
leadership role in the overall game while if firms develop their own technologies, both 
firms enter the R&D game as Nash players. Thus, it is not easy to make a direct 
comparison of both solutions. However, that comparison can be made in an indirect way.
Following Katz and Shapiro (1985), licensing will be the choice in the R&D 
game if it produces an outcome that is Pareto superior to the non-licensing choice. In 
other words, if by licensing the innovation, firm 1 can increase its profits without reducing 
the profits made by firm 2 in the R&D game, licensing will be the final outcome of the 
R&D game. Hence, if we can prove that by setting a license fee that is equal to the R&D 
costs incurred by firm 2 in the non-licensing solution, firm 1 can produce the non-licensing 
cost combination and still increase its profits without reducing the profits made by firm 2, 
licensing will be a dominant strategy in the R&D game.
According to the definitions given above, licensing will be a dominant strategy if
(17) V1’ (c1*,c2*) + V2* (c,*,^*) > Vj* (C!*,^*) + V2* (c,*,C2 *) or
(IT) Vj’CqV) > Vt*(c,V)
because V2’ (qVfe*) -  V2* (cj’.Cj*).
But (17’) is equivalent to
on '2(k|.C2*) "  r2(c l*.<=2*) > 0
Note that if a ^  b, i.e. if firm one is at least as technologically developed as firm 
2, in the sense that it can produce any new technology at an equal or lower cost than firm 2, 
firm one will be the technological "leader".
Thus, the average cost vector that maximizes profits in the non-licensing choice, 
can be produced in a more efficient way by firm 1 with a subsequent license of the patent 
for the new innovation to firm 2. As total revenue in the final good market will be the 
same no matter how the cost combination (cj*,C2 *) has been produced, total profits m ade 
under licensing will be greater for at least one firm without reducing total profits for the 
other, if the cost combination (c/.cj*) is produced with licensing.
This result is just a consequence of the existence of economies of scope that one 
firm enjoys in the production of technology, and it is independent of the initial technology 
gap between the initial average costs of the firms. Therefore, the following proposition will 
always hold,
Proposition 2.- Under assumptions T to 4, licensing by means of a license fee will be a 
Pareto superior to the independent development of R&D in each country.
This dominance of the licensing outcome will also ensure the existence of sub­
game perfect Nash equilibrium, provided that the Cournot games in quantities played 
downstream have a solution. Given that the entire game has a Nash equilibrium as it was 
shown above, if we look at figure III.2. we can confirm that every sub-game has a Nash 
equilibrium and neither player has any incentive to move away from the licensing solution.
Only under very special circumstances that are presented in the annex to this 
chapter, the players would be indifferent between licensing and the independent
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development of the innovation. But as it is shown in the annex, that will happen only if 
both solutions produce the same cost reductions, and under the strong asymmetries 
introduced in the model, that would be an unlikely outcome.
III.2.1.4.- Analysis of results: the rate and direction of technological progress in the 
licensing solution.
From a welfare point of view, it is important to know what are the social 
consequences that licensing imposes on both countries. In that sense, it is also important 
to know what will be the fee charged on firm 2 for the acquisition of the new technology, 
and what will be the relative cost reduction that this new technology will bring about.
For that purpose, we will have to compare the equilibrium values of the 
solutions to (9) and (10), i.e., C|’ against Ci* and o£ against o f .  This difference will be,
(18) k, - c,’ - k, + cj* = cj* - c,’ = n [ ¿ l i e f  fix*) - x11(c1,,C2 ’)  - x2i(c1,,c2’)] 
and,
(18’) k2-C2’-k2+C2* = o f  - C2 ’= n  [t22(c,*,C2*) - *^2(c,\c2’) - x ^ c , ’, ^ ’)]
The sign of the differences between the values of the endogenous variables c,* 
and c / will depend on the sign of the terms in brackets above. Using (14) and (15) we can 
establish that
(19) cf-Ci < 0 (>0) if and only if x 'jic,*,^*) - x ^ c , ’, ^ ’) - x2i(C|’,c2’)] < 0 (>0) 
or
6x2* 5x ,’
Ip ’ ------ { e f f i x * )  - l)x,* - [p’ ------(c ,’,C2 ’) - 1)X2’-
5c, 5c,
5x 2’
- ip ’ — i j *r  < o (> o)
5c,
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(20) c2*-c2> < 0 (>0) if and only if («SfaVfe*) * - » 12(ci’.<^ ’)l < 0 (>0)
or
5x j*  6x2’
Ip ' --------(ci*,c2*) - i]*2‘  - [p'--------(ci’.cj-) -  i(x,'-
SC2 icj
Sx,'
- I p - ----- (<V.C2)- t]x2' < 0 (>0)
In these two expressions, two terms are negative and only one is positive.48 
Little can be said about the their absolute value, and consequently, the sign of these two 
equations will be uncertain in principle. However, we can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3.-Under assumptions 1’ to 4, and if the objective functions are strictly 
concave, the licensing game will produce a process innovation that will result in smaller 
cost reductions in both countries than those that the R&D game would produce, only if the 
two countries have similar R&D capabilities ( i.e. a is close to b). If the two countries are 
very different as regards their ability to carry out R&D, the licensing strategy will produce 
higher cost levels for country 1 but lower cost levels for country 2 than the R&D solution.
Proof.-
Substituting the solution to the R&D game, (cj*, C2*) in the first order 
conditions o f the licensing game as defined in (9) we get
( J V ,  /S c , )  -  » 1i (ci’,c2*)-2 (m /a2) (c ,* -k ,)  + i* ,(c ,*^*)
(S V , /  5 c j  -  - 2 (m /a2) (cj* - k2) + -  0
But from the first order conditions to the R&D game we know that
48 The Xj * terms are considered as negative while the T {j terms are considered as positive. These are the 
normal signs for these terms under ’normal demand conditions’. There are some possible but unlikely 
circumstances in which these terms are different. Sec Seadc (1980) or Dixit (1984) for a detailed discussion o f this.
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ci* ■  k i + in «^ (c iV fc*) and 
C2* = k2 + M2 *S(C|*«2*)
In the second equation the same would happen if a = b. But in the more 
general case in which a > b, if we add and subtract at the same time (2m /  b2) (c£  - k2), we 
get
» 2* ( c i W )  ♦  (®2* - k2> ( (2m /  b2) * (2m  /  a2)]
As X2 1 (ci*,C2*) > 0 and a > b by assumption, this expression will be positive if
and only if
»21 (cl'.C2') > (<!2*-k2) [ ( 2 i i i / a 2) - ( 2 in /b 2)] 
and that will be the case when the difference between a and b is not very large.
Finally, total differentiation of Vj’ at the Coumot-Nash solution gives, after 
substitution of the first order conditions,
d v l ■ * 2l  (cl*»®2*) <*92 + l  («2* * k2) [ (2m /  b2) - (2m  /  a2)] + *2i (Ci #,c2*) ] dcj 
This expression is positive unless
* 1  + '2 1 ( c iV )  * 2  * [(k2 - <=2*) [ (2m /  b2) • (2m /  a2)]] dcj
Hence as we move away from (cI*,c2*) , the value of the objective function Vj’ 
grows if we increase Cj and simultaneously, in case of relatively similar values for the 
parameters a and b. However, if a and b are very different, Vj’ will increase in the 
neighbourhood of (ci*,^*) if we take dc1 > 0 and dc^ < 0.
This result applies to local comparisons of the two solutions. To generalise it to 
all the possible values of (ct, it is sufficient to ensure that the solutions to the two
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problems defined in (3"), (5) and (6) are unique. But, that will be ensured by the 
assumption of strict concavity of the objective functions V’j, V*i and V*2 . 49
■
Thus, we can conclude that, whenever both licensing and developing technology 
domestically are feasible solutions, licensing will be a dominant strategy if both firms have 
different abilities in the production of technology, but the rate and direction of the 
technological change produced will be different under licensing than under autonomous 
development of technology. The sign of this difference will depend on the relative ability 
of two countries to carry out R&D, i.e. the values of the parameters a and b. If the two 
countries are more or less equally able to conduct R&D, the possibility of international 
licensing will slow down the rate of technological development. However, if there is an 
important difference between a and b and R&D costs are relatively important as compared 
to production costs, i.e. m is big the licensing equilibrium would imply a higher production 
cost in country 1 and a lower production cost in country 2, as compared to the outcome 
resulting from autonomous R&D in each country.
An economic reading of these results can be.obtained from equations (19) and
(20). These equations establish that, if there is licensing the cost reduction in country 1 
will be a direct function of the variation in industry profits resulting from it. If there is 
autonomous R&D, cost reduction in country 1 will be just a direct function of the variation 
in its own profits resulting from a lower production cost. However, in country 2 there is an 
additional factor: the difference in countries’ ability to carry out R&D counts and we can 
get a higher cost reduction for country under autonomous R&D than under licensing. This 
will be the case when the difference between a and b and m are big enough as to 
compensate to country 1 for the loss in profits resulting from providing a technology to a 
competitor more advanced than the technology that it could develop on its own. In this
49 See Takayama (1985), chapter 1, section C.
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case, the income than country 1 gets from carrying out R&D for a competitor compensates 
country 1 from the losses that it makes from facing a more efficient competitor. To a 
certain extent, one can say that in this case, the firm in country 1 specializes in doing R&D 
instead of manufacturing the final good.
These results are related to those obtained by Gallini (1984) and, particularly, 
Gallini and Winter (1985). This last paper analyzes the implications that the possibility of 
licensing has on firms incentives to carry out R&D. In a similar duopolistic framework, it 
is proved that the availability of licensing encourages research when the firms’ initial 
production technologies are close in costs and discourages research when initial costs are 
asymmetric.
However, in this model, the differences in countries abilities to carry out R&D 
have been emphasised. We have seen that these differences in scientific and technological 
development are important to determine the rate and direction of technological change. If 
they are large and R&D costs are relatively high as compared to production costs, we can 
find a certain type of specialization in the most advanced country in the production of 
technology.
III.2 .2 . G e n e r a l iz a t io n  t o  n o n -p e r f e c t l y  d if f e r e n t  c o u n t r ie s .
The results of the previous section can be expanded to allow for more or less 
similar countries. We shall maintain the difference in the level of technological 
development between both countries, but the feasible set of average cost combinations 
produced by technological change will be restricted. Thus, now we shall assume that, 
despite the differences in factor prices between countries, any R&D project will result in 
positive cost savings when applied in each country, although these cost savings will be of 
different order o f magnitude in each country.
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For that purpose we shall assume that there exist two frontier lines that represent 
the limit R&D projects for each firm. These lines will be
(2 1 ) C2  = k2  - Sjkj + SjCj and
(2 2 ) C2 = k2  - S2IC1 + S2C1 with Sj < S2
The interpretation of these lines is as follows. For instance, (21) gives us the 
limit R&D project for firm 1 in the sense that this is the R&D project producing a 
maximum cost reduction in country 1 for a given cost reduction in country 2 .
The introduction of this new assumption will modify equations (3) to (7) above. 
The most interesting change will take place in the non-licensing solution. In that case, (5) 
and (6 ) will become now,
(5”) firm 1 max V,*= *x(cx,c£  - (m /a2) [(c, - k, ) 2  + (cj - k2)2]
c,.C2 > 0
s.t. cx ^  kj and C2  ^  k2 
and C2  ^  k2  - Sjkj + SjCj
<=2 a  k2 »2k l ♦  Vl
and
(6 ") firm 2 max V2’ = »*(<:,.Cj) - (m/W) [(Cl - k , ) 2  + (Cj - k2)2] 
cl>c2 > »
s.t. cj <. k, and ^  k2 
and C2  ^  k2  - s,k j + SjCj 
C2 2  k2 ■ J2k, + S2C,
It is easy to see from these expressions that proposition 2 about the dominance 
of the licensing strategy would be maintained, as well as proposition 3 about the rate and 
direction of technological change. However, the introduction of these new boundary values
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for the production costs resulting from the innovation may pose difficulties for the 
existence o f a solution to the two problems. As a matter o f fact, the C2  lines defined in (21) 
and (22) reduce the set of feasible solutions. Therefore, all these results remain intact, 
subject to the existence of a feasible solution to both problems. However, if one of the 
constraints defined by (21) and (22) becomes binding, these results might not hold. This 
possibility will increase as the constraints reduce the size of the feasible set or, in other 
words, as the two countries become more similar to one another.
I I I J .  C o n clu sion s
In this chapter we have seen that, in an international context in which firms and 
countries d iffer not only in their initial production costs but also in their respective degree 
of technological development, the possibility of ex-ante licensing will discourage the less 
developed country from carrying out domestic R&D. The existence of economies of scope 
in the production of innovations will make the licensing solution preferable to domestic 
R&D in both countries, since both countries can benefit from the higher efficiency of 
country in the production of new technologies.
In comparison with previous results in Gallini (1984) or Katz and Shapiro
(1985), the licensing solution will prevail under a broader set of circumstances if the two 
competitors a re  located in different countries. This result would be confirmed by the 
higher frequency of licensing across borders than within local markets.
The strong dominance of the licensing solution and the consequences that this 
conclusion implies for the direction of technological change, should be taken into 
consideration in the discussion about the choice of the appropriate technology. Some 
authors like Francis Stewart (1982) have emphasised this point as an important one for 
technology policy in less developed countries.
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The implications of licensing for the rate and direction of technological change 
are very important. In this model, we have examined the influence of differences in the 
degree of technological development between countries on the rate and direction of 
technological change. Completing the work of Gallini and Winter (1985) commented upon 
above, we have seen that, in a duopolistic context, licensing will speed up innovation when 
production costs are similar for the two firms [Gallini and Winter], But if the two firms 
have similar cost structures in the production of new innovations, the possibility of 
licensing will tend to slow down technological change. Only if differences in R&D costs are 
significant, do we find that the licensing solution will speed up technological change in the 
less developed country as compared to  the rate of innovation resulting from the domestic 
development of new technology in that country. In that case, one country becomes 
"specialized" in the production of technology, because the income that it would get from the 
fixed fee paid by the other country would compensate for the losses that supplying a more 
advanced technology to a competitor would produce.
In this framework, public policy intervention may be justified because the social 
and private costs and benefits of producing technological change will not be independent of 
the way in which that technology has been produced. Profits to the domestic firm in the 
less developed country will be almost the  same with both solutions. However, the social 
cost of technology will be higher if it is acquired through licensing because all the positive 
externalities generated by doing domestic R&D will be lost. This will be particularly 
important in a dynamic context, in which the accumulation of R&D skills over time can 
reduce the future costs of carrying out R&D autonomously. In the developed country, 
private profits will be increased with licensing, but social benefits will not be increased by 
the same amount if licensing reduces the rate of technological change, because less positive 
externalities will be generated. But the welfare aspects of international licensing will be the 
central topic of the next chapter.
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chapter III: Appendix
Proposition 2 is subject to one limitation: it is possible that the dominance of the 
licensing strategy is just weak under certain circumstances. W e have to remember that 
(cl’>c2>) 's the solution to (9) and this implies that,
V ite r * » 1) ♦  v 2'(c i ’.c2’)  *  V ,' (C,‘ ,C2*) + V2' (c ,* ^ !* )  >
> V,* (c,•,<*•) + V2‘ ( c , V )
This inequality will hold as an equality if Cj’ = c,* and o ,’ = . As we already
saw before, if there are no R&D cost differences and a = b, i.e. /*, “ M2  = M» the solutions 
to (9) and (10) above will be the same
a.) if x 12  = ir2i = 0 , we will have that (c, *,<>>*) = ( c j* ^ ’), and the first inequality 
above will be an equality. Using (15), this would happen in the very special case 
when,
6x2’ fix,’
P’ ----- (Cl'.&s’) -  P '-------- (c /.c /)  = 1
SC,
b) if i 'i ( c , ,,c2') + »2 ,(0 , ’.Cj') -  r ' l  (c,*,C2*) and ^ ' ( c , ' ^ ' )  + w2Hcl\c1’) -  i 22 
(C1 *,C2*). In general, we cannot give any precise characterisation of these situations, 
but in the case of linear demand functions, it is possible to solve the expressions 
above. Then, those conditions become
(6/9) (Z - 3c,* + 2 C2 *] -  (6/9) (Z - 3c,* + 2 c2*] -(4/9) [Z - 302 + 2c,1
and
(6/9) [Z - 3cj- + 2c,-] .  (6/9) [Z - 3cj' + 2c,1 -(4/9) [Z - 3c,’ + 2cj']
where Z  is the  intersection of the demand function with the Y axis. This can be rewritten as
2Z  = 9c|* - 3ci’ + 2 c /  - 6C2* and
2 Z  = 9cj* - 3c2* + 2 c /  - 6c,*
As in that case c,’ = c,* and = C2* , the expressions above can be
simplified into
2Z = 6cj - 4c2 
2Z -  6C2  - 4c ,
which solves for oj = Z  /  5 and c, = 7Z /  15.
Looking at expressions (19) and (20) above we can get an economic 
interpretation of this result. Note that the directions of the inequalities will depend on the 
variation of industry profits and company profits as costs are reduced. In the simplest case 
of the two, the  cost reduction will be bigger for country one in the licensing equilibrium 
than in the R&D equilibrium, if lowering firm l ’s costs increases the profits of that firm 
more than the total profits of the industry. The same applies to country 2 if a and b  are 
close enough to each other. However, if country 1 has a relatively high technological level 
as compared to  country 2, a low value for C2* can be expected in the R&D equilibrium. In 
that case, country 1 can increase its profits by selling to country 2  a better technology than 
it could have developed by itself. This would happen only if that technological difference is 
big enough as to compensate the effect of > 0 , i.e. the adverse effect on its own profits 
of reducing its rival’s costs.
Therefore, we can conclude that when demand functions are linear, the 
functions jr'j (<:,’,Cj) + ^ ¡(c ,’,« ’^) and t ', (c ,\c 2*) only intercept once over the [c ,,^ ]  
plane along the straight line defined by the multiples of oi = Z /  5 and c, = 7Z /  15. For 
any value of c , and below that line, the absolute value of *■', (c,*,C2 *) will be greater that 
the value of »*, (Cj’.Cj’) + *jj(e1’,c2’)-
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These two very special cases would not come up as the solution to our problems, 
as they depend on very special parametric conditions. We would normally expect to 
observe cases in which Cj’= /=  Cj* and <>i = / =C2 *- The direction that these inequalities will 
take under different circumstances is important to know. For instance, if Cj’ > Cj* and > 
C2*, this would imply that licensing will be a ’progressive’ alternative, in the sense that the 
gains obtained from the economies o f scope that licensing permits to obtain will be applied 
to the achievement of further cost reductions. However, if Cj* < Cj* and o£ < o f ,  licensing 
would slow down the rate of cost reduction in both countries.
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Chapter IV: The Impact of the International Licensing of Process Innovations on
Domestic Social Welfare.
IV. 1. Introduction .
The previous chapter has dealt with several positive issues that arise in the context 
of international licensing. This chapter considers some welfare implications of 
international licensing.
In recent years, Gallini and Winter (1985), Katz and Shapiro (1985 and 1986), 
Kamien and Tauman (1984 and 1986), and Ireland (1988), have tackled some of the 
interesting problems that arise in this particular form of ex-post and arms-length 
cooperation between companies. Although Sahal (1982) among others, made important 
contributions to understand the magnitude, characteristics, varieties and direct economic 
consequences of this phenomenon, the above mentioned authors were among the first in 
presenting economic analyses of licensing in strategic environments.
These contributions have modified substantially the economic understanding of 
licensing that was derived from earlier work in International Economics. In some cases, 
these contributions have disclosed some interesting forms of strategic behaviour (Gallini 
and Winter (1985)). In other cases, they have clarified the economic effects of different 
forms of licensing (Kamien and Tauman (1986) and Ireland (1988)) and other studies have 
highlighted different aspects of optimal behaviour when there is the possibility of licensing 
(Katz and Shapiro (1985) and (1986)).
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Nevertheless, despite the importance of those findings, little has been done to 
insert this new approach into the international context. The relatively marginal attention 
paid to the welfare impact of the licensing of new technologies in this strand of the 
literature could in part explain this fact. But in international licensing, the existence of 
transfer payments as fixed fees or royalties to the foreign patent holder must be deducted 
from social welfare to calculate the welfare impact of the license, and this fact requires 
specific consideration.
The unquestionable importance of aspects such as those mentioned earlier in 
international licensing and the quantitative importance of this phenomenon in 
international economic relations,50 both call for more research efforts in this direction.
This chapter addresses some basic matters concerning the welfare impact of the 
international licensing of a new process innovation by a foreign patent holder to a domestic 
group of oligopolistic producers of a certain final good. Its main objective is the 
identification of the potential market failures that might appear in such a market structure. 
This should be the prior step in the definition of any kind of policy recommendation on this 
matter. It will be shown that, in these kinds of market conditions and if the number of 
oligopolistic firms is relatively large, the private market equilibrium implies a number of 
licenses sold and a price paid for each license which is above the socially optimal 
equilibrium. This result is a consequence of the difference between the public and private 
incentives to buy licences. It seems to contradict the intuition suggesting that the more 
licenses that are bought the higher domestic welfare will be, as these will lower the costs of 
our domestic firms. However, this intuition disregards the fact that the willingness to buy 
the license depends on the number of firms in the industry. The model presented here 
suggests that the higher this number is, the higher will be the rivalry between firms to get
50 OECD’s Science and Technology Indicators Department estimate that 1987, 13 major OECD countries 
obtained receipts from the sale of technology that amounted 41bn US S.
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the license because the opportunity cost of not having the patent increases. Rivalry 
between oligopolists raises the price o f  the fixed fee above the socially optimum price.
The model also shows that, according to what has been suggested in the traditional 
literature on licensing, at least under certain conditions, the net contribution of the license 
to the social welfare of the country may turn out to be negative.
This work relies direct and substantially on earlier work by Kamien and Tauman 
( 1984a,b and 1986) and Ireland (1988), but also indirectly on some ideas suggested by 
Quirmbach (1986) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). The former two papers focus on the 
market outcomes of licensing games where a patent holder sells a license either in an open 
market at a price that is optimal for him or by using an auction mechanism. They both 
provide clear-cut results in terms of number of licenses sold, prices, revenues for the  patent 
holder, etc. The model presented in this chapter, is based on a model developed by 
Kamien and Tauman (1984b and 1986). The indirect link existing between our work and 
Quirmbach (1986) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) stems from the nature of the market 
failure that we identify here, which has some resemblance to the ones presented in those 
papers, although in their cases, this kind of market failure appears in contexts where there 
is no licensing.
IV.2. International licensing of a non-drastic innovation by means of a fixed fee 
only: the non-drastic innovation.
This model is an extension of that of Kamien and Tauman (1984b and 1986). The 
model features a game in three stages between a foreign patent holder who wants to 
license a patent for a process innovation and domestic firms operating in an oligopolistic 
market for a given final good where Cournot conjectures are assumed. In the first stage of 
the game, the patent holder announces a fixed fee, r, that will be the price that firms will
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have to pay for the right to use the patent. In the second stage, the oligopolistic 
competitors react simultaneously and decide whether or not to buy the license. Finally, 
domestic firms play a Cournot game in the market for the final good and realize their 
payoffs. In this kind of game, the patent holder enjoys a "leader" position as he can take 
the reaction functions of the oligopolistic firms as constraints for the profit maximization 
problem that he faces in chosing his optimal strategy, r. The strategies for the oligopolistic 
firms are their decisions on acquiring the new technology or not.
In this model it will be assumed that the patent holder does not use his patent to 
produce the final output and compete with the existing oligopolists in their domestic 
market as an exporter. This possibility exists and the conditions under which the patent 
holder would start selling in the domestic market are described in Kamien and Tauman
(1986). But introducing it in the model would complicate the calculations without adding 
significant insights to the kind of effects which are described here. Therefore, this 
possibility will be ruled out by assuming a prohibitive tariff on the imports of the final good.
As is usual in these models, the need to parameterize results requires the use of a 
particular example. It will be assumed that all firms have the same cost function prior to 
the sale of the license. Firms buying the license will have a positive reduction of V  in their 
previous constant average costs of production "c". For the time being, we will assume that 
the innovation is not drastic in Arrow’s sense. There are n firms in the industry facing a 
linear demand function of the form 
n
p = a - E q j , where p is the price for the homogeneous final good, and q: is the output of 
i-1
the i-th firm.
Each one o f the k firms buying the license will make profits equal to
»i = Qi (P - c + «) - r for i= l,2,3,...k or i e S, where S is the set of firms
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buying the license. Meanwhile, each firm not buying the patent will make profits given by, 
“ 9j (P *c ) for j ■ k+  l,...n, or j e S', i.e. the complementary set o f S.
Total profits to the licensor will be,
»pH -  k  r
1V2.1. The market outcome.
Kamien and Tauman (1984b) have solved the market outcome for this kind of 
situation. As one might expect, the final result depends on:
1- the total number of firms in the  industry, n, and
2- the final number of licenses sold, k.
Although the number of licenses sold is an endogenous variable, the final market 
equilibrium also depends on k, because when this number is relatively high, firms not 
buying the license leave the market for the final good, hence introducing a discontinuity in 
the payoff functions. In this sense, although the size of e "per se" does not make the 
innovation "drastic" as defined by Arrow (1962),51 the number of licenses sold can have 
that effect on the equilibrium of the industry. Thus, for k ^  (a-c)/e, only firms buying the 
license will produce a positive output, while for k :£ (a-c)/e, both types of firms produce 
positive outputs. Therefore, a new discontinuity is introduced in the reaction function 
faced by the patent holder.52 For this reason, from now on, the analysis will be carried out 
for each one of the intervals defined by the k>< (a-c)/e partition of the non-negative 
subset of the real line. Henceforth, they will be called cases A and B. In order to
51 According to Arrow (1962), an innovation is drastic if it reduces the average cost of production below 
the market price previous to the introduction of the innovation.
52 See Kamicn and Tauman (1984a).
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distinguish between these cases and Arrow’s definition of drastic innovation, the following 
definition is introduced,
Definition.- An innovation will be drastic in the Kamien-Tauman sense if the number of 
licenses sold and the absolute reduction in production costs th at the innovation produces 
drive the market price below the average production cost of the  firms that did not buy the 
license.
Case A.
If the number of licenses sold is k £  [(a-c)/t] -1,. then a firm will buy the license if 
the price that it has to pay for it is below or equal to the profits that it will make from 
acquiring the patent, i.e. firm i will buy iff
0 )  r  :£ x,<k,n) - Tj(k-l.n) i e S, j e S°
where Xj(k,n) are Cournot profits that firm i makes when it is one of the k firms buying the 
license and Tj(k-l,n) are profits made by the firm when it does not buy the license and k-1 
firms do. For a non-licensee, the situation would be, firm i does n ot buy the license iff
(2) r ^  X j( k +  l,n) - xj(k,n) i e S, j e Sc
With linear demand and cost functions, the general solution for Cournot profits is 
xi -  [a - (n+ l)Cj + nCjJ2 /  (n + l)2
and substituting into (1) we get the inverse demand function that the patent holder faces 
when all firms keep on producing after the licensing process is over:
(3) rP = ne [2(a-c) + (n-2k+2)e] /  (n + l)2
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This is the inverse of the private demand function for the license that oligopolists 
will present in a non-regulated market for the new technology. According to the allocation 
procedure suggested by Kamien and Tauman and reproduced here, the patent holder will 
take this as a reaction function and will supply a number of licenses kP that maximizes his 
revenues. That number will be given by the tangent line between the patent holder’s iso- 
profit curve and the reaction function in (3). From the definition of the patent holder’s 
profits and (3), it is easy to see that this will happen when,
(a-c) (n+2)
(4) kP -  ------- + --------
2t 4
However, this is just the characterization of the internal solution and com er 
solutions will be important here. First, we have one comer solution when the total number 
of firms in the industry is smaller than this interior solution, kP = n 53. On the other hand, 
as the value of k is bounded by (a-c)/e, this will be another possible corner solution.
Case B.
If the total number o f licenses sold is k i  (a-c)/«, only firms buying the license 
make positive profits. Therefore, the decision rule depends on the comparison between 
the price of the license and the profits made by each one of the firms producing a positive 
output, because the alternative of not buying the patent implies making zero profits. In 
other words, a firm will buy the license if and only if 
a -c  + c
r £  (----------------- )2
k + 1
Notice that this reaction function faced by the patent holder now yields the 
following payoff function,
* p „  =  k i a - c  + i J V C k + l ) 2
53 In other words, in this case (¿xpH /5k)>0 in the optimum.
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which is a decreasing function of k. This can be explained by the fact that the patent holder 
is now facing an inelastic demand function for his licenses. As k = (a-c)/e belongs to the 
feasible set for this maximization problem, (as a matter of fact, it is the lower bound of the 
feasible set), it will be the solution to our problem. Hence we can conclude that,
Proposition 1 (Kamien and TaumanV The market solution for the licensing game 
described above will be given by kP, where 
Case A: if k ^  (a-c)/e
(a-c) (n + 2) 
2c 4
when n £  2 [[(a-c)/e] +1] /  3
when 2 ( ( ( a -c ) /c |+ l |/3  si n £  2 [[(a-c)/c]-l]
and,
Case B: if k > (a-c)/c kP -  (a-c)/c
Proof.- (See Kamien and Tauman (1986) annex).
Figure IV. 1. shows the relationship between the total number of firms in the 
industry, the  number of licenses sold and the demand function and equilibria values in the 
market for licenses.
110

IV22. The social optimum.
In order to be able to evaluate the performance of this market for the new 
technology, let us assume now that the foreign patent holder will not be directly facing an 
oligopolistic industry but instead, a social planner that will buy the licenses from the patent 
holder and will distribute them later among firms in the oligopolistic user-industry.54 
However, the basic mechanism of license allocation presented in the previous section will 
be maintained here. We will still assume that the patent holder quotes a profit maximizing 
fixed fee taking into account the reaction function of the social planner, and given that fee, 
the latter will then decide the number of licenses to be bought so as to maximize domestic 
social welfare. The standard measure of social welfare, industry profits plus consumer 
surplus, will be used.
In this section the social-planner’s demand function for patents will be derived first, 
and then, equilibrium values in the market for the new technology will be found.
(V2.2.1.-------- Jhe social demand for licenses.
First, let us start by defining the domestic social welfare functions gross of the cost 
of licenses for the case in which the innovation is drastic in the Kamien-Tauman sense and 
then for the case in which it is not.
Lemma 1.
In a market with n firms, where k firms produce at constant unit costs (c-i) and (n- 
k) firms produce each with an average production cost c, social welfare, W, before 
subtracting the cost of the licenses, is equal to
54 The way these licenses are distributed later is not important here. We can assume that they are freely 
available to firms in the industry and the purchase is financed through an income tax.
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Case A:
n(a-c)*(n + 2)+2(a-c)ki-kV [(a-c) + (n-k +1 )i]«k
(5) w  -------------------------------------------------------+ ___ _ ______ ______
2(n+l)* n+ l
if q, > 0 and ^  > 0, and 
Case B:
if qj > 0 and = 0
k (k+2) (a-c+e)*
(5’) --- ------------------------------------
2(k+ 1)*
where is the output of each one of the n-k firms and q, is the output of each one of the k 
firms using the new technology.
Proof.
Case A.- If q^O,
w  “  0/2)(a-p) [kpl + (n-k)qs] + (p-c)(n-k) qs + (p-c+e) kq, - kr =
= (1/2) [(a + p - 2c) (n-k) % + (a + p-2c+2e) kq,] - kr =
= (1/2) (a+p-2c) [(q|-qs)k + n q j  + « k q ,-k r  ;
substituting the general Cournot solutions for qs, q, and p,
q, = (a-c+[n-k+l]e)/(n+l) ; qj = (a-c-k«)/(n+1) ; p = (a-ke + n c )/(n + 1) 
we get the result above.
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a + p - 2c + 2«
W = ([a-c]/2) k qj +(p-c+i) kqj - k r = -------------------------k q,
2
and given that q] = (a-c+c)/(k+ 1) and p = a - kqj, the result above can be obtained by 
simple substitution.
l
Note that the welfare function defined by (5) is increasing and concave in k for any 
k :£ (a-c)/e. Indeed,
dW(k) 1 1
--------- ----------------  (2(a-c)«-2ki*] + ------  [(a-c)< + (n-2k +!)<*]
d k  2 (n+ 1) n+1
which is positive under this condition, i.e. if the innovation is not drastic in the Kamien- 
Tauman sense, and
d*W -2** -2<*
-------- = -----------------  + -----------  < o
dk1 2(n + 1)* n+1
If the number of licenses sold is such that only those with a license remain 
operative, i.e. if the innovation is drastic in the Kamien-Tauman sense, the social welfare 
function depends just on k, the number of operating licensees .
Now we can calculate the socially optimal number of licenses that the planner 
would be willing to buy for each fee fixed by the patent holder. This will give us the inverse 
demand function faced by the patent holder as the reaction function that he will have to 
use as a constraint in his profit maximization problem. This inverse social demand for 
licenses will be given by the maximum willingness to pay for each license bought by the 
social planner, as measured by the difference in social welfare which will be obtained when 
a different number of licenses is sold.
Case B.- If = 0,
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Given the fixed fee, the social planner will demand a number of licenses that 
maximizes the social welfare functions defined above. In other words, the social planner 
will buy licenses as long as k^(a-c)/«  and W(k) - W (k-l) ^  r, and will not buy a number 
of licenses for which W(k) - W (k-l) > r. Hence, for a given r, the socially-optimal number 
of licenses will be ks, such that W(ks) - W(ks-1) = r if ks^ (a -c )/t. However, for any 
number of firms above the number of firms that makes k = (a-c)/«, no more than k = (a- 
c )/t licenses will be demanded as there is only room for that number of firms in the market 
and any additional licenses bought would be useless. Hence one can expect that the social 
demand for licenses will become inelastic at that point.
The general expression for the socially optimal demand for licenses, both for the 
case in which k ^  (a-c)/t and when k > (a-c)/t, is given by lemma 2,
Lemma 2.-
The socially optimal number of licenses that a central planner will buy for a any 
fixed fee, r, will be given by,
Case A.
If the innovation is not drastic in the Kamien-Tauman sense,
[2(a-c)(n + 2) + i {2n(n + 3)-2k(2n + 3) + 5}] t
(6) rsA ---------------------------------------------------------------- or
2(n+ 1)*
Case B.
if the innovation is drastic in the Kamien-Tauman sense, i.e. k > (a-c)/t, then 
(2k +1)
(6’) r*B = -------------------  (a-c+c)*
2(k+ l ) Jk*
Proof.- (See annex)
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It is important to note that in case B, the patent holder faces an inelastic demand 
function similar to what happened in the private market equilibrium.
l v 22,2-----------Social-Welfare properties Qf the private demand for licenses.
The inverse demand functions obtained in the previous section indicate the 
maximum amount of money that the social planner would be willing to pay for a certain 
number of licenses. Now, the socially-optimal demand functions can be compared with the 
demand function for licenses resulting from the individual actions of the oligopolistic 
industry that was calculated in section 2.1. First, we can get the following result,
Proposition 2.- If the foreign patent holder sells to the oligopolistic industry a number of 
patents k such that 3 < k with k ^  [(a-c) /  t], we can say that,
a) for the same number of licenses, each oligopolist will be willing to pay for each 
license a price above the maximum price that the social planner would be 
willing to pay for each one of those k patents, or
b) for any given positive price for which those demand functions are defined, the 
number of licenses that the oligopolistic industry would buy is bigger than the 
number of licenses that the social planner would buy a t that price.
Proof.-
If k < [(a-c) /  t], the relevant socially-optimal demand function for licenses is 
defined by (6). Subtracting (3) from (6) we get
(7) r* - rm -  e [2(a-c) (2-n) + e (2n-6k + 5) ] /  2 (n+1)1 
which is negative for n > 3.
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It is quite obvious from (3) and (6) that both demand functions are linear and the 
absolute value of the market demand function is bigger than that of the socially-optimal 
demand function for licenses. If they ever intersect it is for low values of k and n. Hence, 
we can get the following corollary,
Corollary.- Under the conditions of proposition 2, the difference between the private and 
social reservation price for a given number of licenses grows with the number of licenses 
sold.
Proof.-
From (3) and (6) it is simple to check that
d m  dt^ 3
-------- ----------------= -------------------- > 0
d k  d k  2 (n + l)a
■
These results state that when the patent holder sells a number of licenses that is 
below the number of firms in the industry, the private demand for licenses is above the 
social demand. Consequently, if the patent holder faces an oligopolistic industry buying his 
licenses, a market failure may result in too  many licenses demanded at a price that is too 
high from a social point of view.
The explanation for this market failure has to be found in the different value given 
to the license by the social planner and by each oligopolist. For the social planner, a new 
license sold increases social welfare because average costs in the industry are reduced, total 
output expands and price falls which results in an increase in consumer surplus. However, 
for each new licensee that buys the license there is a double source of benefits from buying 
the license:
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a) first, he gets a direct benefit from reducing his marginal cost, that is offset 
to a certain extent by the resulting reduction in the  price of the final good that 
he sells,
b) but secondly, there is an indirect gain arising from the increase of his 
market share at the expense of his licensed and non-licensed competitors. This 
gain is larger the larger the number of already existing licensees is, and this 
explains our corollary.
This second source of profits is very important for our result because it is not 
present in the benefits from the innovation that the social planner computes being just a 
transfer of profits across firms.55
The source of this market failure can also be described as deriving from the fact 
that if the number of licenses sold is less than the number of firms in the industry, there is a 
socially optimal number of licenses, but while the social planner is indifferent about the 
identity of those firms, each oligopolist strives to avoid being one of the non-licensees. The 
cost o f this struggle to avoid the disadvantage of having high marginal costs is lower for 
each oligopolistic competitor than for the whole society, and as a result, it is possible that 
too many licenses are sold at a too high price.
Before concluding this section, it is important to notice that proposition 2 also 
applies in the case k> [a-c]/t, because for those values of k
- 2k2 + 2k + 1
(8) r*-rP -------------------------------  <  0
2k2 (k+ l)2
55 Similar kinds of effects have been obtained before in different contexts by Fudenbcrg and Tiróle (1985)
and Quimtback (1986). The later proves that a joint venture will adopt a new process technology more slowly than 
a non-cooperative group of firms, as the former will take into account the negative effects of the adoption on the 
profits o f the other members of the joint venture, while the non-cooperative firm will not take those effects into 
account. The introduction of the paper by Fudcnberg and Tiróle deals on the difference between the two benefits 
that accrue to the innovator in a model concerning timing of adoption, but the social welfare consequences of that 
difference arc not explored.
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But we must remember that in this case, k *[a-c]/e , because both, social and 
private demand functions become inelastic. Therefore, just part a in proposition 2 could 
apply here.
! v-2,23---------- The iocialb/ optimal equilibrium in (he market for ¡¡censes.
The results of the previous section provide information about the reaction 
functions that the patent holder has to face when he has to deal with different types of 
buyers of the patent. It suggests that the social planner will tend to buy less licenses and to 
pay a lower price for them than the oligopolistic industry. However, nothing has been said 
about the actual market equilibrium that would be reached in each case. In principle, for 
instance, one could think of a situation in which the social planner pays a lower price for 
the licenses, but buys more licenses than the oligopolistic industry. But to explore this 
possibility it is necessary to characterize the equilibrium in the market for licenses when 
the patent holder faces a social planner. The following proposition describes that market 
equilibrium.
Proposition 3.- If the patent holder faces the reaction function of a social planner buying 
licenses such as defined in lemma 2, the market outcome, ks, will be given by
(9) k* =
for all n ^  nx
2(a-c)(n + 2) + t[2n(n + 3) + 5] 
4(2n+3)<
for nj < n < n2
(a-c)
for n S: n2
where nt and n2 are the values of n that solve respectively,
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6n,*€ + 2[3«-(a-c)] nt - 5« - 4(a-c) = 0
and 2n2* e + 6[e - (a-c)] n2 + 5t - 8(a-c) * 0
Therefore, for values of the parameter n £  nt , all the existing firms in the industry 
will become licensees, but for values of n higher than n2 , the patent holder will maximize 
profits selling a number of licenses less than the number of firms in the market. However, 
for n>n2, the innovation becomes drastic in the Kamien-Tauman sense, because just the 
licensees, (a-c)/« firms, can remain operational in the market, and consequently, the social 
planner would not want to buy more than that number of licenses. Hence, although for 
different reasons depending on whether n >< n2 only if n < nj there will be complete 
diffusion of the new technology among the previously existing firms.
Now a comparison can be established between the two kinds of market equilibria 
described in propositions 1 and 3.
Proposition 4.- If we define kP as the number of licenses sold to the oligopolistic
industry, for given values of «, a and c we will have that,
i) if the number of firms in the market n ^  n j , there will be complete diffusion of 
the licensed technology among the existing firms, irrespective of whether the 
patent holder is selling them to an oligopolistic industry or to a social planner.
ii) if the number of firms in the industry is such that nj < n £  2 [[(a-c)/«] + l]/3 , 
n licenses will be sold to the oligopolistic industry and ks < n to the social 
planner.
iii) if the number of firms in the industry is 2[[(a-c)/«] + l]/3 < n ^  2 [[(a-c)/«] - 
1], the interior solutions are such that kP > k*.
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iv) if the number of firms n is such that 2 [[(a-c) /  e] - 1] < n < n2 , then kP = 
([a-c]/i)>ks and finally
v) for n > n2 , ks = kP = ([a-c] / 1 ).
Proof.- (See annex)
This proposition proves that the market failure commented upon before usually 
results in fact, in an excessive number of licenses being sold in the market place from the 
social point of view. In those other cases in which we have a comer solution for both 
demand curves, the number of licenses sold is the same. However, in those cases, the 
oligopolists acting individually will pay a license fee that will be higher than the fee that the 
social planner would be willing to pay for the same number of licenses.
Proposition 5.- If n> 1, and ks = kP = n or ks = kP = (a-c) /  e , the market equilibrium fee 
paid in the private market for licenses will be higher than the fee paid if the same number 
of licenses is sold to a social planner.
Proof.
The proposition follows immediately from expression (7) after substituting the 
value of k for n and (a-c) /  e.
Drawing conclusions about the market equilibrium values o f the license fees for the 
other cases is not simple. However, we can prove the following result.
Lemma 3.- For those values of n > 3 such that both k* and kP reach interior solutions, the 
market-equilibrium fixed fee paid by the firms will be smaller than the fee paid by the 
social planner.
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Proof.- (See annex)
IV 3 . MARKET VALUE AND SOCIAL VALUE OF THE PATENT.
In the former section it has been established that the private market value of the 
license for the new technology differs from the social valuation that a central planner would 
give to the license. But the latter value is a first-best from the social point of view. It gives 
the best responses from the social point of view that correspond to a given combination of 
cost reduction and fixed fee per license established by the patent holder.
However, one can still question what is the difference between the private-market 
cost of the license - as given by the price actually paid by the oligopolist industry for that 
license -, and the social value of the patent as measured by the increase in social welfare 
(consumer surplus and profits) that it produces. This question is particularly important in 
open economies where there is a transfer payment to foreign nationals of the fees collected 
from the sale of the license. In this case, the contribution of the license to social welfare 
must be net o f  those transfers m ade to the foreign sector.
The social value of the license will be the result o f  subtracting total social welfare 
net of the cost of the licenses, when n or k firms have a license allowing them to produce at 
[c-f] average costs and total social welfare before the license is introduced, i.e. when n 
firms produce at constant average costs equal to c.
Instead of analyzing the three possible outcomes corresponding to the cases in 
which k = [(a-c)/e], k = [(a-c)/€] + [(n+2)/4] and k = n, we shall concentrate on the last and 
most interesting one. When n = k, the social value of the  license will be given by the 
difference between total welfare when n firms are operating with average costs [c-e] and c, 
which given the value of W(n) given above, it will be defined as
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(10) W(n;c-t)-W(n;c)
n(n + 2)[a-c+«]2 n(n+2)[a-c]2
2(n + 2)2 2(11+ 1)*
n(n+2)[2(a-c)«+<2] 4n2« (a-c) + 2n2t2 (2-n)
2 (n+1)2 2 (n+1)2
Meanwhile, according to Kamien and Tauman (1986, page 476), when k=n the 
patent holder will receive from the oligopolistic market a total revenue equal to.
(11) *p
4n2i2 [(a-c)/« + 1 - n/2] 
2 (n+1)2
Therefore, we can conclude that
Proposition 6. 
( 12)
For k = n, the social value of the license net of its cost will be,
2 (a-c)e [2n-5n*] + f2 [4n3-7n2+2n]
W(n;c-«) - W(n;c) - t ph  =
2 (n + l)2
and consequently,
W(n;c-<) - W(n;c) - > 0 iff 2 ((a-c) /« ] > ((4n2-7n + 2) /  (5n-2)J
and
W(n;c-t) - W(n;c) - TpH<0 iff 2((a-c)/<] < [(4n2-7n + 2) /  (5n-2)]
Note that for relatively small values of n and e as compared to the value of (a-c), 
which is precisely for the kind of values for which n = k, the numerator in (12) will be 
negative. Therefore, for those values of our parameters n, e and (a-c), the net effect on 
welfare of the introduction of the license in the oligopolistic markets may be negative.
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This conclusion would not have important implications for closed economies, where 
the patent holder is just receiving an internal transfer o f income from the oligopolists. 
However, it has important implications in an open context, because it implies that the 
oligopolistic firms will pay to the foreign patent holder a total revenue, which is above the 
total welfare increase that the new technology will bring about into the domestic market.
Proposition (6) provides a formal proof to this possible outcome in international 
licensing, that has often been suggested in the traditional literature on licensing, but which 
has seldom been presented formally in a strategic context.
IV .4 . L ic e n sin g  o f  a n  in n o v a tio n  by m ea n s  o f  a  f ix e d  f e e  o n l y : t h e  c a se  o f  d r a st ic  
INNOVATIONS IN ARROW’S SENSE.
Kamien and Tauman have shown that in case of a drastic innovation in Arrow’s 
sense, the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the licensing game that has been used above 
implies just one producer in the market using the new technology in monopolistic 
conditions.
However, the patent holder in this case does not appropriate fully the monopolist 
profits of the producer as the latter can always refuse to buy the license and obtain the 
profits of an oligopolist with n-1 competitors using the old technology. Therefore, the 
maximum price, rP, that the patent holder could expect to m ake for the only license that he 
will be selling in this case will be the difference between the monopoly profits with costs of 
c-e, xm(c-i), and the oligopolist profits with costs c and n competitors, Tj(n;c).
From the social point of view, the maximum amount o f money that a social planner 
would be willing to pay for just one license of the drastic innovation will be the following
r4 ■ xm + 6CS - n Wj
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where 5CS is the increase in social welfare resulting from the output expansion and the 
impact of a new monopoly price below the previous marginal cost.
In this case, it is easy to see that the difference between rP and r* has an ambiguous 
sign. This difference is equal to
r*-rP  -  6CS - (n-1) »¡(n;c)
This difference is an increasing function of
i) n as Ti(n;c) = (a-c)J/(n+1)1
ii) the difference between the old cost and the new monopoly price.
Therefore, for a drastic innovation of a given size, one can expect to find a market 
failure similar to that commented upon in the previous section. There, the oligopolistic 
industry was very competitive, but the private market equilibrium produced a price below 
the socially optimal one if there were just a few competitors in the oligopolistic market.
It is interesting to note here that this result is consistent with another result 
obtained by Kamien and Tauman (1986), who point out that the patent holder will make 
more profits from the license as the oligopolistic market approaches perfect competition , 
n -» oo, because in that case the opportunity cost of not buying the license increases as -* 
0.
IV.5. C av ea ts  a n d  c o n c l u s io n s .
Technology has become a major factor of production in modern industrialized 
economies. Only those firms and countries having access to up-to-date technology can 
have access to the economic quasi-rents that are usually the result of imperfect competition
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in that kind of market. The need to acquire that technology as soon as possible before 
those quasi-rents are diluted by the effect of competition or by the appearance of new 
generations of innovations, may distract governments’ attention from the price that is being 
pay for that technology. In many instances, public policy is oriented towards the provision 
of economic incentives to increase the propensity of domestic firms to buy foreign 
technology. Sometimes, this policy can take the form of the distribution of information 
about the characteristics of new technologies, and in other cases, it is implemented by the 
removal of all the possible obstacles that may hamper the licensing process, or even by 
direct subsidies for the acquisition of foreign patents.
It has been shown in this chapter that there are reasons to believe that the market 
allocation of resources to purchase foreign licenses can be in many cases above the social 
optimum. Competition in oligopolistic markets can lead firms in those markets to bid a 
price for the license which is above the social optimum. But it also can result in too many 
licenses sold from a social point of view. Consequently, these results suggest that public 
policy should pay attention to the amount of domestic resources devoted to licenses, and it 
should also tend to induce a reduction in the number of licenses bought by the domestic 
firms.
However, the identification of these market failures should not lead us directly to 
propose policy actions aimed at reducing the number of licenses bought by the domestic 
industry. In first place, the limitations in terms of generality of the model presented above 
are many. Secondly, these conclusions are drawn in the context of a static model of partial 
equilibrium. This implies that any potential externalities that the new technology could 
have upon other sectors have not been accounted for. Furthermore, the process of 
technological change requires very often the accumulation of technological knowledge in 
the form o f know-how that could be derived from having access to different generations of 
technologies. Therefore, there could be some potentially beneficial effects derived from 
the license that could "spill over" in time, which are not accounted for in the model.
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Finally, the implementation of those policies via taxes or bureaucratic supervision of the 
process may result in further misallocations of resources, whose magnitude is difficult to 
compare with the one that has been detected here.
But I think that there are some more interesting lessons that can be learned from 
this simple exercise.
A) First, it has shown that competitors in oligopolistic markets have strong 
incentives to get licenses for new technologies, even in the context of Cournot 
competition, where rivalry is not very strong. As one may expect and the 
empirical evidence shows, the incentives to licence in this international context 
are higher than those detected by Katz and Shapiro (1985) for firms operating 
in the same market. What is not so trivial is that those incentives seem to 
increase with the number of competitors in the market.
B) The traditional literature on licensing has stressed the importance of ancillary 
restrains restraints and excessively high prices demanded by the licensor as the 
main source of concern from a social welfare point of view. Although ancillary 
restraints require more careful attention, the approach for considering the 
social desirability of the market equilibrium that has been taken here is totally 
different to the traditional ones: even in the present context where the patent 
holder has a "leader" position, it is the competition among oligopolists that 
results in an excessive allocation of resources to the purchase of licenses. This 
suggests new possibilities to tackle an old problem with new weapons. For 
instance, forming a coalition among the buyers of licenses could be an 
alternative to consider.
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C) When countries have to choose between engaging in R&D efforts or adopting 
a passive attitude and acquire foreign technology, the costs of the latter 
alternative are often not as clear as those of the first one. Another potential 
source of social costs that may arise from licensing which is not present in the 
current literature has been pointed out here. It suggests that the market 
structure of the group of producers using the license has to be considered in 
order to assess the effects on social welfare o f the transfer of technology 
through licensing.
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Chapter IV: Appendix
Proof-o f lemma 2.-
Case A.
As it was pointed out above, for k £  (a-c) /  e, the welfare function defined at (5) is 
increasing and concave in k. Therefore we can ensure that in the domain [O.(a-c)/«] there 
is a k that maximizes (5) as defined in lemma 1. After subtracting the cost of licenses, 
domestic social welfare is equal to,
n(a-c)*(n + 2) + 2(a-c)ki-k*e* [(a-c)+ n-k + 1 )«]i k
W (k )« -----------------------------------------+ ---------------------------  .  kr*
2(n + 1)* n+1
As k is an integer, the socially optimal k will the be the minimum k that makes 
W(k) - W(k-l) = rs. The value of function W() for k-1 is easy to get from the expression 
above. Subtracting both we get,
n(a-c)*(n+2) + 2(a-c)ke - k*e*
W(k)-W(k-1) -----------------------------------------------+
2(n+ 1)*
n(a-c)*(n + 2) + 2(a-c)<(k-1 )-(k-1 )*«*
--------------------------------------------------- fS +
2 (n+1)*
[(a-c) + (n-k + l)f]«k - [(a-c) + (n-k+2)«]c(k-l)+-----------------------------
n + 1
2<(a-c) - e*[2k-l]
= --------------------------  +
2(n+1)*
ik[(n-k+l)«-(n-k + 2)il + e [(a-c)+ (n-k+2)«)+------------------------------ r*
n+1
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2<(a-c) - i*(2k-l) -«ak + i[(a-c) + (n-k + 2)t]
2(n+ l)2 n+1
2<(*-c) - t*(2k-l) 2(n+ l)[(a-c)« + n«2-2ki2 + 2€
2(n+ l)2 2(n+ l)2
2(a-c)t(n + 2) + <2[2n2+6n-4kn-6k+5]
“ --------------------------------------------------  - r*
2(n+1)*
(2(a-c)(n + 2) + «[2n(n + 3)-2k(2n + 3)+5]}f
------------ --------------------------------------------------r*
2(n+1)1
The social planner will buy licenses until the point in which the last license sold will 
make W(k)-W(k-1)«0, i.e.
{2(a-c)(n+2) + <[2n(n + 3)-2k(2n+3)+5J}e
2(n+ !)*
Case B.
For case B, we depart from (5’) and subtract its value at k-1 from W(k) getting, 
k3(k + 2 )-(k - l) (k + l)3
W(k) - W (k-l)  --------------------------------(a-c + <]J -
2 (k+ 1)* k*
2k+l
r* = ---------------  [a-c+e]2
2(k+ l)*k2
Proof of Proposition 3.-
The profits for the patent holder will be given by
Tp,, -  ks r5 -
[2(a-c)(n + 2) + « {2n(n + 3)-2k(2n + 3) + 5} ]t 
2(n+ l)2
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Maximizing with respect to k we get the following first order condition56
dir«« [2(a-c)(n + 2)+c{2n(n + 3)-4k(2n + 3)+5}]<
---------«=.............. ................ ..................................................  2  0
dk 2(n + 1)*
and solving for k we get the following interior solution,
k* -
2(a-c)(n + 2) + <[2n(n+3)+5]
4« (2n + 3)
The comer solution n = k* will take place for values of n :£ ks for ks given by (7) 
above, i. e. when
6n2e + [3«-(a-c)] n - 5e -[2(a-c)/e +5/2]= 0 
which defines nj.
As one could have expected, the socially-optimal demand function for licenses for 
case B shows for any value of k a negative marginal revenue equal to
[a-c+i]J [
- 8k3 - 14kl - 8 k - 2 
4 (k + l)4 k4
Therefore, the patent holder will maximize profits for ks = (a-c)/e, that is the upper 
bound of the interior solution described above. This corner solution will occur for values of 
n bigger or equal to n2 which is the value of n that makes,
2(a-c)(n2+2) + « P n ^ ^ + 3 )  + 5] a-c 
4(2n2+3) < * T
that can also be expressed as.
2n2* + 2{3< - 7(a-c)] n2 - 5« + 20(a-c) = 0
56 It is easy to see that second order conditions for a maximum
for licenses is concave in k.
fulfilled as the inverse demand function
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This completes the proof.
Proof  Qf Proposition 4.-
We shall start by proving part (iii) of the proposition. The interior solution of ks 
can be written as
Note that the first two parts of the RHSs of these expressions are related as follows,
for those values of n. Furthermore, the second parts of the RHSs those expressions are
because 2n* + 6n + 5 < 2n*+7n + 6. Therefore, we can conclude that for a given value of 
2[[(a-c)/«]+1]/3 < n ¡2 2[l(a-c)/e]-lJ, k* < kP .
(i) and (ii) follow directly from propositions 1 and 3 once we have proven that nj ^  
2[[(a-c)/«]+1] /  3 . But given that
(a-c) (n + 2)
kP = -----  + -------- and
I t  4
(a-c)(n+2) 2n(n + 3) + 5
2t (2n + 3) 4 (2n + 3)
(a-c)(n + 2) 2n(n + 3) + 5
k*
while
(a-c) n + 2
2 e 4
(a-c)(n+2) a - c (n + 2)
for all n ^  - 1 because < 1
(2n + 3)
2n(n+3) + 5 n + 2
> for any n > 0
4(2n + 3) 4
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a re  both increasing and continuous in n, kP (n) > k‘ (n) for all positive values of n implies 
th at kP(n) intersects k = n for a higher value of n than k*(n) does.
To prove (iv) and (v), we can see that as kP(n) > k*(n) for all positive values of n, 
kP(n) intersects the horizontal line k=[a-c]/« for a smaller value of n. Therefore, 2[[(a-
c )/e ]-l] > n2 and this completes the proof.
■
Proof of Lemma 3.-
From section IV.2. we know that the profits of the patent holder are equal to
» p H  "  k  r ( k )
Optimisation with respect to k requires that 
r(k*) -  - r'(k") k-
w here k* is the optimal number of licenses sold at prices r(k*). In the case of the interior 
solution of the private market equilibrium,
r(kP) = 2n kP while in the case of the social planner, 
r(k*) -  (2n + 3) k*
Therefore, r(kP) > r(ks) if and only if 
kP/k* > (2n + 3) /  2n
Substituting the values of kP and ks given by (3) and (6), we can confirm that the previous 
inequality is equivalent to
[a-c] / 1  > [4n* + 16n + 15] /  [4n* - 2n -12]
but given that we are in an interior solution to the private market problem, n ^  2 [[(a-
c )/e ]-l] as shown in proposition 1. This constraint can also be expressed as ([3n/2] - 1) £  
[(a-c)/«]. A sufficient condition for
[a-c] /  « *  ([3n/2] - 1) > [4n* + 16n + 15] /  [4n* - 2n -12]
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C h a p t e r  V: S e q u e n t ia l  M o d e l s  o f  I n novation  a n d  m a r k e t  E v o l u t io n  in  As y m m e t r ic  
Ec o n o m ie s
V .I .-  I n t r o d u c t io n .
Since the early work o f Schumpeter, the economic consideration of technological 
change has been related to the problem of market-structure dynamics. However, when this 
problem has been reconsidered in a formal way between 1962 and the early 80’s, 
economists have concentrated their studies on the influence of market structure on the rate 
of technological change, and little attention has been paid to a central issue in 
Schumpeter’s work: the impact of technological change on the evolution of market 
structure.
Gilbert and Newberry (1982), Kamien and Schwartz (1982) and Reinganum (1983) 
were the first to question the relative advantages and disadvantages of incumbent firms or 
new entrants in game-theoretic models of patent races. But in these models only games 
with just one innovation were considered and they did not explore the impact of a sequence 
of innovations on the initial market structure.
In Reinganum (1985)57 *, this problem was addressed for the first time, but the 
structure of the model is extremely simplified. Reinganum considers only drastic 
innovations that preserve the initial monopolistic structure.
57 The excellent paper by M.T. Flaherty (1980) which presents a very different approach to that in the
papers discussed here, merits special mention.
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The class of models that seems to have established itself as "the" appropriate way of 
approaching and tackling this problem has its roots in Vickers (1986). In this paper, 
Vickers studies conditions for the persistence o f technological leadership by a firm (what 
he calls "increasing dominance") and for variations in the identity of the firm with lowest 
marginal costs ("action-reaction" in Vickers term s). Beath et al. (1987) adapt Vickers’ 
model of process innovations to a setting with product differentiation and new product 
innovations, and Delbono (1988) uses a similar structure to incorporate in the model 
gradual approximations in the technological level o f  both firms, although he incorporates 
important differences in the auctioning process.58
In this "family" of models, a sequence o f new technologies is produced, and two 
duopolists that compete in a final-product m arket bid in an auction for the exclusive right 
to use a patent. In this auction, there is no strategic conduct whatsoever on the side of the 
two duopolists, and both players have perfect information, not only about the 
characteristics of the new technology, but also about their rival. Furthermore, there is no 
uncertainty about getting the patent and if a firm outbids its rival in the auction, it will win 
the patent with certainty. In this sense, the game is deterministic, as Delbono admits, and 
given the parametric data of the game (market conditions and initial cost structure) the 
final equilibrium is known by each player before th e  game starts.
In spite of this lack of strategic behaviour in the technology game, these authors 
establish some links between the type of duopolistic competition in the final-product 
market and the evolution of the market structure. Leaving aside some qualifications made 
by Beath et al.,59 all these authors point out that low (high) levels of competition in the
58 Harris and Vickers (1987) provides a completely diflerent approach to study the influence of 
technological change on market structure, but, to our knowledge, this line of research has not been developed any 
further.
59 Beath et al. (1987) have shown that the nature of that relationship depends on the existence of price or 
product competition in the market for the final good. In a model with product innovation in which different 
’generations' of the same product can be sold, they reach conclusions that are the opposite of those obtained by 
Vikers.
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final-product market imply leap-frogging (increasing dominance) in the technological 
leadership of the market.
All the models of sequential innovation, including Reinganum’s, concur in 
predicting quite simple (sufficient) conditions for the occurrence o f permutations in 
technological leadership. In the real world, we find lots of cases of technological 
asymmetry between firms competing in national or international markets that are 
perpetuated over time. Changes in technological leadership are the exception and not the 
rule. However, it seems hazardous to impute this generality to the existence of high levels 
of rivalry in the final-product markets. This discrepancy between the predictions provided 
by economic theory and reality, is a sufficient motivation to examine closely the structure 
of this family of models, because this could help us to learn to what extent these predictions 
are induced by the particular way in which the models have been set up.
This is the main concern of this chapter. The predictions of this family of models 
seem to be highly dependent on the structure of the game, which has many possible 
equilibria besides increasing dominance and action reaction in technological leadership. 
The analysis will be carried out in two stages. Firstly, the characteristics of different 
equilibria in this family of models will be studied using a simplified version of the model 
proposed by Vickers. In a second stage, the structure of the game will be altered in order 
to study how these modifications alter the results.
One important feature of these models is that they relate the  outcome of the 
technology game to the market conditions prevailing in the final-good market. Identifying 
the nature of those relationships will be the purpose of section V.5.. In  it, Vickers’ results 
are examined from a comparative-statics point of view. In this way, one  can get a better 
idea about the generality of his results.
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In sections, V.2. to V.4., a simplified version of Vickers’ model with only two 
innovations is introduced. Despite its simplicity, this model captures all the features of the 
models used by Vickers and Beath et al. But this simplification allows to identify the direct 
benefits that stem from winning the patent, and those derived from the strategic advantage 
in future auctions that winning today implies. Furthermore, with this simple game 
structure, we can find necessary and sufficient conditions for four different types of 
equilibria which are combinations of the two simple types of equilibria studied by other 
authors.
The last sections of the chapter present several modified versions of the basic 
model. As the results of these models depend heavily on the structure of the game, it seems 
that, only by adapting the model to particular cases, can we draw conclusions which are 
applicable to those cases.
yjL. T h e  M o d e l  a n d  P r e l im in a r y  R esu l t s .
The model consists of two different but related games. First, let us assume that two 
firms producing a perfect substitute compete as duopolists in the market for the final good. 
On the other hand, a technology game is played by these two firms. Both firms are 
competitors to gain cost-reducing patents to produce the final good.60
Initially, at time zero, firm 1 has lower constant average costs than firm 2, i.e. kt < 
k2 • At the end of this period, two new process innovations are announced and both firms 
bid for the new patents. The winner of the first patent will be able to produce the final 
good with average costs "c" during time period I. The winner of the second patent will 
enjoy average costs < c < kj < k2 during period II. The firm with the highest 
reservation price for each patent will be the winner of the auction. However the winner
60 As Dclbono points out, this kind of games arc quite general as they can be adapted to study product 
innovations.
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will not have to pay his reservation price to get the patent but just a small amount above 
the bid made by his rival, i.e. his rival’s reservation price. Finally, it will be assumed that 
the cost reductions brought about by the innovations will not be drastic enough to eliminate 
the duopolistic market structure.
The nature of the game and the resulting cost structure in each period are shown in
game 1.
Game 1.
Period "0"
Initial costs (ki,k2)
Period I
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
If firm 1 wins 
the first auction
(c,k2)
\
\
\
\
\
\
\
If firm 2 wins 
the first auction
( M )
Period II
/
/
/
/
Firm 1 wins 
2nd auction
( + .k 2)
Firm 2 wins 
2nd auction
(c.*)
/  \
/  \
/  \
/  \
Firm 1 wins 
2nd auction
(*.c)
Firm 2 wins 
2nd auction
( M )
Case: A C D
Note that this collection of cases includes the two cases studied by Vickers: "A" 
would coincide with what he calls "increasing dominance" and "C" is a three period example 
of "action-reaction".61 However, this model includes two extra possibilities which are but
61 According to Vickers, there will be 'increasing dominance' when the firm that enjoys an initial cost 
advantage maintains and increases that advantage by winning all the subsequent new patents, while its rival keeps 
its initial cost level all along the duration of the game. On the contrary, the term 'action-reaction' denotes a kind 
of equilibrium in which the identity of the low-cost firm alternates from one period to the next one. As a certain 
strand of the literature has kept this nomenclature (see Bcath et al. (1987) and Delbono (1988)). we shall adopt it 
here too.
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combinations of the other two. Thus, it is possible that one firm "overtakes" the other but 
in two periods instead of only one. It is also possible to have one firm passing its rival and 
building an increasing dominance afterwards.
Nevertheless, Vickers’ "non-historical" approach is maintained here, in the sense 
that one firm can bid for a patent under the same conditions than his rival can, irrespective 
of the difference in their initial cost levels.
Sub-game perfect equilibrium will be used here as we will require time consistency 
in the behaviour of the players. The two innovations will be announced at the end of 
period "0". Both firms will make their calculations about their own and their rival’s 
reservation prices and each one of them will know who will win each patent. Hence, 
reservation prices for each patent will reflect not only present conditions, i.e. current costs 
for each firm, but also:
- the "past", because current costs will depend on who won the last patent, and
- the "future", because the identity of the winner of today’s auction will have an 
impact on the future auction. This impact will be twofold. First, whoever wins the 
second patent will have to face a competitor with a given cost level, and that level 
will be determined by the outcome of the previous auction. Secondly, the cost levels 
with which firms face the second auction will have an influence on their respective 
chances of winning the second auction, but those initial cost levels will be the result 
of the first auction.62
62 Alternatively, one could th ink  o f  a  "closed-loop' perfect equilibrium, that would b e  tim e consistent 
forwards too . I have worked out this m odel, which is not exactly th e  same, but the  main conclusions are  basically 
the  same. However, this departure from  Vickers’ original model has th e  advantage of allowing to  compute the 
absolute and relative impact o f the  existence o f  a second patent race  on the  firm’s reservation prices for th e  first 
innovation. In that case, the  existence o f  a second patent raises th e  reservation price for th e  first patent in both 
firms, bu t th is  increment is relatively bigger in the  initially high cost firm. This asymmetry o f  the  model will be 
com m ented later.
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In the rest of this section, necessary and sufficient conditions for each type of 
equilibrium are derived. As it is usual in this kind of model, we shall proceed backwards. 
For simplicity the effect of discounting will not be taken into consideration.
a. Period II.
As this is the final period, the value of the patent for any firm will be just the 
difference in current profits for that firm in the only two possible outcomes: when it wins 
the second patent and when it loses the auction. Each firm will have two different 
reservation prices depending on who won the first auction.
In cases A and B, i.e. when firm 1, the initially low cost firm wins the first patent, 
the reservation prices for the second patent for firms 1 and 2 will be,
(1) P1!! «= - T ^ c ,* )  and
(2) x2i|(c ,« )-*2n(^,k2) ,
where Pit and x jt denotes reservation prices and profits for firm i= 1,2 in period t = I,II. The 
first (second) argument in the profit function indicates the cost level for firm 1 (2).
In cases C and D, i.e. when firm 2, the high cost firm at the beginning of the game, 
wins the first patent, reservation prices will be,
O ’) p ln *  * ‘n (* .c) - and
(2’) P2,, = »2n(k,,*) - t2h(*,c).
Comparing two by two these equations we can know which firm wins the second 
patent. However, to compute the net payoffs for each firm, we will have to subtract the
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price o f the patent from the profits that it will make in the second period. This will give us 
the following payoffs, V, for each firm in each case,
Case A:
firm 1: V*„ = T1Ii(^,k2) - x2„(c,*) + x2, , ^ . ^  = on(<*>,k2) - x2„(c,4>)
firm 2: V2,, = x2, ^ , ^ )
Case B:
firm 1: V1,, = ^ „ (c ,^ )
firm 2: V2,, = x2, , ^ )  - x1, , ^ . ^ )  + » ‘»(c,^) = an(c,<» - x ^ i^ .k j)
CaseC:
firm 1: »*„ = x^ifa.c) - x2n(k1,^) + x2n(^,c) = on(4>,c) - x^^k ,,^ )
firm 2: V2,, = ^¡¡(frc)
CaseD:
firm 1: V1,, = x 1, ,^ , ,^ )
firm 2: V2,, = ^ „ (k j ,^ )  - + x ^ ^k j,^ )  = ^„(k,,^)-»1! ^ ^ )
where ajj are the industry joint profits in period two.
b. Period I.
Reservation prices for the first patent will capture the influence of the result of the 
first auction on the second one. For that purpose, it is necessary to define the value 
functions, for each firm, o f winning and losing the first auction.
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Let Mi(r,s) be the present value of all present and future net auction bids for firm 
¡=1,2, when firm 1 has costs r and firm 2 has costs s. Hence, if firm 1 wins the bid for the 
first patent, its value function will be,
/ti(c,k2) = xi,(c,k2) + max {T1n(^,k2) + x2„(<fck2) - x ^ c , * )  , x ^ M » )}  or,
(3) Mi(c,k2) = x ^ c-k j)  + max {an(^,k2) - ^ „ (c ,* )  , x^ ifc* )}
while, if firm 1 loses the bid for the first auction, we will have,
Ml(kj,c) = »Ijikj.c) + max { x ^ ^ .c )  + x2, , ^ )  - «¿„(k,,*) , x ^ k , ,* )}  or,
(4) Mi(kllC) -  x ^ C M ) + max {an (*,c) - x2, ,^ , .* )  , x ^ k , » }
As firm’s 1 reservation price for the first patent is just the difference between the 
maximum profits that this firm will make if it wins the auction and the profits resulting 
from losing the auction, this price, P*| will be
(’ ) I*1| - « ( c * 2 ) - » ‘l ( M )
Similarly, this reservation price fo r firm 2 could be defined  as,
(6) P2, = /i2(k,,c) - /i2(c-k2 ) where
(7) M2(ki,c) = T2I(ki,c) + max{a||(k1,^)-»1II(^>c),»-2I|(^ tC) |  and
(8) M2(c,k2) -  x2[(c,k2) + max{o,I(c,*)-»>II(*,k2),T2I|(*,k2)}
c. Definition o f  equilibria.
From the definitions above, one can conclude that the necessary and sufficient 
conditions to have "increasing dominance" (case A), as the equilibrium in our game, will be 
those that enable us to have at the same time
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P‘, > P2, and P '„  > P2,,
and the equilibrium will bring "action-reaction" (case C) if and only if
P>, < P2, and P‘„  > P2,,
Finally, for the other two equilibria we have,
P1! > P2i and P ^  < P2n in case B and 
P1! < P2i and P 'ii < P2n in case D.
Before establishing the equilibrium conditions of the game, it may be interesting to 
specify some of its characteristics. The main ones are the following:
1. - The game is finite, and the cost structure after the last auction will have an impact
on the last period current profits only. If we assume that both firms keep on 
competing in the product market after the technology game has finished, the 
reservation price for the last patent will be higher for both firms, and this will have 
induced effects on the o ther previous auctions.
2. As patents are allocated in auctions, only the winner has to incur in costs in the 
patent race. In this way, we lose one of the most important features of R&D races. 
As Dasgupta (1988) and o thers have pointed out, in patent races, losers do not get 
any return to their efforts and winners get all the rewards. Here, there is no cost 
derived from losing an auction other than operating with higher costs in the product 
market. Hence, an important incentive to win the patent is not being taken into 
account here. A priori, there  is no reason to believe that this incentive will be 
different for each firm, (unless some kind of asymmetry in the R&D costs, which 
each firm has to incur in order to achieve the same innovation, is added to the 
initial cost asymmetry between firms).
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3.- The auctioning process has some peculiarities that do have a strong influence on 
the outcome of the game, as will be shown in th e  next section. Who wins the patent 
is determined by the difference in reservation prices, but the cost of the patent is 
equal to the bid made by the firm that loses th e  auction. This implies that winning 
today’s auction has an impact on future auctions. This influence is twofold: first, it 
determines who will be the low cost firm in the  next auction, and second, it has an 
indirect effect on the reservation prices for the  next patent, and hence, on the 
possibilities of winning that next patent and on the payoffs derived from doing so.
With these considerations in mind, let us proceed with the characterization of each 
kind of equilibrium.
V3. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Each Kind of Equilibrium.
In the game described in the former section, the identity of the winner of the 
second auction will depend just on the sign of the following two expressions,
(9) 0|l(*,k2) * ®li(c.*) and
(9’) <rii(ki>4) - ffn(*.c)
If firm 1 is the low-cost firm and (9) is positive (negative), firm 1 (2) will win the 
second and final patent. But if firm 2 is the low cost firm and (9’) is positive (negative) firm 
2 (1 ) will be the winner of the second patent.
The identity of the winner of the first auction depends on the sign of (P '| - P2|). But 
note that the "max* expressions in (3), (4), (7) and (8) will depend precisely on the sign of
(9) and (9’). This relationship reduces the possible specifications of differences between P*| 
and P2| as defined in (5) and (6) to only four possible cases. These are expressed by
147
equations ( 10)-( 13) that summarise the values of the differences in reservation prices for 
first patent that the two companies will have depending on the outcome of the second 
auction:
(10) P1! - P2! = <Ji(c,k2) - ai(kt>c) + aII(<^ ,k2) - ®n($,c) + **n(ki»0) + ">r2li(^.k2) - <7n(4>,c)
(11) P \  - P2, -  a ,(c.k2) - o ,(k ,.c) + 0„(* ,k2) - OnfktA) + v ^ l f e k z )  * » ‘iK M )
(12) P>, - P2, -  a,(c,kj) - 0 ,(k„c) + ^ „ (k ,.* )  - x»„(*,k2)
(13) P», - P2, -  a,(c,kj) - o,(k1,c)+ 2o„(c,<i>) - » » „ (k ,»  - o„(k„*) - x>„(*,k2)
Following the process of elimination that can be found in the appendix, (9) and (9’) 
together with (10)-(13), these necessary and sufficient conditions for each type of 
equilibrium can be obtained,
Case “A  " will occur i f  and only if:
Al.- au(^,k2) - an(c,^)>0 ; ffn(c,^) - an(^,k1)>0 and
« l(c.k2) • 0|(k,,c) +  onW .kj) - 2 » „ (c ,*) +  »'2ii(k 1,0 ) +  I 2n(<.,k2) >  0
or if
A2.- on(<i>,k2) - ou(c,<i)) > 0 ; an(c,$) - ffiifa.k,) < 0 and
®l(c»*c2) * ®i(ki,c) + an(k2,<^ ) - an (k I,^ ) + *2n(^ ,k2)  - x 1u (k i ,^ )  > 0
Case "B" will occur if  and only if:
Bl.- an(« ,^k2) - <T||(c,«i>) < 0 ; on(c,$) - an(«>,k,) < 0 and
0 |(c,k2) - ff,(k,,c) + 2o\\(<t>,c) - a n ^ .k j)  - » ‘»(k,,*) - x2n(d*,k2) > 0
or,
B2.- c»||(<#>,k2) - an(c,$) < 0 ; an(c,<£) - an(4>,ki) > 0 and
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®l(c,l<2 ) - 0l(kl.c) + x^iKk,,^) - h^ hOMcz) > 0
Case "C" will occur if  and only if:
C l-  0n($,k2) - On(c,<t>) < 0 ; an(c,<A) - <yn(</>,k,) > 0 and 
0Il(**k2) - oh(^.Ici) + Jr2ii(k1,*)-T1,|(*,k2) < 0 
or,
C 2 - <ru(4,k2) - an (c ,^ ) > 0 ; an (c,4) - an (<i>,k,) > 0 and
0l(c.k2) - 0i(k ,.c) + a„(<i>,k2) - 2a„(c,*) + ^ „ ( k , .* )  + T2„(* ,k2) < 0
Case "D" will occur i f  and only if:
D l - 0n(^,k2) - ffn(c,^) > 0 ; ou(c,<f>) - ffii(^,k,) < 0 and
0l(c»k2) * 0l(k i.c) +  0ll(k2 ^ )  '  0Il(k l.* ) + »2ii(‘>.k2) -T ^ iik j,^ ) < 0
or,
D2- 0n(< ,^k2) - ou(c,<t>) < 0 ; on(c,4>) - <7n(tf>,k,) < 0 and
0l(c»k2> - 0i(ki»c) + 2otl(4>,c) - ffn(^,kj) - T*n(k1,^) - T2n(</.,k2) < 0
V.4. D ir e c t  a n d  I n d u c e d  E f f e c t s  a n d  t h e  V ic k e r s  As s u m p t io n .
The necessary and sufficient conditions presented above are a generalization of the 
results in Vickers (1986). In his paper, Vickers concludes that the following assumption is 
sufficient to have action-reaction in an n-period model:
Assumption 1 (Vickers).- For any period t and cost levels k>0, c>0 such that k>c, 
at(c,k+i) < o,(c,k)
i.e. industry joint profits will be higher the lower the cost level of the high-cost firm is.
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However, the inverse of assumption 1, (i.e., that joint profits are increasing with 
respect to the cost of the high-cost firm), is not sufficient to ensure increasing dominance. 
For this later case, Vickers only provides a necessary condition, namely, that the high cost 
firm is making zero profits.
As assumption 1 is fulfilled in the Coumot-Nash case with linear demand function, 
Vickers goes on to identify action-reaction in the technology game with low levels of rivalry 
in the market for the final good that both firms produce. On the contrary, in his second 
proposition, Vickers finds that zero profits in the high cost firm is a necessary condition for 
increasing dominance.63 From there, Vickers concludes that a high level of rivalry in the 
output market is a necessary condition for a stable condition of increasing dominance in 
the technology game.
Before considering those conclusions, let us see what is the economic interpretation 
to these results. In a recent paper, Beath et al. (1989) point out the two kinds of incentives 
that oligopolistic firms with different costs have in patent races. First, there is the incentive 
provided by the cost reduction that the patent will produce. If two firms have different 
average production costs, they will have different incentives to engage in a cost reducing 
investment. This incentive is independent from the fact that firms are competing in a 
patent race, and it can be computed as the difference in profits made by the firm with and 
without the patent. But on the other hand, oligopolistic firms will also compete for a patent 
because there is a competitive threat in patent races: losing a patent race implies that a 
rival has won it, and hence, you will face a stronger competition in the product market, in 
other words, there are benefits derived from being the first to innovate. The magnitude of 
this incentive can be known only in an indirect way.
63 This is consistent with our sufficient conditions Al and A2.
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In any case, in the race for just one patent, without any further future innovations 
(as it happens with the second patent in our model), the sum of these two effects for each 
firm is reflected by reservation prices such as those given in (1) and (2), and it will be called 
direct effect. Which firm will have the highest total incentive or reservation price will 
depend on the sign of expressions (9) or (9’). This is clear because the profit incentive can 
be measured as,
Q1 =  T*(^.k2) * » ‘(c,k 2) and 02 = - x 2(c,k2)
and the total effect is given by (1) and (2). The incentive derived from the competitive 
threat will be the difference between,
pi . Qi = 4>l = x 1(c,k2) - » ’(c,^)
p 2 .0 2  -  *2 = *2(c,k2) . *2<*,k2)
Consequently, the differences in profit incentives and incentives due to the 
competitive threat can be defined as:
(14) 0« - Q2 -  [*>(*¿2) - *»(*.<:)] + f»l(k*c) - *2(k2,c)]
(14’) - *2 -  (vKkft*) - x>(c,*)] + [«*(k*c) - x*(k2»c)l
Note that the last two terms in brackets in (14) and (14’) have the same absolute 
value but different sign, and therefore, they cancel out and the combined effect of the 
profit incentive and the competitive threat is just the result of the addition of the first two 
terms. Furthermore, notice that this combined effect is equal to (9) and consequently, its 
sign will be the same as that of (9). However, which incentive will be greater in absolute 
value for each firm depends not just on the sign of (9) but also on the relative difference in 
profits between the two firms prior to the auction, i.e. the second term in brackets.
1S1
As a matter of fact, the combined direct effect can be positive or negative, 
irrespective of the sign of (14) and (14’). However, which firm will have a higher incentive 
to get the patent coming from the profit incentive or from the competitive threat will 
depend on the initial cost difference between k2 and c. Actually, for a given value of the 
terms in (9), if the initial cost difference is relatively small, the profit incentive will be 
greater for the low cost firm, and the competitive threat will be greater for the high cost 
firm, but which one will be dominant will depend just on the sign of (9). This is so because 
the first term in brackets in (14) will always be positive and the first term in brackets in 
(14’) will always be negative, but (14) will turn negative only if the cost asymmetry between 
c and k2 is big enough to make [xJ(k2-c) - x2(k2-c)] negative and big enough, and (14’) will 
turn positive only if [x2(k2-c) - x*(k2-c)J is positive and big enough. On the other hand, if 
the initial cost difference is relatively large, the profit incentive will be greater for the high 
cost firm, and the incentive derived from the competitive threat will be greater for the low 
cost firm, but again, the net effect will be given by the sign of (9).
In a model with a sequence of innovations and patent races, the combination of 
these two effects still remains and can be found in the terms a(c,k2) - o(c,kj) in (10)-(13). 
However, when a sequence of innovations is considered, the former two incentives are not 
the only ones. In the particular auctioning system considered here (as well as in Vickers 
(1986) and others), the following effects, that will be called induced effect, are introduced 
in the n-1 first auctions: 1
1- If a given firm wins today’s auction, that firm will become the low cost firm 
in the next period, and consequently, that firm will have lower or higher 
incentives to win the next auction, depending on the sign of (9) and (9’). 
That will have a negative or positive influence of the willingness to pay for 
the patent currently being auctioned. Hence, the direct effect that arises 
from the profit incentive and from the competitive threat can be reinforced 
or offset by the existence of future auctions.
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2- If a given firm wins today’s auction and (9) and (9’) are negative, his 
competitor will have a higher direct net incentive to win tomorrow’s race. 
Consequently, to win tomorrow’s patent, our firm will have to pay a higher 
price for it, as his rival’s reservation price will be higher. Again, this effect 
will encourage or discourage firms to win today’s patent depending on the 
sign of (9).
V J .  D is c u s s io n  o f  Eq u il ib r ia .
The necessary and sufficient conditions in A l, A2, Bl, B2, Cl, C2, D1 and D2, 
capture the influence of the direct and induced effects for the two auctions. They are 
obtained from all the possible combinations of expressions (9), (9’) and (10) to (13).
It is interesting to notice that, for instance, the cases of increasing dominance in Al 
and action-reaction in C2 have in common some necessary conditions. Namely both 
require that
(9) 0n(4’k2) - ffn(c,<*>) > 0 and
(9’) ffll(ki>^) * 0h(6e) < 0
These conditions imply that the low cost firm at the time when the second auction 
takes place will win that auction too, only if that firm is the firm with low costs at the 
beginning of the game. But if firm 2 is the low cost firm at the time of the second auction, 
then it will lose that auction. Hence, no matter what happens in the first auction, firm 1 will 
win the second one.
However, in both cases there is a third condition which is determinant to have 
either action-reaction or increasing dominance, because this condition gives us the winner 
of the first auction i.e.
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al(c>k2> - ®i(ki.c) + an(0,k2) - 2on(c,4>) + ><0
Leaving aside the direct effect of the first auction, the effect induced by the 
existence of a second auction is:
*ll(*»k2) - «r,i(c,$) + x 'n fa .k j) + v 2u(<t>Mi) - ®n(c,*) =
= ffn(^,k2) - <t„ ( c,<*>) + ffiii^.kz) - au(c,<^) + ir1, |(^ ,k 1) - » ‘„ (^ .k j)
This effect will be either negative or positive but with a small absolute value. 
Hence, only if the direct effect of the first auction is negative, i.e.. favourable to firm 2, and 
relatively large in absolute value, we can expect action-reaction. Otherwise, increasing 
dominance will normally result when (9)>0 and (9’)<0.
Cases C l and B2 require (9)<0 and (9’)<0. If these conditions are met, action- 
reaction occurs but not necessarily in the first auction. Note that in this case, the signs of 
(9) and (9’) fulfil assumption 1 and if this assumption remains valid for the direct effect in 
the first auction, action-reaction is the only possible outcome. In fact, the induced effect 
here is ,
»^lltkl.*) - ''ll(« .k2) < 0
and hence, it is always favourable to firm 2, i.e. the initially high cost firm. If the direct 
effect in the first auction is favourable to the initially low cost firm and it offsets the 
induced effect, action-reaction will occur but only after one period of increasing 
dominance. Obviously, assumption 1 ensures that the high cost firm will win the second 
auction.
The inverse to assumption 1 arises when both (9)>0 and (9’)>0. Then we can have 
increasing dominance, A2 or increasing dominance for firm 2 after action-reaction in the 
first period, D2. As Vickers points out, contrary to what might be expected, this is not a
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sufficient condition to have increasing dominance. Here, the direct effect in the second 
auction is always favourable to the firm that won the first one, and hence, it is just the 
opposite to what happens when (9) and (9’) are both negative. However, the induced 
effect does not always reinforce the direct effect now. It is equal to:
[an(4,k2) - ffiK kj,^)] + [x2ii(0,k2) - » 'iK k j,^ )]
which has no definite sign. Notice that the second term in brackets is always negative and 
this will counteract the positive direct effect. Ultimately, the sign of the induced effect will 
depend on the relative values of ffufa.k^ and an (k,,^). If an(^,k2)< 0 n(k1,^), the induced 
effect will be negative and favourable to the second firm. Consequently, one can conclude 
that although the reverse to assumption 1 plays has a contrary influence over the direct 
effect than assumption 1, it is the induced effect what does not provide sufficiency to 
ensure increasing dominance.64
Finally, if (9)<0 and (9’)>0, cases B1 and D2 can arise. Here, the direct effect in 
the second auction is always favourable to firm 2, the initially high cost firm. The induced 
effect in the first auction is,
- M k ^ )  - - » ^ (k i,* )  < 2<j,|(tf>,c) - a„(k2,*) - an(kj,*)
that can be positive or negative depending on the absolute value of the differences in (9) 
and (9’).
From the discussion above some conclusions can be drawn already about the 
structure of this kind o f model:
64 As we will see in the second pan of the chapter, the way the induced acts on present auctions depends on 
the way the game is designed, and the reverse of assumption 1 can be a sufficient condition to guarantee 
increasing dominance in a modified game.
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1. firstly, assumption 1 (i.e. if industry joint profits are higher the lower the cost level 
of the high-cost firm are), and its reverse are central to determine the sign of the 
direct effect, but,
2. the complete evolution of market structure is complemented by the induced effect, 
and the influence of this effect depends on the way the game has been modelled.
In the next section, the implications of assumption 1 are examined. The rest of the 
chapter consists of several alternative versions of the basic game, which show how the 
influence of the induced effect varies as new assumptions are introduced in the game.
V .6 . J o in t  P r o f it s  a n d  F ir m s ’ C o s t s .
The direct effect plays a crucial role in determining the outcome of the technology 
game. This direct effect depends on how joint industry profits change when firm costs 
change. Under Cournot assumptions, and for a linear demand function, joint industry 
profits are an inverse function of the cost level of the high cost firm. Furthermore, zero 
profits in the high cost firm is a necessary condition for increasing dominance. Based on 
these two results. Vickers (1986) identifies a certain relationship between rivalry in the 
product market and rivalry in the technology game. A particular version of assumption 1 
will help us to explore the generality of Vickers’ results using comparative statics.
From Dixit (1984) one can conclude that in any duopolistic structure with constant 
marginal costs Cj > and product homogeneity, when the high cost firm changes its cost 
levels, assumption 1 can be expressed as
(1 5 ) (do/dcj) = (dxj/dcj) +  (d x ^ d c j )  <  0  with 
(15a ) (dx]/dC|) -  - r 1 [ p ^ a ^ , - ^ ) ]  - x, and
(15b ) (dxj/dc,) = r 1[*2Pla2 0 - r2v 2)J
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where
S2*! /  6xj2 d2»! /  6x22 I
62jt2 /  ¿Xj2 52t 2 /  fix22 I
a, = i^ i /f ix ,2 < 0 ; a2 = &-wJbi£ < 0 ; 65
Vj = conjectural variation for the ith firm, 
xi = output of the i**1 firm.
Pi -  (Sp(*i.x2)/iXi)
and r; -  is the slope of firm i’s reaction function.
The cross effect (dx-^dcj) is always non-negative, but the effect of a change in the 
costs of the high cost firm on its own profits can go either way. There is a negative direct 
effect represented b y  -Xj, but there is an indirect effect acting via quantities that can 
reinforce or offset this direct effect.
It is easy to check that for a general Cournot-Nash equilibrium with constant 
marginal costs, Vj = 0 and
(16) da/dcj < 0 if and only if -p2x1a 1r2+x2p1a2 < XiT or 
da/dcj > 0 if and only if -p2xla lr2 +x2Pla 2  > XjT
> 0
With a linear demand function, the expressions above can be reduced to: 
do/dc, y < 0  iff2(p,)2(xI-x2] >< x ,r
but the left hand side of this expression is always negative because Xi < x2 and 
consequently, da/dcl is always negative as Vickers finds out. However, it is not possible to 
generalize this result from (16) above to any kind of demand function without further
65 These sign conditions are required by stability assumptions (see Dixit (1984)).
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elaboration. Note that in the left hand side of (16), the first term is negative while the 
second is positive while the right hand side of (16) is also positive.
As regards to the inverse of assumption 1, (15) suggests that it will usually arise in 
cases of intense competition between the two firms in the product market. But this result 
is also subject to some qualifications. When there is competition in that market, the 
conjectural variations will approach one as the product becomes perfectly homogeneous 
and then, [Vi - r j  will be negative as Dixit proves for the normal case when r2 < 0 . As a 
result, (15a) will have a positive component and a negative one. (15b) will not have any 
influence here as it will be equal to zero.
The former discussion points out that there is some kind of link between market 
structure and the sign of the direct effect in the technology game. However, this link cannot 
be generalized in the sense that Vickers does when he establishes that
"(the conjectural variation) is regarded by some people as an index of 
’competitiveness’ since collusion is approached as the conjectural variation 
approaches 1 and Bertrand behaviour is approached as the conjectural 
variation approaches -1. In this language, it can be stated that in a single 
patent race, the incentive of the high cost firm minus the incentive of the 
low cost firm increases as behaviour in the product market becomes less 
competitive and more cooperative" (...) "...assumption 1 is likelier to hold as 
behaviour in the product market is less competitive". [Vickers (1986) p.l 1].
Demand conditions seem to play an important role in the sign of the direct effect as 
can be seen from expression (15), although the conjectural variations also have an 
important influence. However, simulations with a linear demand function p=100-Xi-X2, 
c=20 and Vj =v2=0,5 show that joint industry profits fall when the costs of the high cost 
firm fall from 39 to 37 but increase if they fall from 23 to 21 for instance.
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This kind of result, besides product differentiation,66 could help to explain the 
different results obtained by Vickers and Beath et al.. But in sequential models of 
innovation, the induced effect plays a crucial role in the outcome of the technology game. 
In the next sections, a series of variations to the basic model proposed by Vickers are 
presented in order to study how his conclusions are modified as the structure of the game 
varies.
V .7. S e q u e n t ia l  I n n o v a tio n s  W ith  F r e e  D if f u s io n .
It has been argued often that one of the market imperfections associated with the 
technology markets is due to the low cost of transmission of the information, which 
facilitates almost free diffusion of some technologies. This has been considered as factor 
playing in favour of the high cost firms and countries. However, in case of "free diffusion” 
in game 1  - i.e. if at the beginning of each period the high cost firm can use the technology 
abandoned as obsolete by its rival at zero cost- the structure o f the game is simplified and 
the influence of future innovations is lost. In other words, with free diffusion there is no 
difference between a game with a sequence of innovations and a sequence of games with 
only one innovation each. Nevertheless, this model is also valid for any number of time 
periods, as long as the patents give an exclusive access to the new technology but just for 
one period of time.
In this setting, the action-reaction equilibrium is as likely as any other and it does 
not depend on the assumption 1 .
66 Note that under product differentiation, conjectural variations arc not symmetric in the competitive 
as they will be Vj -  - (p'j/p'j).
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Let us assume the same game structure as in game 1. However, it will be assumed 
that at the beginning of each period, the high cost firm can use for free the technology 
abandoned as obsolete by its rival. This gives the following game 2.
Period "0"
Initial costs
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
Period I
If firm 1 wins 
the first auction
(c.ki)
Period II
Firm 1 wins Firm 2 wins
2 nd auction 2 nd auction
(♦.«=) (C,*)
Game 2.
<W*>
\
\
\
\
\
\
\
If firm 2 wins 
the first auction
( M )
Firm 1 wins Firm 2 wins
2 nd auction 2 nd auction
(*.c) (c,*)
Note that now, only two final price structures remain but the number of possible 
equilibria is still four. If the final price structure is (<*>,c) the payoffs of the second period to 
firm 1 are.
Ml -  o(4>,c) - x 2n(c,<*.) 
and to firm 2  are,
M2 -
but if the final price structure is (c,<£),
Ml ■  » ‘»(c.*) and M2 * ®(c.*) - » ‘ lK ^ c)
From here, it is easy to define the reservation prices for the first innovation as,
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p,I ■  ^ i f e k f )  + max [<j(<t>,c) - t 2, , ^ ) .  T^rfc,*)] -
- » ‘K M )  - max [o(*,c) - « ^ ( c , * ) , » ‘»(c,*)]
P2I = »^(kj.c) + max [o(<t>,c) - x ,n(*.c) . » ^ (¿ .c ) ]  -
- » ^(c-k i) - max [o(*,c) - T>n(*,c) , x2^ ^ ) ]
Conditions to know which firm will win the first innovation are derived from the 
difference between P1] and P2^ , but
P‘, - P 2l -« (c ,k 1) -» (k 1 .c) = 0
Thus, no firm shows a reservation price different from its rival’s in any auction and 
who will win is not known. Note that the initial asymmetry between firms is lost after one 
period and has no influence on the outcome of the game.
In terms of our discussion in section V.4., what free diffusion introduces is a 
substantial difference in the technology game. First, the induced effect is the same for both 
firms. But second, this is due to the fact that, with free diffusion the technology game is no 
longer a patent race: the firm losing one auction can still improve its technology, not as 
much as the winner, but it will have lower production at no cost at all. Using a terminology 
introduced by Dasgupta, firms are indifferent between fighting for the patent in the auction 
and waiting.
Finally, note that action-reaction still remains as a possible equilibrium, but 
assumption 1 has no influence on its appearance. However, free diffusion ensures that 
increasing dominance will exist only if k2  - kj < c - k, < <j> -c.
V A  S e q u e n t ia l  I n n o v a tio n  W it h  N o -R e v e r s ib l e  R& D  c o s t s .
As we pointed out before, in the models by Vickers and Beath et al. R&D costs are 
reversible as the firm not winning the patent does not incur into any R&D cost. This is not
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the case in real life as any firm competing for an innovation has to incur into positive R&D 
costs while only the winner will obtain some reward for these expenses. Furthermore, in 
the models mentioned above, firms always enter the patent race. This is logical when this 
is free, but if there is some non-reversible cost in joining the patent race, firms will have to 
decide first whether to enter the patent race or not.
Firm 1
/
/
/
/
/
Enter
/
Firm 1
/  \
Enter Do not enter
/ \
/  \
Payoffs:
Ifa(<>,k)>a(c,<£) V ^ x ^ .k j - z
V I.  „l(*.k).T2(c,*) + „2(*.k) V2- »2(*,k)
V2=,2(*.k)-z
If <7(&k)<0(c,4)
Vl = 1T>(c,</>)-Z
V2 =x2(c,0 )-x 1(^,k) + ir1(c,^) with <t> < c < k
The structure of the game is very simple. Each firm has to pay a fixed amount z to 
enter the patent race. If both firms joint the race, the firm with the highest reservation 
price wins it, and that will depend on a(<£,k) > < a(c,$). But in that case, the firm losing the 
race has to pay the R&D cost z. If one firm joins the race and the other does not, then the 
first one will win it at a cost equal to z, but the other firm would save that amount. If 
neither of the two firms enter the race, the innovation is not adopted. It is easy to see that 
a solution with both firms entering the patent race is not a Nash equilibrium because
\
\
\
\
\
Do not enter
\
Firm 2 
/  \
Enter Do not enter
/  \
/  \
V>-T>(C,*) Vl «W*(cJt)
V2 « » 2(c,*)-z V2 »x 2(c,k)
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whatever is the sign of a(4,k)-a(c,4), the firm losing the auction would win z by not joining 
the race. The only possible Nash equilibria are:
- firm 1  enters and 2  doesn’t if o(<t>,k)>a(c,<f>) and if ir1 (^,k)-z>x 1(c,k)
- firm 2  enters and firm 2  does not if a(^,k) < a(c,<f>) and if ir2(c,^)-z>x2 (c,k)
The second condition above is important to avoid no firm joining the race. If the 
single period game above is expanded to the general game 1 with three periods, we get the 
following reservation prices for the two firms in period 1 :
P1, -  i ‘i(c.k2) + max [x'lriAkj) - z  , x ' rr(c,*)] -
* ‘l(ki.c) - max (xl,|(*,c) - z , I 'lK k ,.* )]
P2, -  x2i(k,,c) ♦ max [x2„(k|.<.) - z , i 2„(<i,c)] - i 2,(c,k2)
- max [>In(<k*>«x, ||(4 .k 2)].
Note that the second condition implies that the first terms in the brackets are 
maxima because if we require that x 1(^,k)-z>x 1 (c,k) and x2(c,^)-z>x2(c,k) the former 
implies that,
tr1Il(</,.k2) - z > x1! ! ^ )  because x ^ ifck ) > x^^c,«» and 
»*ll(k i »  - z  "  **n(*.ki)  - z > •ali(^ c ) *
and x 1n(c,k) > x ^ c .^ )  fo ranykcc .67 
Subtracting P2j from P 1 1 we get,
P>, - P2, = «»(c.kz) - a(c,k,) + Iv1n(^,k2) -
67 Similarly,*2(c ,# )-x  > w2(c ,k )  implies that » 1i , ( * , c ) - z  > *1, ! <k1 ,#) and *1 j , ( c ,* ) - z  » » 1,,< * ,k 2) 
^ ( c . k )  »  « 2(# .k j )  > *2(#,k2)  for any k.
163
where the term in brackets at the right hand side is always positive. Therefore, it is 
possible to conclude that the reverse to assumption 1 . i.e. <rt(c,k+i) > a,(c,k) is a sufficient 
condition for increasing dominance.
This result, contrary to Vickers’ conclusions, is due to the new structure of the 
game. Notice that while the induced effect was acting in favour of the second firm in 
Vickers’ model, here, it is always favourable to firm 1. As a result, action-reaction is 
possible if and only if the direct effect act in the opposite direction and is big enough to 
compensate the induced effect.
V.9. D if f e r e n c e s  in  t h e  A b il it y  t o  A d o p t  N e w  T e c h n o l o g ie s . ("H is t o r y  M a t t e r s").
In game 1 described in section V.2, both firms have the same opportunities to have 
access to any innovation that is auctioned at the beginning of each period. This is one of 
the most striking characteristics of Vickers’ model. In a model with n + 1 periods and n 
innovations, it is hard to envision that a firm that has lost n - 1  auctions and is 
technologically far behind its rival, can win the last auction and become the low cost firm 
overnight.
In game 3 below, a factor reflecting the influence of the relative backwardness of a 
firm has been incorporated to the game. This can be done in several ways. One can think 
of some extra costs that the high cost firm has to pay for the patent but which the low cost 
firm does not have to incur. Alternatively, it is possible to imagine a situation in which the 
high cost firm cannot have access to the "latest" technology at the beginning of each period, 
but to the immediately more advanced technology to the one it is using. Note that now, if 
firm 2  wins the first auction, symmetry is restored and firms have the same incentive to win 
the second patent.
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A particular case of this game is the case in which the innovation reduces costs in 
each firm by a certain fixed amount that is subtracted from its past constant marginal costs, 
Le. k2*k, = k,-c = c-4 .
Period "0" 
Initial costs
Game 3.
( M 2 )
Period I
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
If firm 1 wins 
the first auction
(c,k2)
If firm 2 wins 
the first auction
(M,)
/  \
/  \
/  \  
/  \
Period II
Firm 1 wins 
2 nd auction
(*.k2)
Firm 2 wins 
2 nd auction 
M i )
Firm 1 wins 
2 nd auction
(c.k,)
Firm 2 wins 
2 nd auction
(k„c)
Following the usual procedure, the difference in reservation prices in the first 
period will be
plI * p2I = a(c»k2) + "tax K ^ .k 2 )-T2n(c,k,), ir1„(c,k1 )]-a(k,,k1) - max [a(c,k1)-T2II(k 1,c), 
*’1Il(ki.c)] - max [ff(k1 ,c)-T1II(c,kl ), »^ifok ,)] + max (a(c,k1 )-ir1 i,(0 ,k2), w2 tI(4 ,k2)]
The first interesting result that arises here is that assumption 1 and its reverse have 
no influence on the direct effect while asymmetry is preserved. Note that the direct effect 
in the first period depends on the sign of a(c,k2) - o(k,,k,), i.e. how joint industry profits 
vary when the cost levels of each firm start to diverge from a certain common level. It can
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be proved that both under Cournot and under Bertrand conjectures and with a linear 
demand function, this difference is positive if (kj - c) = (k2  - kj). However, this is not 
necessarily true when (ki-c) = /=  (k2-k1). Hence, Cournot behaviour in the product 
market plays in favour of the first firm in the first auction, not necessarily leading to action- 
reaction.
The induced effect has no definite sign. If ®(^,k2 )-a(c,k|) > 0, it is just 
. ‘(*,k2) - ^ k „ c )  ♦ 2 rH*,k2) - 2 »2(c.k,)
However, if k2-kj = kj-c = c-<£ it will usually be positive under Cournot behaviour 
producing increasing dominance as a result.
V .IO . C o n c l u s io n .
This chapter has analysed the structure and limitations of a series of models of 
sequential innovation that try to explain market evolution. For that purpose, a very 
simplified version of the model developed in Vickers (1986) has been presented.
Two kinds of incentives to win each auction are distinguished: the direct effect, 
which exists in any single period game and the induced effect, which is due to the influence 
of the sequence of innovations and auctions. In the original model used by Vickers and 
others, the first one depends on how joint industry profits vary when the costs of the high- 
cost firm change. However, this is not true when "history matters". Then, the direct effect 
depends on how industry profits vary when costs diverge.
The induced effect captures the influence of future auctions on the willingness to 
pay for the patent currently being auctioned. This effect depends heavily on the structure
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of the game, particularly whether or not there is free diffusion and when R&D costs are 
reversible.
In spite of being highly dependent on the structure and the assumptions of the 
game, these models can shed some light into the forces affecting adoption and diffusion of 
new technologies. Furthermore, the differences in the results obtained when the 
assumptions are altered as it is done in Beath et al. (1987) and here, can help us to isolate 
and identify the impact of those assumptions.
When there is free diffusion and firms can obtain without any charge the 
technology auctioned in the previous period, the induced incentive is the same for both the 
high and the low cost firm. The only incentive to win the current patent is the "profit 
incentive" identified by Beath et al. (1989) which can be derived of having lower production 
costs in the next period. In this case, both firms have a strong incentive to wait for free 
diffusion instead of bidding for the new technology.
If the situation takes the form of a patent race and R&D costs are sunk costs, i.e. if 
the firms have to pay a fixed amount to participate in the auction, it is possible to find a 
sufficient condition for increasing dominance. That sufficient condition is exactly the 
reserve to the Vickers assumption. If joint industry profits are higher when the costs of the 
high cost firm are higher, I.e. a(c,k+e) > o(c,k), there will be increasing dominance. 
Furthermore, while in Vickers’ model the induced effect was always acting in favour of the 
high cost firm, here it always favours the low cost firm.
Finally, we should be aware of the reservations concerning the optimality of this 
kind of auctioning mechanisms. For a detailed discussion on this topic see Vickery (1961) 
and Myerson (1981).
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In the next chapter, the problems of the evolution of market structure will not be 
considered. The emphasis will be put on the problem of the relative incentives that firms 
have to adopt new technologies in an asymmetric context where the direction of 
technological change matters.
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Chapter V: Appendix
We can assume either:
*) ®ll(<kk2) - ffIl(c’t )  > 0  and aj|(k,,^) - au(4 ,c) < 0 , then
(10) P1, • P2, -  <F|(c,kj) - 9 |(k ,,c) + o„(0 .k2) - 2on(0,c) + i^K k ,,* )  + »JTI(*,k2)
Under assumption (i), firm 1 will always win the second auction and depending on 
the sign of (10) we could have type A or type C  equilibria. Both are possible because (i) 
implies,
ffl(c.k2) - ai(kltc) > 0  
®Il(*.k2) '  °Il(*-c) > 0
but t2^ ^ , ^ )  + »2n(^,k2) - <T|i(<^ >,c) < 0  because,
+ »2n(^.k2 ) < » '»(^.ki) + ^ i i i^ .k ! )  = ojji^.k,) < an(<£,c) 
and the sign of ( 1 0 ) could go either way.
“ ) ffllfa>k2) - ®ii(c.$) > 0  and a|i(klt^) - o\i(<t>,c) > 0 , then
(11) P1! - P2, = a|(c,k2) - o'i(k1 ,c) + T^ifa.kz) - »^¡(k,.^) - ff»(«kk2) - ffn(k,,*)
Here, (ii) implies that the firm that won the first auction will win the second one 
too. Hence, cases A and D are the only two possible outcomes depending on the sign of
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( 1 1 ), which is uncertain because although [tr2n(^,k2)-ir1n(k1,^)] is always positive, (ii) does 
not imply any sign on aiifa.kj) - a^k ,,* ).
***) ®ii(^.k2) - ou(c,4>) < 0  and <rn(ki.4) - ou(<p,c) < 0 , then
(12) P>, - P2, -  a,(c,k2) - 0 |(k,,c) + ^ „ (k , .* )  - i In(^,k2)
Here, (iii) implies that the firm that lost the first patent will always wins the second 
auction. Consequently, only cases B and C are possible. Furthermore,
- "■Ili(^.k2) = f l^ n fr k i)  - *-1ll(^*k2) < 0.
As a result, if assumption 1 holds for any period, only case C  can occur. But if the 
reverse of assumption 1 holds for the first auction, case B may appear.
iv) 0 u(4 .k2) - <7||(c,<#>) < 0 and <7l|(k1,<^ ) - an(4 ,c) > 0 , then,
(13) P1, - P2i = a,(c,k2) - ff|(k,,c) + 2on(<t>,c) - ffn(k,,^) - »^¡(kj,«^) - » 1n(^,k2)-
In this case, firm 2 always wins the second auction. However, nothing can be said 
with certainty about the sign of (13).
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Chapter VI: International Diffusion of New Process Technologies with
Asy m m e t r ic  D u o p o u s t s
V I. 1. I n t r o d u c t io n .
The theoretical study of the diffusion of new technologies has benefited from 
important contributions in the last two decades. However, little attention has been paid to 
the specific implications and circumstances that accrue when diffusion processes take place 
across national borders. Different strands of the literature on technological change and 
international trade as diverse as Teece (1977), Gomulka (1971) or Jensen and Thursby
(1987)68 take the existence of diffusion as a phenomenon playing a role in their arguments. 
However, the explanation of diffusion is not the central object of their works.
Another strand of the literature starting with Posner (1961), Vernon (1966), 
Hufbauer (1966) and more recently continued by Krugman (1979), Cheng (1984), Dollar 
(1986) and Jensen and Thursby (1987), stresses the importance of different levels of 
technological development among countries, or "technological gap",69 to explain changes in
68 Lee (1984 a and b) and Cimoli et al. (1986) approach the issue of international diffusion in a more 
direct way. But Cimoli's work considers it in a very general framework that includes aspects such as structural and 
institutional differences among countries and Lee’s work is more a model of technological transfer. Neither of 
these models considers the timing of the adoption of the innovation across countries in a explicit way.
69 The difference in the technology level between two countries or "technology gap" as it is usually known, 
can make reference to two different things or, sometimes to both of them simultaneously. We can say that there is 
a technology gap between two countries whenever the technology used by the firms in one country is more 
advanced than the technology used by their competitors abroad, in the sense that the first firm can produce more 
sophisticated products or a certain product at a lower cost. However, some authors refer to the technology gap 
between countries whenever the stock of technology available to the firms in each country is not the same. Here, 
we will say that the technology gap persists even in those cases where firms in both countries are using the same 
technology, but their ability to develop new technologies is not the same.
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the patterns of trade between countries over time. Undoubtedly, the so called "technology 
gap" has an important influence on the timing of adoption of new technologies by different 
countries. However, little is known about international diffusion when countries have 
similar levels of technological development. In any case, one could question whether this 
"technological gap" is the one and only determinant o f international diffusion.
The objective of this chapter is to explore the impact of different types of 
asymmetries between firms and countries on the international diffusion of a new process 
innovation, leaving the effects of the "technology gap" on a secondary plane. This is not 
done because the "technology gap" is not considered as an important factor to explain 
diffusion. On the contrary, I consider it as a relevant factor. But here, the  emphasis is put 
on finding some other less obvious factors of a strategic nature, which also have an impact 
on international diffusion of new technologies.
The following sections deal with the relative incentives to adopt an innovation in 
the presence of initial cost asymmetries and strategic interactions between the firms. The 
influence of the technological gap is reduced to the initial differences in average costs of 
production in two countries. The strategic interactions are of a very simple kind, but they 
include different forms of oligopolistic behaviour by the innovating firms (Cournot-Nash 
and Bertrand conjectures) and the supply-side behaviour of a monopolist selling the 
innovation to the two duopolists.
The influence of cost asymmetries was first emphasized in the diffusion literature 
by P. David (1985). The importance for diffusion of strategic interaction between the 
potential adopters was firstly mentioned in Reinganum (1981). Later, Stoneman and 
Ireland (1984) pointed out to the influence on the pattern of diffusion of strategic 
behaviour by the supplier of the new technology. However, the kinds of strategic 
interactions that will be used here are closer to those developed in Vickers (1986) and 
Beath et al. (1987).
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In this chapter, mutual cost asymmetries and strategic interaction are brought 
together to study the relative incentives to adopt different types of innovations, that would 
produce different cost reductions in the two different countries which we will be 
considered. For this purpose, a very simplified setting will be assumed with two firms, each 
one operating from a different country and competing in an international market. In this 
sense, this model resembles Reinganum’s 1981 model. Reinganum proved that in a 
perfectly symmetric duopoly, both firms would not adopt a cost reducing innovation 
simultaneously. In that situation, one firm will adopt the new technology later and will 
obtain lower profits than the first adopter. But there are two Nash equilibria and it is not 
possible to tell which firm will lead in the process of adoption. "Ceteris paribus", both firms 
have the same probability of being the first adopter.70
In the same paper, Reinganum reports on results obtained by M.T. Flaherty (1980) 
and herself (1980) for the asymmetric case, in two unpublished papers. In this case, firms 
do not adopt simultaneously either, but the identity of the leader in the process of adoption 
will depend here on its "comparative advantage in implementing the new technology".7 1 
This type of analysis is closer to the type o f situation studied in this chapter. However, the 
model presented here differs from those in Reinganum (1981) and Fudenberg and Tiróle 
(1985) in the sense that those models focus on the precise timing of diffusion as a sequence 
of calendar dates, rather than on the order of adoption as it is done here.
The results obtained in this chapter are similar to those reported by Reinganum but 
the analytical framework is considerably simpler here. Furthermore, this chapter includes 
some possible expansions of particular relevance to the international diffusion of
70 This paper has been criticized on different grounds by Fudenberg and Tiróle (198S), Quirmbach (1986) 
and Grindlcy (1986). For our purposes here, the contribution made by Fudenberg and Tiróle has particular 
importance. They show that under certain conditions, the diffusion solution provided by Reinganum does not hold 
and there are equilibria for which late simultaneous adoption results.
71 Reinganum (1981) page 404.
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technology, such as supply-side considerations. Section VI.2 sets up a simple model with 
only one "world demand" function and presents some results on the influence of different 
production costs across countries. Section VL3 compares the incentives to adopt different 
new technologies under Cournot-Nash and Bertrand conjectures in the market for the final 
product. That section reconsiders some of the questions that were addressed in the 
previous chapter. It examines the impact of the different cost reductions that a new 
process technology can bring about, when it is introduced in different countries. Section 
VI.4 develops the simple model incorporating some structure concerning the conditions of 
supply of the innovation, and section VI.5 introduces demand asymmetries between 
countries.
V U .  T h e  "w o r l d -m a r k e t  m o d e l " w it h  c o u r n o t -N a sh  C o n je c t u r e s .
Assume that two different firms, 1 and 2, each one of them operating in a different 
country, (1 and 2), and producing a homogeneous good. Their output is sold in a "world 
market" at the same price and there are no transportation costs. The "world" demand 
function is linear and output units, xlf are chosen so that it can be written in the following 
the form,
p -  A - x, - x2
Firms buy their inputs in their own domestic markets, and consequently, they face 
different factor prices. There could also exist initial differences in the technology used by 
each firm. Constant average costs of production are a function of the input prices paid by 
the firm and the technology used. Firm 2 is assumed to have lower average costs of 
production, k2, than firm 1, klt prior to the innovation.7 2 This difference can be due to: a)
72 These average costs will be the unit costs at which firms 2 and 1 will be operating during the first period, 
unless they introduce the innovation. Note that there is a change in the ordering of the initial costs of firms 1 and 2 
with respect to previous chapters.
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lower factor prices in country 2  when both firms have the same technology, b) better 
technology in country 2 , with equal prices, or c) some combination of a and b.
There are only two periods of time and at the beginning of the first one, a new cost- 
reducing technology is available in the market. The price of the technology declines over 
time and the first adopter will be the firm with a higher reservation price for being the first 
user. This does not indicate precisely at what point of calendar time each firm will adopt 
the new technology. In this discrete time setting, only the order in which adoption takes 
place is relevant. Thus, these periods of time will be defined in such a way that in period 
one, only the first adopter uses the innovation, while in the second period, both firms are 
using the new technology.
The cost structure o f the firms in the first period will depend on which one adopts 
first. When firm 1 is using the new technology, it has average costs Cjj when firm 1 is using 
the old technology, its average costs are k, Similarly, prior to the adoption of the new 
technology, firm 2 has average costs k^ and after adoption these costs drop to c^. One can 
think of each pair of average costs for both firms as corresponding to a different type of 
technological progress or innovation. As a result of technological change, the firms’ 
isoquants will shift towards the origin. But the different input prices faced by firms 
operating in distinctive countries will not result in the same average costs for each firm. 
Thus, the type of the innovation will determine the shift of the isoquants, and this will 
result in many different possible combinations of average costs for both firms. Table VI. 1 
summarises the possible cost combinations for the two firms,
By assumption, k, > k^ but little can be said a priori about the relative position of 
Cj and C2 . In principle, one should think that the case in which ct ^  C2  will be the most 
interesting one. If Ci < c^ one should expect that firm 1 will be the first adopter, because 
the change in profits for firm 1 will always be greater than for firm 2 , for any initial value of
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kj and k2. However, nothing excludes, a priori, the possibility that, even in that case, the 
low cost firm might adopt first. Therefore, both possibilities remain open .73
Table VI. 1.
Average costs user of the r.on-user of the
when: new technology new technology
firm 1 is C 1 k |
firm 2  is ®2 >■ 2
Ci may differ from C2  due to differences in input prices between both countries. As 
it has been repeatedly assumed in previous chapters, differences in production costs are 
not necessarily the result the of differences in technology. If just one factor (say, labour) 
has a different price, country 2 will be the country paying a lower price for that input. But 
if one input is cheaper in one country and a second one is more expensive in that country, 
the identity of countries 1 and 2 will depend on the initial technology. Thus, if Cj > C2 , one 
will say that the new technology does not change the prevailing "comparative advantage” as 
measured by the ratio of unit production costs in the two countries.
It is assumed that there is no difference in the adoption costs of firms in each 
country, and thus, the following adoption rules can establish 74
- firm I will adopt first if and only if
(1) F -  9 [ * V  . «c2  + » k j  > 0
- and firm 2  will adopt first if and only if
73 Cj can be greater o r smaller than k2.
74 For simplicity, drastic innovations that eliminate the duopolistic structure are not considered.
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(2) F = 9[*«! - 1 ^ 1  - » « 2  + xk2 ] < 0
where for i= 1 ,2 ,
»°i = profits made by firm i when it is a user of the new technology and its rival is not. 
xkj = profits made by firm i when it is not a  user of the new technology and its rival is.
If the i,h firm (¡=1,2) is not using the new technology in a certain period of time 
and its rival j (j = 1 ,2 ) is already using it, the problem for firm i will be to find jq to
max *», = (A  -  Xj -  Xj • k,) Xj
and for the j,h firm, the problem would be to find Xj as to 
max m (A - Xj - Xj - Cj) Xj
Assuming Cournot-Nash conjectures, the simultaneous solution of the two former 
problems could be written as,
(3) i r t  -  (A + <5 - 2lq)2 /  9
= (A + Iq - 2ckj)2 /  9 i= /= j=  1,2.
A function F(cj, C2  ; kj, k2) is defined as the difference in reservation prices 
between firms 1 and 2, for a certain technology producing costs (c^cj). The sign of F will 
not be the same for every pair ( c j^ ) .  The low cost firm, 2, will benefit more from being 
the first user than the high cost firm 1 , because it already has a larger market share. 
However, firm 1 will have lower profits than firm 2 when it doesn’t have the new 
technology and its rival has it, and in a sense, one could say that firm 1 loses more than 
firm 2 if it is not the first adopter. Thus, who will benefit more from being the first 
adopter, and consequently who will be willing to pay more to be the first innovator, is not a 
trivial question.
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F can be considered as a function of c , and C2  taking k2  and k, as parameters 
initially fixed . Its sign depends on the values of c, and C2 , i.e. on the nature of the 
innovation. F is continuous in Cj and C2 - The level curve of function F() for values of the 
variables (c,,«^) and parameters (kltk2) such that F(c,,C2  ; k,,k2) = 0 , will divide the set 
defined by [O.kJ x [0,k j ] into two subsets F  and Fc. In F, expression (1) above holds and so 
does (2) in F \  That is,
F  = { (C1 .C2 ) I F(ci.C2) > 0  } and
** "  { (C1 .C2 )  I F(c, cj) < 0 }
These two sets are illustrated in figure VI. 1. But before exploring their implications 
it is necessary to study the frontier between both sets. Given (3), F  = 0 will be
(4) F « 2 A(k, + c2 - c , - k 2) + 8 (k1c2 -c ,k 2) + 5(c12  + k22 - k 1 2 -c 22 ) « 0
Notice that F icj.c^k ,,^ ) = 0 goes through the point k, = c, and k2  = cj, because if 
there is no innovation both firms would be willing to pay nothing for it.
Applying the implicit function theorem to (4) we get the following lemma,
Um m a.- For F fcj.c^k^k^ = 0 and values of k, ;> = c, and k2  ^  that preserve the 
duopoly structure,
(5) d c i/d ^  = (A + 4kj - 5 ^ ) /  (A - 5cj + 4k2) 
and
d ^ /c k ^ 2  = [- 5 /  (A + 4c, - 5k2) < 0 .
Proof.- (See appendix)
Differentiating F with respect to  c, and Cj we can see that points above and to the 
left of F=0 imply F<0 and under and to the right of F=0 imply F>0. Figure VI. 1. 
describes function F() in the c,, Cj space.
F igure VI. l.
If a  is defined as the initial cost disadvantage for firm 1, i.e. a  = k, - k2 and B is the 
cost differential between firms after the innovation, i.e. 8  = c, - C2, (4) can be written as
(4 ’)  F  -  2A(or - B) +  8(orB + - B k,) +  5[8(B + 2cj) +  a ( a  - 2k,)] -  0
Expression (4’) enables the study the pattern of adoption of some particular types 
of innovations. For instance, all the innovations maintaining the cost differential (in 
absolute value) between the two firms will be characterized by a  = B or [k, - c,] = [k2  - c j
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In that case, function F(C|,C2), whose sign indicates which firm will adopt earlier, 
collapses into,
8 a (a  + C2  - kj) + 1 0 a (a  + - kj) = 1 8 (c2 _ kt + a )  = 1 8 (C2  - k2) ^  0
which implies that F ^  0, and consequently, this type of innovations will always be adopted 
earlier by the firm in the low cost country, 2 .
Innovations which eliminate the cost differential between firms and countries are 
characterized by 8  = 0. In that case, which is the only case considered by Vickers (1986), we 
know that under Cournot conjectures, the high cost firm will always adopt first (as can be 
easily seen from expressions (1) and (2) above, because in the Cournot case, we know 
that75 xc 1 + r k2 > + **2). Therefore, for any innovation for which a  = 8 , the low
cost firm will be the first one to adopt it.
This result also applies to those innovations that maintain the relative cost 
differential between both firms, i.e. those innovations that make [k j/k J  = [c j/cJ . That 
straight line goes through (k,, k2) and C! = -  0. It was shown in lemma 1 that Cj = f(<^
; F(cltC2  ; kj,k2) = 0) is a concave function that also goes through (ki,k2), and F(0,0 ; 
kj,k2 ) > 0 . Therefore, all the points in the [ c j , c j  space for which [k j/k J  = [C j/cJ and 
k! >Cj and k2 >C2  must be beneath those that make F(cltC2  ; k j.k ^  = 0 .
Proposition 1.- Under Cournot-Nash conjectures, the relative incentives to adopt a new 
innovation producing average production costs in each country (c ,,^ )  are such that
a) any innovation producing the same average cost levels in both countries, Cj =c2, 
will always be adopted firstly by the high cost country,
75 See Vickers (1986) pages 10 and 11.
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b) any innovation maintaining the absolute cost differential between the two
countries, [kj - c,] = [k2  - c j ,  will always be adopted earlier by the low cost 
country,
c) any innovation maintaining the relative cost differential between the two
countries, [k j/k J  = [cj/cJ , will always be adopted earlier by the high cost 
country.
Finally, it is necessary to remember that there can be differences in the costs of 
adoption between the two firms and these will also have an impact on the pattern of 
adoption. These costs include any other costs necessary to operate with the new 
technology that are not included in its price. They can be due to differences in the level of 
technological development in their respective countries. It is easy to see that, any 
difference in adoption costs between both firms, will shift the function F(cltC2 ) = 0 
upwards or downwards, depending on the identity of the firm enjoying this favourable 
advantage. As a result, the measure of sets F  and Fc will change accordingly.
V I3. T h e  "W o r l d  D e m a n d  F u n c t io n " w it h  Be r tr a n d  C o n je c t u r e s .
The purpose of this section is to compare the relative incentives that the two firms 
located in the two countries have if they act as Bertrand duopolists. For this particular 
case, product differentiation is introduced. It is assumed that the final products produced 
by the two firms are not perfect substitutes. This product differentiation is reflected in the 
following demand functions,
Xj = M - zp, + P2  and
* 1  ■ M ♦ Pi • zp2
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The z term indicates the degree of substitutability between the two goods. Stability 
conditions require that z > 1/2. Furthermore, it is also assumed that substitutability is 
such that the effect of a variation in the price of one good on the quantity demanded of 
that good is greater than the crossed effect on the quantity of the other good, i.e. z > l .76
In this case, the maximum value of the profit function for the i-th firm if j has 
innovated and it has not is given by ,
w*i(B) -  [z/(4z2 - 1)] [M(2z+ 1) + scj ♦  lq (1 - 2z*)]2 
and correspondingly,
* * i ( B )  -  [z /(4 z 2  -  1 )] [M ( 2 z +  1 ) +  sk j +  q  (1  -  2z2)]2
Following the adoption rules defined in (1) and (2) above, the same procedure used 
in the previous section can be applied here to define the loci of new technologies defined 
by the unit production costs (cj.c^), such that given the initial values of M, z, k,, and k2 ,
(6 ) B(c„ c* k„k2) -  Iz/(4z2 . 1 )] [*c,(B) . Tkj(B) - *«2(B) + *k2 (B)] -  0
This expression has the same meaning as expression (4) above for the Cournot- 
Nash case. Substituting the values of the maxima of the profit functions we get the 
expression of a conic section similar to the one obtained in (4). The parametric form of (6 ) 
is
(6 *) B -  [k22  + c,2 - k , 2  - CJ2] [z2  + ( 1  - 2z2)2] + 4 z (l -2z2) (c,k2- cjk,)
+ 2 M(2z + 1) (z - 1) (C| + k2  - kj < 2)
76 Although it will not be necessary to compare these demand functions with the homogeneous product 
demand function used in the previous section, the relationships between both, the implications of our assumptions 
and the resulting equilibria have been studied in Singh and Vives (1984) and Okuguchi (1987).
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Unfortunately, the partial derivatives of B with respect to cI and C2 have an 
ambiguous sign which depends on the relative magnitudes of the coefficients in expression 
(6 ’). Therefore, B() cannot described in the same way as it was done with F() in the 
previous section. However, simple inspection suffices to get some information about the 
location o f the (cj,C2 ) points that make B > -  < 0.
Figure VI.2.
The partition of the set [c,,0] x [O.cJ defined by the level set B = 0 will be as shown 
in figure VI.2. (See a description of this figure in the appendix).
Comparing figures 1 and 2 one can see that there is a set of potential cost pairs 
representing new technologies for which F ic^c^  > 0 and B(cltC2 ) < 0. In other 
words, some technologies that would be adopted first by the low cost firm under Cournot 
conjectures will be adopted first by the high cost firm under Bertrand competition and
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product differentiation. Note that this possibility exists both for cost combinations that 
alter and others that maintain the ’comparative advantage’ of the two firms.
However, the contrary does not happen. There is no innovation that being adopted 
first by the high cost firm under Cournot conjectures is adopted first by the low cost firm 
under Cournot conjectures. Moreover, there are some technologies that will be always 
adopted first by a certain type of firm, regardless of the oligopolistic behaviour of the two 
firms.
This conclusion is an important nuance to the results pointed out in Vickers (1986). 
It was shown in the previous chapter that demand conditions are crucial to link market 
evolution and rivalry in the final-product market. But we have just seen that the key 
factors determining the evolution of market structure, i.e. the adoption rules in ( 1 ) and (2 ) 
above, are also affected by rivalry in the product market and the direction of technological 
change.
For certain types of technological change, i.e. those above F = 0 and below B = 0, 
rivalry in the product market does not have any influence whatsoever, as they are always 
adopted first by the same firm. However, for values of (cj.t^) within the boundaries 
defined by B= 0 and F = 0, rivalry in the product market does matter. The direction of this 
influence is always the same one: Bertrand competition and product differentiation delay 
early adoption by the high cost country for those innovations.
V I.4 . S o m e  S u ppl y -s id e  C o n s id e r a t io n s .
From now on, the Cournot-Nash case will be taken as the benchmark. The two 
previous sections, it has been shown that in the asymmetric case, the nature of the 
innovation available for adoption, i.e. the associated fcj.&O. is one of the determinants of
186
who will adopts the innovation in the first place. It is reasonable to argue that the (cj.t^) 
combination will be the result of decisions made in the R&D sector. Questions such as 
who determines which R&D project to pursue and the cost of alternative R&D projects 
will determine which innovation will be produced in the future.
The demand side conditions of the process of adoption have been studied above, 
but it is necessary to define some supply structure in the production of R&D to complete 
the picture of the process o f creation and adoption of technological changes. In this way, it 
is possible to have an integrated view of the sector. Nevertheless, there are some simple 
supply structures that can give some interesting results.
VI.4.1. Independent R&D producer with sequential innovations.
The set Fc defined in the second section as the new cost combinations that would 
be adopted earlier by the firm in the low cost country, i.e. firm 2 , can be partitioned into 
FC1 and Fe2 , depending on whether the new technology reduces or increases firm 2’s initial 
cost advantage. Assume that a sequence of innovations are introduced in a continuum of 
time by an independent profit-maximizing R&D laboratory. This continuum of time is 
divided into many time intervals t= 1,2,3,...,T, each one of them containing two discrete 
time periods as has been assumed until now. Each new innovation is available for adoption 
at the beginning of each time interval and by the end of this interval, complete diffusion of 
that technology has taken place in both countries.
C j(r )  and kj(r) will designate cost conditions in two time intervals considered, and 
these will define the corresponding sets F(t) and Fc(t).
First of all, note that if a certain innovation producing average costs (Cj.c^) is 
introduced at time t = 1 ,  this pair becomes the initial (k 1(k2 ) at r= 2. If all the innovations
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in the sequence give (ci(t),C2(t)) pairs that belong to the corresponding F(t) sets, then, at 
time T + l, cost symmetry is restored and any firm can be the first adopter77. In other 
words, assuming that technology in the R&D sector is such that it is always optimal for the 
R&D producer to produce innovations which are  going to be adopted first by the initial 
high cost firm 1 , then there is a certain point of time when initial average costs are the 
same for both firms. After that date, the results in Reinganum (1981) and Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1985) apply.
The explanation of this result is simple. Any innovation in F  reduces the cost 
differential between firms. But each F(t) set is bounded by c, = C2  and Cj+o=C2 . As a  is 
reduced when r  increases, there will be a T  large enough for which both upper and lower 
bounds coincide in c t = c2-
The same type of result can be produced if all the profit maximizing choices 
(ci(t),C2(t)) for the R&D producer belong to Fc1(t), where the low cost firm adopts first 
but its cost advantage is continuously eroded. However, this will not be the case if the 
(cl(T)»c2(T)) combinations always belong to Fc2(t). These cost combinations increase the 
cost differential between both firms, and in the limit, the duopoly structure collapses and 
the firm in the high cost country disappears.
VI.4.2. Independent R&D producer and small innovations.
The former results are based on the strong assumption that the cost combinations 
that maximize profits for the R&D firm always belong to the same set. However, under 
much weaker assumptions one can prove that an independent R&D monopolist will always
77 But if the particular conditions described by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) apply, late simultaneous 
adoption will take place.
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produce innovations that belong to F0¡, and consequently, will always be adopted earlier by 
the low cost firm, firm 2 .
F ig u r e  V I3.
To carry out this exercise, it is desirable to eliminate any bias in the cost of 
producing a certain innovation in favour o f  any one of the two potential adopters. This 
requires a certain kind of "neutral" cost structure for the R&D sector. For this reason, it 
will be assumed that those innovations for which there is the same relative incentive in 
both countries to adopt them first are relatively cheaper to produce. In other words, cost 
combinations along the curve F(cj,C2 ) = 0  will be relatively cheaper to produce in the sense 
that any other cost combination near the F  = 0 loci, producing the same cost reduction in 
country i but reducing costs a little bit less in country j will be more expensive to produce. 
(See Figure VI.3.)
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defined as the R&D cost of producing a certain cost combination (cj.c^. 
This cost function defines a collection of convex and continuous level sets in the (cj.c^- 
space that imply the same R&D cost for the monopolist. Assume that for a given cost 
combination (cj0,^ 0) such that F(ci°,c2°)=0,
- any other combination (cj.c^) such that c,>C!° and F(cl,C2 ° ) < 0  will be more
expensive to produce, and
- any other combination (cj0^ )  such that C2 >C2° and F(c1°,c2)>0 will be more
expensive to produce.
More precisely, the following assumption is introduced.
Assumption.- For each and every point (ci°,C2°) such that F (c 1°,c2o) = 0, there will be a 
continuous R&D-isocost curve 1°, such that
a. dcj/dc2  > 0  along 1° and
b. if (C|°c*o) « 1° and (c,00,^ 00) « I°°, 1° > I°° if and only if (cj°,C2°) > > (C]00,^ 00).
Total revenue to the R&D monopolist will be defined as follows. In the first 
period, it will sell the new technology to one firm ( 1  or 2  according to their reservation 
prices for that technology), and this firm will pay the maximum price that its rival will be 
willing to pay for that particular technology. This assumption was used in the previous 
chapter and has also been used in Vickers (1986) and Beath et al. (1987) among others.
In the second period, the late adopter pays for the technology a certain percentage, 
a e JO, 1], of the maximum benefits that it will obtain from adoption, when its rival is already 
using the innovation.' This percentage will not vary with the identity of the late adopter. 
The problem for the monopolist is
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|| qi - R(cj,C2 ) if 1 adopts first 
max V = <
|  q2  - R(c„C2 ) if 2  adopts first
(cl’°2 ) e F  (Gi’.Ca’) « F0 where,
q, -  r ^ k vC2 ) - x 2(cl-k2 ) + 6a [T2(c,,c2 )-T2 (c 1,k2)] 
q2* Ti(c i ’'k2)  - + 6a [T1(c 1’,c2> T 1(k 1,c2’)]
and 5 is a discount factor. Note that the first two terms in the RHS of both equations are 
always greater than the corresponding term in brackets. This is consistent with the 
declining price of the new technology and inter-temporal price discrimination on the 
monopolist’s side.
This problem doesn’t have a straight forward solution and it is difficult to solve 
explicitly. However, it is possible to get some qualitative information about its solution. If 
one can prove that for any cost level given by a R&D-isocost curve, the (cj.Cj) combination 
that maximizes the monopolist’s profits always belongs to F  or Fc, it will not be necessary to 
determine in an explicit way the absolute level of R&D spending.
In fact, this is the case when the monopolist maximizes profits producing "smaU" 
innovations.
Pefinition.- An innovation is ’small’ if, given k, and k2, (cj.Cj) is such that
26a (k2-C2 ) < A + cr 2k2 and 
25a (kj-C]) < A + c2-2 kj.
Now we can prove that,
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Proposition 2.- If the  R&D monopolist will maximize profits by producing "small" 
innovations, the monopolist will always produce innovations that will be adopted first by 
the low cost firm, 2 .
Proof. -
Take a certain R&D-isocost curve 1°, which implies R&D costs for the monopolist equal to 
R°, and call
(ct.cj) m arg max V1 = q 1 - R° 
and (Ci’.Cz’) ■ arg max V2= q2 - R°
Note that for small innovations, q1 and q2  are both decreasing functions of (Cj,«^) 
and (cj’, ^ ’). respectively. This implies that, given the assumed shape of 1°, the 
monopolist’s profits will increase as we move down along the two branches of the R&D 
isocost curve above and below F  = 0.
However, the monopolist’s profits are not continuous at the point (ci,C2) = (Ci’,C2 ’) e 
F(ci,C2 ) = 0. At that point, both firms will be willing to pay the same price for the 
technology in the first period, i.e.
-  » '(C j’J t j )  - i 1(k1.c2’)
and consequently, either of them can be the first adopter. But if firm 1 adopts first and 2 
follows, the monopolist obtains lower profits in the second period than if firm 2  adopts first 
and 1 follows. (See proof in appendix) .78
Consequently, the  monopolist will maximize profits by producing a cost 
combination in 1° close to the point (c^c^) = (cj’.Cj ) e 1 ° to ensure that firm 2  will always
78 Alternatively, if Fudcnbcrg's and Tirole’s conditions apply, it is obvious that late simultaneous adoption
will not be a profit-maximizing solution for the monopolist.
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be the first adopter. The existence of such a combination is guarantied by the continuity of 
the isocost curve.
Although this result has been obtained assuming a very particular cost structure in 
the R&D sector, it can help to advance some conclusions about the relationships between 
the direction of technological change, and the incentives to develop and to adopt an 
innovation.
It has been shown that even if the  cost structure in the R&D sector is neutral in 
terms of which firm will be the first innovator, an independent monopolist will tend to 
produce innovations that will be adopted earlier by the initial low cost firm. From the 
point of view of the country where the high cost firm is located, there is little incentive to 
develop that particular technology, because the final cost combination prevailing when total 
diffusion has taken place, is not particularly disadvantageous for its local firm, i.e. firm 1 . 
The low cost country 2 will always be interested in fostering the innovation that maximises 
the profits of the monopolistic R&D laboratory, because, even if it does not get the 
benefits from the R&D producer, it will benefit from the extra profits that early adoption 
will give to its local firm. Therefore, even when there is no cost advantage in favour of 
innovations that would be adopted earlier in either country, the low cost country will have 
higher incentives to foster R&D. Only a cost advantage in favour of those technologies 
that would be adapted earlier by the high cost firm could induce an independent 
monopolist to develop an innovation that would be adopted earlier by the high cost firm.
Therefore, one can conclude that, under our assumptions of neutrality and market 
structure in the R&D sector, market forces will tend to perpetuate the identity of the high 
and low cost firms in the market of the final product. However, under these conditions, 
public policy intervention in the high cost country to promote the development of 
innovations that would be adopted earlier by the domestic firm would be costly in terms of
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welfare. In addition, as the incentives in the low cost country are  greater, retaliation by the 
low cost country would make public policy intervention by the high cost country ineffective.
V I.5 . T h e  t w o - m a r k e t  m o d e u  
VI.5.1.Demand asymmetries.
Until this point, the model included one common "world demand" function, and no 
transportation costs and consequently, the differences between firms were due only to 
differences in production costs. In order to introduce the analysis of the impact of trade 
variables such as trade policy or different market prices in the two countries, separated 
markets for the final homogeneous good will be assumed, with different market sizes and 
transportation costs in each country, and possibly, different prices for the final good in each 
national market.
This section examines the implications for diffusion of asymmetry on the demand 
side for two monopolists that operate in two different national markets.
For simplicity linear national demand functions will be assumed in each market, 
with the form
y, + x2  = Sj (D - p,) for country 1 
and y2  + Xi = s2 (D - p ^  for country 2,
where for i~  1 , 2  , y{ is the production of the i,h firm for its domestic market, x( is exports of 
the i,h firm to its foreign market, pf is the price of the final good in country i, and Sj (> 0 ) is 
a factor reflecting market size in country i. Note that units of output are normalized in a 
different way than in former sections.
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The model also allows for the possibility of different transportation costs from one 
country to another. Constant unit transportation costs of tf (i= 1,2) are assumed for firm i 
selling in a foreign market. By transportation costs consist of any non-production cost 
added to the domestic cost o f the final product, when it is sold in a foreign market. Thus, 
transportation costs will include not only extra sales and marketing costs incurred by the 
firm because it is selling in a different market, but also tariffs, foreign taxes and domestic 
subsidies.79
In this setting, firm 1 will choose y, and Xj to maximize
» 1  ■ (Pi * ci)Yi + (P2  * cl - *l) *l
and firm 2  will choose y2  and x2  in order to maximize
» 2  -  (P2  - *2 ) y i  *  (Pi • k 2  - h )  « 2
Under Cournot conjectures, the maximized values of each firm’s profits as a 
function of constant average costs (c,k2) are
»1 -  *,(D + k2  + t2 - 2c,/3)2 + s^D  + k2  - 2c, -2t,/3)2 
and t 2 = s2( D +  c ,  + t, - 2 ^ 3 )2  + s,(D + c, - 2k2  - 2 ^ 3 )2
Following the definitions of reservation prices for being the first adopter used in 
section 2, we can define the difference in reservation prices between firm 1 and firm 2, G, 
as
°  =  1 [i| (C | k 2) -T | (k i.c2)-ir2(k i,c2) + T2(Ci.k2)l
79 Our model is similar to Venables’ (1985).
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Firm 1 will be the first adopter if and only if G>0 and firm 2 will be the first 
adopter if and only if G < 0.
Assuming total asymmetry between both firms, function G will be equal to
(7) G -  (s, + sj) [2D(k, + c j  - c , - k2) + 8 ( 1 ^  - c .k ^  + 5(k22 ♦ c,2 - k,2 - c j)
+  2 [(*c2 'c 2 ) ( 5 s l , 2 '4 s 2t l )  +  (*cr c l ) ( 4 s l t 2‘5 s 2t l) ]
This expression is very similar to (4) and allows one to differentiate between the 
incentives of being the first adopter due to cost asymmetry from those due to demand or 
market asymmetry. The first term in the summation of the RHS of (6 ) is the equivalent to 
F  in (4) and we will call it F* which simplifies (6 ) to,
G -F* + 2[(k2 -c 2)(5 s ,l2 .4 s 2t 1) + (k, -c ,) (4 s lt2 -5€2t,)]
In order to simplify the interpretation of (6 ), let us start by assuming that there is 
cost symmetry between firms 1 and 2, i .e .,k |-k 2i and k2-c2 =k,-c1. In this case, F*
collapses zero and
G = 18 ( k ^ )  (Sjt2-S2 tj)
Once more, this expression will not always be positive or negative for any value of 
the  parameters, kj, k2, Sj, s2, tj and t2. However, as could have been expected, for any size 
of the innovation and for any possible difference in market size between both countries (st 
and s^ , demand asymmetry in the reservation prices for being first between the two firms 
vanishes when t! = t2 =0. In other words, it is the existence of positive transportation costs 
between the two countries that produces differences in the reservation prices to be the first 
adopter.
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Of course, if transportation costs are positive, there is a transportation cost 
combination (tlft2) for each market size pair (S],S2) that eliminates that difference in 
reservation prices. If S|t2  = /=  s ^  the high cost firm will always adopt any innovation 
earlier if stt2  > s^tj and vice versa.
As the shape and situation of F*=0 is already known from the study of the cost 
asymmetry case in section VI.2 , we can proceed by examining the effect of different 
demand asymmetries on the relative position of F*«0, given k] and k2. In that sense, if a 
demand asymmetry implies that G = 0 is below F* = 0 for any cost combination (cj.c^, we 
can say that in the presence of this demand asymmetry, some innovations that would 
otherwise be adopter earlier by firm 1 , will now be adopted earlier by the low cost firm 2 , 
and viceversa.
To study the general case, notice first that along F*=0, (k ,-c,) will always be 
greater than (kj-c^. Thus, as long as s = (s^ j/ s^ j) > 4/5, F* = 0 will be below G = 0 if and 
only if,
5sjt2  - 4s2t 1 5s - 4 kj - ct
5s2t ! - 4sjt2  5 - 4s k2  - C2
From this expression one can conclude that s > 1, is a necessary but non-sufficient 
condition to increase the measure of the set of innovations that are  adopted first by the 
high cost firm. This means that if the combined effect of transportation costs and country 
size work in favour of the low cost country 2 , the high cost country can use trade policy to 
make its local firm the first adopter of the innovation.
V I5 2 .  Comparative statics.
The comparative statics of this version of the model are quite simple. 
Differentiating function G with respect to Tj and t2  we get.
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dG /dt2  -  s, [10{k2 - c j) + 8(k, - c,)] > 0 for all (c ,.^ ) .
d G /d t, -  s j [10(c, - k,) + 8(C2 - kj)] < 0
If the transportation costs faced by firm 1 are increased ( or a tariff is levied on its 
exports), the number of possible innovations that would be introduced earlier by firm 1 will 
be reduced. The opposite effect will result from an increase in t2.
However, the effect of market size is not so clear. Consider,
iG/fis, -  6F*(ci,c2)/6s 1 + t2  [K K k j-c ^  + 8 (k , -c ,)J  
and 5G /6S2  = S F 'ic ,,^ ) /* ^  + tj [ lO ^  - k ,) + 8 ( 0 2  - k2).
The sign of the two former equations is not unambiguous because, (for i= 1,2)
(6F*/6si) = 2D(k1 + C2  - Cj - k2) + 8 (k,C2  - c,k2) + 5(cj2  + k22  - kj2  - C22)
will be positive o r negative depending on the values of the new cost combination. Thus, for 
those cost combinations ( c j^ )  such that
a. - G ^  5F*/5sj > 0 , then (6G/6Sj)>0 but the sign of 6G /6S2 will be uncertain, and if
b. - G ^  6F*/5sj < 0 , then (5G/& 2 ) < 0, but 6G/6sj can have either sign.
Cases a or b  will appear depending on the relative values of ( s ,^ )  and (t, t2). If the 
demand asymmetry acts in favour of country 1 , any increase in market size for country 1 
will increase the number of innovations that the firm in this country will adopt first. But if 
the export market grows, the effect on diffusion in country 1 can be positive or negative. 
We can only be sure that this effect will be negative if the market asymmetry works against 
firm 1 , but if this is the case, we can not be sure that an increase in its own market size will 
have a positive impact on G.
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VI.5.3. The impact of trade policies on adoption.
As it has been shown above, zero transportation costs implied demand asymmetry 
between the two firms and, consequently, in this case F* = G = 0 for any cost combination 
produced by the innovation. However, if s, =S2  and thus s= 1, and t 1 = t2 >0, G = 0 is below 
F* = 0 for all (cj,C2 ) because
G = F* + 2 sit2  [k2 -«^+kI-C|] > F*
This implies that, even when there is symmetric demand conditions in the two 
markets and equal but positive transportation costs, the inefficiencies due to the existence 
of these transportation costs imply that some innovations that otherwise would be 
introduced earlier by firm 2, will now be adopted earlier by firm 1. This result is important 
if we recall that transportation costs included policy variables such as tariffs, taxes and 
subsidies.
It indicates that if country 1 attempts to increase its probabilities of being the first 
adopter of a new technology, by raising tariffs and this is counteracted by country 2  by an 
equal but opposite extent, then the final outcome is an upward shift in the boundary line G 
= 0. Consequently, the number of innovations that would be adopted earlier by the high 
cost firm (country), 1 , will increase.
V IJ.4 . D iffusion and trade flows.
This model gives some indication of the impact of international diffusion on trade 
flows. The balance of trade in this sector between both countries will be given by the net 
exports x,-x2  If costs are (c,,k2),
x, -  sj(D + k2  - 2k, - 2t, /  3)
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x2 -  s,(D + c, - 2k2 - 2t2 /  3)
Obviously, the balance will depend on market size and transportation costs as well 
as on production costs. Nevertheless, if S j= s2 and 1 1 = t2, the low cost country 2, will be a 
net exporter of the final good to country 1 :
a) before the innovation was introduced in any country,
b) when both firms are using the innovation, and
c) when the low cost firm, 2 , is the first adopter of the new technology.
However, if the high cost country 1 is the first adopter, it can temporarily become a 
net exporter of the final good, but only if the innovation reduces its marginal costs below 
the marginal costs of its competitor when the latter has not yet introduced the innovation .
VI.5.5. The impact of market size on diffusion.
Differences in market sizes do not seem to have an important impact. From the 
expressions above it is easy to see that if we subtract F* from G when k2 - <^  = kj - c, , we 
get,
O - F* -  18 (k2  - c j  C(s,/sj) - ( t , / t2)] S j l2
This expression shows clearly how the transportation or trade policy variables t and 
the market size have an impact similar in magnitude but of different direction upon the 
adoption decision of the firms. Thus, if for instance, firm 1 has a relative transportation 
cost disadvantage but it has a market size advantage that offsets that disadvantage, it will 
increase its chances of being the first one to innovate.
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VI.6. CONCLUSIONS.-
This chapter is an attempt to study the mechanism of diffusion of new technologies 
across countries facing different types of asymmetries, but excluding the influence of the 
"technology gap" between the two countries. In a very simple model with only two firms, 
one in each country, competing in the international market for a final good as Cournot 
duopolists, it has been shown that the nature of the new technology available for adoption 
will be the crucial factor determining which firm will adopt the innovation earlier. 
Consequently, the conditions of supply of new technologies in the R&D sector will have an 
important influence on the subsequent process of diffusion of new technology. All this 
suggests the necessity of approaching the study of technological change from an integrated 
point of view.80
Under particular supply conditions in the R&D sector, some specific results can be 
obtained. For instance, under the cost conditions described in section VI.4.2. an 
independent R&D laboratory will produce innovations that will always be adopted earlier 
by the low cost duopolist. Section VI.4.1. shows that if a series of innovations of this kind 
happen over time, the high cost firm will eventually disappear.
The relative incentives that the two firms have to adopt the innovation earlier 
under two simple types of duopolistic conjectures have also been compared. For some new 
technologies, the type of duopolistic behaviour downstream does not have any impact on 
the pattern of adoption. However, for some types of technologies, Bertrand conjectures 
increase the relative incentives of the low cost firm more than those of the high cost firm 
and the diffusion pattern is changed. This may happen both for technologies that maintain 
and change the initial comparative advantage.
80 See for instance Stoneman and Ireland (1984).
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Finally, the model has been expanded by differentiating the markets for the final 
product in each country to examine the influence of demand asymmetries. In this case, 
transportation costs and any other non-production costs borne by exported output, will 
have an important influence on diffusion. Any trade policy measure devised by the high 
cost country to improve its probability of being the first adopter (e.g. an increase in tariffs), 
when offset by a similar policy of the same intensity by the low cost country, will have a net 
positive effect in favour of the high cost country, i.e. the original ratio of average 
production costs.
All these results are obtained at the cost of a low level of generality (linear demand 
curve and constant average costs), in the context of an example, and therefore, one must be 
conscious of their limitations. But in many cases, and to the best of my knowledge, this is 
the first time in which some of these questions are addressed in the literature on diffusion. 
The main aim of this chapter has been trying to identify the direction of some effects in a 
context, that despite its relative simplicity presents sufficient complexities and 
intractabilities.
New insights into the mechanism of international diffusion of technology could 
arise under more general assumptions. Alternatively, the consideration of new conditions 
of supply in the R&D sector could produce new solutions. These are only two lines of 
possible future research in a field demanding much more attention that it has received 
until now.
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Chapter VI: Appendix
P r o o f  o f  lem m a 1.-
This expression is positive unless either of the following happens:
a )  A + 4k! > 5 c2  when A + 4k2  < 5cj or
b ) A + 4k, < 5c2  when A + 4k2  > 5c!
However, this possibility can be ruled out if we restrict our attention to the 
economically significant values of (cj.cj) and (k 1(k2). As we have assumed that the 
duopolistic structure will be maintained regardless who adopts first, the economically 
meaningful values of (c,,«^) and (kltk2) are only those that ensure positive outputs for 
both firms after diffusion is complete. The winning firms will have the following output 
levels,
x, -  {(A + k2  - 2c,) /  3] > 0 and x2 -  [(A + k, - 2 ^ ) /  3] > 0
As k! is always bigger or equal than C2 , 3(k, - Cj) ^  0. But from the restriction on 
x2  above, (A  + k, - c,) > c^ therefore the sum of the two RHS of these inequalities can 
never be negative. Hence, the b possibility above has to be eliminated for economically 
relevant values of (c,,^ ) and (k,,k2).
The other possibility requires A + 4k2  > 5c,. By the restriction on x, above we 
know that A  + k2  - c, > c,. This possibility may still occur but only if and only if 3(c, - k2) 
> A - k2  - 2c,.
However, this possibility can be ruled out. Notice that [dc,/dc2] = 0 for c ^ -  [(A 
+ 4k,) /  5] > k2 because A > k2  and k, > k2 . Furthermore, for c, = 0
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dci/dc2 = (A + 4 k , - 5c2> /  (A + 4 1 ^  > 0
as we have seen that the num erator cannot be negative. AS we are considering values of c2  
^  k2  only, i.e. point to the left o f  C2  * [(A + 4k,) /  5 ], the slope of the function c, = f(c2  ; 
F  = 0) between that critical point and C2  = k2  will always be positive.
Description o f the loci B = 0 in  figure  VI.2.
Firstly, note that for the values of (c,,«^) and (k,.k2) such that [k j/k J  = [c ,/cJ , i.e. 
for cost reductions that maintaining the relative cost differential between both Firms, B() as 
expressed in (6 ’) is equal to
[k22 + c,2 -k [2  - 022] [z2  + (1 - 2z2)2] + 2 M (z- 1) (c, + k2 - k, -c*) -
(6 ") = 2M (2z + 1) (z  • 1) (c, - k | + k2  - Cj) +
+ [ (ci - k,) (Cj + k ,) + (k2  - Oj) (k2 + Cj)] [z2 + (I-2 Z 2)2 ]
In (6 ”), the second term
i ( c i - k i ) ( c ,  +  k ,) +  (k2 -C 2 ) ( k 2 + c2)] [z2 +  ( 1 - 2 z2)2) £ 0
because along the straight line defined by [ k , / ^  = [c j/cJ , the (k, - c,) difference is 
bigger than the (k2  - c ^  difference.
For the same reason, and given that (c, + k ,) > ( ^  + k2) along the same line, the 
first term { 2M (2z + 1) (z - 1) (c, - k, + k2  - }  is also non-positive. Therefore, the total 
sum in (6 ”) will be negative when [k j/k ^  = [Cj/cJ and equal to zero in the point ( c , ^ )  = 
(k,,k2), where there is no cost reduction.
In other words, the level se t defined by B() = 0 does not cross the line defined by 
[k i/k j = [c i /c j  f°r positive values of the cost reduction. Therefore, we can see the first
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important difference to the Coumot-Nash case: all those innovations which maintain the 
proportional cost differential between both firms, will be adopted earlier by the low cost 
firm.
Given that B = 0 does not cross the line defined by [ k ^ k j  = [c j/c J  for Cj < k, 
and C2 < k2, the level curve B = 0 must be below or above that straight line.
Firstly, a sufficient condition for B > 0 can be provided. Note that if Cj2  - c £  > k , 2 - 
^2 2  * B() *s always positive. This condition will be met by points down and to the right of the 
rectangle. Therefore, for those points, B > 0, as it happened in the Coumot-Nash case.
Secondly, note that for kj - Cj = k2 - cj, (6 ’) becomes 
B -  [(c,- kj)(cj + k,) + (k2  - c2)(k2 + cj)] [z2 + (1 - 2z2)2] + 4z (1 - 2z2) (c,k2  - Cjk,) < 0
For the particular case in which Cj = 0, this expression is always negative. Thus, we 
can conclude that for points above and to the left o f  the rectangle B() will always be 
negative. B = 0 will thus be located underneath [k j/k J  = [c j/c J  as shown in figure VI.2.
Proof of proposition 2.- (Completion)
At (c ,,^ )  = ( q ’.cj’) t  Ficj.t^) = 0 we know that
F = 2A(kj + C2  - c, - k ^  + 8 (k,c2 - Cjk2) + 5 (0 ,2  + k22  -k , 2  - Cj2) = 0
Furthermore, if Cj =Cj’ and c ^ t ^ ’, the difference in revenues to the monopolist in 
the second period depending on who adopted in the first will have the same sign that
Q -  9 1x 2( 0 ,,C2 > - x 2(c 1 ,k2) - »•(cr.tV) + » '(k i.c^ )] -  
= 4[(C22 + k , 2  - c, 2 - k22) + A(k2+ c, - k, - Cj) - ^ k ,  - c,k2)]
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If we substitute in this equation the value of A ikj+Cj-k,-^) from  its value in (4), 
the sign of M is the same as the sign of
2(k,C2 - C jkj) +  c,2 + k22 - k,2 - Cj2 -  2 0 (0 2  - kj) + 2ft(c2 - k ^  + B2 - a 2 < 0 
because C2  £  k2  and for any point that satisfies (4), o  > B.
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Chapter VII: International Trade, Endogenous Innovation and Dynamic Efficiency
V II.1 . I n t r o d u c t io n .
In the last fifteen years, there has been an important surge of interest in 
incorporating technology related issues into international trade models. As technology is 
an essentially dynamic variable, the new trade models developed to include technology 
issues have in many cases had to take time into account. The simultaneous consideration 
of time and technology has produced new results that contradict the standard conclusions 
from the conventional theories of trade. Good and recent surveys of these new 
developments can be found in Cheng (1984), Soete (1985) and Lyons (1987).
It is difficult to consider trade and technological change in a simultaneous and 
comprehensive way. Economists have had to choose among the many facets that these two 
problems present. In some cases, they have concentrated their attention on studying the 
effect of new products and processes on the patterns and composition of trade and, 
ultimately on welfare. In those cases where technology has been considered endogenously, 
economists have studied how trade policies can affect the rate and direction of R&D or the 
pattern of diffusion of a new technology. Finally, technology has sometimes been 
considered either as a tradable commodity or as a factor of production which can be highly 
mobile across borders.
Within the first line of inquiry, the most remarkable result is the so called 
immiserizing technological progress. According to this result, an increase in the productivity 
of factors intensively used in one country’s export industry will have an adverse effect on 
the terms of trade of that country. If the country’s demand for its export good is relatively
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insignificant and the international demand for that good is inelastic, technological change 
would have an adverse effect on the country’s welfare.
Stoneman (1987) has suggested another kind of adverse effect that may arise from 
the combination of trade and technological change. This argument considers the 
implications of trade policies in terms of dynamic efficiency when there is learning by 
doing. Although free trade can be efficient from a static point of view, when there is 
induced technological change, one country’s future possibilities of production can be 
influenced by the characteristics of the new technology, and these can be influenced by the 
present trade regime. Thus, a trade off between static and dynamic efficiency appears, as it 
usually happens when technological change is considered.
The purpose of this chapter is to show in a formal way how this trade off can arise 
even when there is not any learning by doing. In the context of a conventional model of 
international trade, it is shown that trade policies can introduce biases that affect the rate 
of factor augmentation. As a result of this, under certain technological conditions, having 
free trade when the innovation is produced can have an adverse effect on the country’s 
future welfare.
VII2.. The model.
Assume two different countries, home and rest of the world, that produce two 
different final goods, and y2, under constant returns to scale. To produce these goods, 
two basic inputs are used. The domestic country has an initial endowment X' of each 
factor of production i = 1,2 . In the foreign country, these initial endowments will be given 
by X1*. The linearly homogeneous production functions in each sector are the same in both 
countries and can be written as:
( i)  y '-  fCQ n. 0 , 2)
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(2) y2-  **(021.022)
where Qjj is the total amount of factor of production X' used in the production of final 
good j, with ¡= 1 , 2  and j = 1 ,2 .
Constant returns to scale allow us to write = yj where is just the amount 
of factor of production X' used in the production of only one unit of final good j.
In equilibrium, perfect competition ensures that:
where p i is the relative price of good 1 in terms of good 2 , whose price is assumed to be the 
same in both countries for simplicity, and wf is the price of input i= 1 ,2 .
Full employment o f both inputs requires that:
In order to complete the description of the static equilibrium of each economy at 
any point in time, some assumption about the regime of trade between the two economies 
is needed .81 But let us turn to the technology side of the model.
It will be assumed that there is some kind of technological asymmetry between the 
two countries. This asymmetry is introduced in the model by assuming that industries in
81 This static model can be generalized and incorporated into a dynamic one by assuming that each static 
equilibrium corresponds to a certain point in a continuum of time. For that purpose, it can be assumed that there 
are stable steady-state paths of growth for the two economics, both under free trade and autarky. An innovation 
introduced at a specific point in time would shift the economy from one steady state to a new one. However, as 
this generalization would not alter the results, the static approach will be maintained.
(3)
(3-)
Pi -  wl1 ll  + w2<ll2
1 -  » l<bl + w2<l22
(«)
(•*')
x l  -  Q „  + Q2|
X2  -  0 , 2  + Ç a
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the domestic country will be the first to introduce a certain process innovation, developed 
at home or abroad. The innovation is ordered at a certain moment t = 0. The innovation is 
adopted later by the foreign country and there is a final moment, T, when diffusion is 
complete and all the firms in both countries are using the same technology.82
Technological leadership in the domestic country has implications for the direction 
of technological change. The characteristics of the new process technology are going to be 
determined or induced by production conditions in the home country. In order to reduce 
costs, the current distribution of income between factors of production is taken into 
account and the new technology will tend to save the relatively better paid input. The 
production conditions that will have an impact on the direction of technological change will 
be those prevailing in the relevant domestic industry at time t = 0 .
This assumption is clearly plausible if the new technology is developed or ordered 
from an external R&D laboratory by the domestic industry. It can also be justified on the 
grounds of some priority in adoption times: when deciding the rate and direction of 
technological change, only the "taste" of the first customer matters.
In any case, income flows generated by the trading of technology will not be taken 
into account here. When the new technology is developed at home, it will be assumed that 
it is produced using one factor of production only (that can be called "scientists") which is 
used at full capacity. In order to be able to exclude the influence of this sector in the 
national income accounting, it will be assumed that the total return to scientists will be a 
fixed amount and that "scientists” have a zero marginal product when used in the 
production of final goods.
82 As it will be seen later, this innovation will not normally be neutral in any sense and consequently, in a 
dynamic context, each economy will be in different steady states at t - 0  and at t-T . As the emphasis is put here 
on the potential dynamic inefficiencies that trade regimes can generate, only the different final equilibria that can 
be achieved at time t -T ,  depending on the trade regime prevailing at time t - 0  will be relevant here.
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This idea was suggested by Hicks (1932) and later developed by Kennedy (1964), 
von Weisacker (1966), Drandakis and Phelps (1966) and Binswanger (1974), who assumed 
that the direction of technological change is actually influenced by the relative distribution 
of income between the factors of production. According to these authors,83 if the 
production function of good yj can be written as
(5) yj -  f i  {A(t)Ojj. B(t)Qp>
where A(t) and B(t) are two factor augmenting coefficients, we can define a certain 
"Invention Possibility Frontier"84 as the geometric locus of points giving the different 
maximum proportional increments a(t) and b(t), of the factor augmenting coefficients, i.e. 
different rates of factor augmentation, for a fixed R&D budget. Hence, we can define,
(6 ) b(t) -  *[a(t)]
where a(t)=  [(dA(t))/dt) /  A(t)] and b(t) = [(dB(t)/dt) /  B(t)J. Function <*> is assumed to 
be decreasing and concave towards the origin reflecting the fact that there is a trade off 
between the rates of factor augmentation. In other words, increasing rates of factor 
augmentation in factor 1  can be attained only at the expense of lower rates of 
augmentation in factor 2 , and this will take place at an increasing rate.
If we define the rate of unit cost reduction at any moment t as: 
dC(t)
(7) c(t) -  [----------J/C(t) -  a(t)0  + (1-0) b(t)
dt
where 0  and (1-0) are the relative shares of inputs 1 and 2 in the total cost of output. The 
domestic industry will choose the direction of technological change, i.e. it will choose the
83 More precisely, the version adopted here is the one proposed by Drandakis and Phelps (1966).
84 There has been a certain disagreement on whether to call this curve the Invention Possibility Frontier or 
the Invention Possibility Frontier, and some comments on this can be found in Binswangcr (1974) and Stoncman 
(1983). Here, the first option will be taken.
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a(t) and b(t) so as to minimize expression (7) above, subject to the technical constraint 
expressed by (6 ). That is, the domestic industry will "order" a new technology such that,
(8 ) max c(t) -  a(t) 0  + ( 1 -0 ) b(t) 
a(t), b(t) > 0
subject to b(t) = *  [a(t)]
An interior solution to this problem will require a tangency between the isocost- 
reduction lines defined by (7) and the Invention Possibility Frontier. Consequently, in an 
interior optimum, the following condition must be fulfilled:
- 0
(9) * ’[a (t)J------------
1 - 0
Under different trade regimes, the relative shares of the two factors of production 
will vary, both in the whole domestic economy and within each industry. As a result, it is 
reasonable to assume that this will have an impact on the direction of technological change 
and consequently, different biasses will be induced on technological change under free 
trade and under autarky. In turn, this will imply a different shift outwards in the 
Production Possibility Frontier at time t = T, depending on the trade regime prevailing at 
time t = 0. The next section studies the impact of opening to trade on the relative shares of 
the two factors o f production, within the two domestic industries.
VII3 .  T h e  im p a c t  o f  o p e n in g  t o  t r a d e  o n  f a c t o r  s h a r e s  w it h in  ea c h  in d u s t r y .
Assume that at time t = 0, there is a prohibitive tariff at home so that no trade takes 
place between the two countries. The introduction of a demand side in the two-sector 
general equilibrium model described by (3), (3’), (4) and (4’) above, will yield the well
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established standard autarky equilibrium, as described in any traditional text on 
International Trade.85
This equilibrium defines a certain distribution of income in the domestic economy 
as a whole and within each industry in particular. As a result of these factor shares, the 
direction of the technological change taking place in either industry after time t = T, will be 
endogenously determined by equation (9). Let us call 0* the factor share of input 1 in 
industry 1 under autarky. For a given 0*. the optimum rate of factor augmentation under 
autarky that can be defined as a*(t) and b*(t).
One such case is shown in figure VII. 1, where MM’ is the Invention Possibility 
Frontier and the optimum rates of factor augmentation under autarky are given by point 
R. as a result of factor shares in industry 1 , 0 * and ( 1 -0 *) defined by the autarkic 
equilibrium.
Given the direction of technological change, when the innovation has been fully 
adopted and is being used by all the firms at time t=T , the production possibility frontier 
between goods y! and y2 at T, associated to the trade regime at time t = 0 is determined by 
the rates of factor augmentation a*(t) and b*(t). However, it is important to note that the 
different [a(t),b(t)] combinations along the Invention Possibility Frontier existing at t = 0 
will usually yield different production possibility frontiers at time t=T.
Assume that at time t = 0, the prohibitive tariff is partially or completely removed so 
that we move towards a free-trade regime. Assume that the international price of good yj 
is higher than its domestic price under autarky, and that the home country has a 
comparative advantage in the production of good 1 , i.e. the home country will tend to 
export good yj and import good y2.
85 See Dixit and Norman (1980) for instance.
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Figure VIM.
Furthermore, assume that factor 1 is intensively used in the production of good y y 
and factor 2 is intensively used in the production of good y2. Finally, any possibility of 
factor intensity reversals for any level of output, relative input price ratios and both, prior 
and after the introduction of the new technology is ruled out by assumption. In other 
words,
(q il/q i2 ) > (q2 l/q 22) foraU Yidb > °; wl/ w 2  > o , for any t in [0 ,t]
Under these assumptions, the Stolper-Samuelson (1941) theorem assures that 
removing the prohibitive tariff on imports will raise the real wage and the share in 
international income of factor 1 , while reducing the same variables for factor two, i.e..
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(10)
—  |W|XV(Piy,+y2)] > 0
d  Pi
d
d
d Pi
< 0 -----[w2X2/(Ply|+ 2 )| > 0
d  P2
However, to  know how opening to trade influences the direction of technological 
change, we need to  know first its impact on the rates of factor share augmentation 
[a(t),b(t)]. This depends on how opening to trade affects the relative factor shares in the 
industry "ordering" the innovation at time t = 0. The following lemma establishes this 
relationship between the direction of technological change and the rates of factor share 
augmentation, which depends on the elasticity of factor substitution.
Lemma 1.- The removal of a prohibitive tariff by the domestic country will increase 
(reduce) the factor share of the input intensively used in the domestic export industry, if 
and only if the elasticity of substitution as defined by
<J(w2/ '" 'i )  q i i /q n
is bigger (smaller) than -1 .
This is not a surprising result. As the tariff is removed, if the home country has a 
comparative advantage in the production of good 1 , the relative price of that good will tend 
to increase and m ore resources will be allocated into that sector. Relative prices will also 
change as predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. As good 1 is intensive in factor 1, 
the price of factor 1 will increase. This will induce a mechanism of substitution of inputs 
that will tend to offset the rise in the relative weight of factor 1 in the total costs o f  sector 1 . 
The capacity to compensate for using more of the relatively more expensive input will 
depend on technical conditions, i.e. having an elasticity of substitution more or less than 1 
in absolute terms.
d(q i2/qu) wi/w2 0 5)
a =
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VIM. The induced effect of trade policies on the direction of technical change
AND ON DOMESTIC WELFARE: THE SMALL COUNTRY CASE.
The purpose of this section is to draw some welfare implications about the dynamic 
consequences of having autarky or free trade at a certain point in time '»hen technological 
change is taking place. If we assume that the home country is small and takes international 
prices as fixed, the study of the consequences on welfare of opening to free trade can be 
reduced to studying its impact on the production of good yj, for each output level of good 
y2. In other words, it will be sufficient to compare the production possibility frontier 
resulting from autarky and the production possibility frontier resulting from free trade, 
both at t = 0 .
As it was shown in the last section, opening to trade has an impact on the factor 
shares within each industry. Therefore, lemma 1 can be applied to learn about this indirect 
impact of trade policies on the direction o f technological change.
In figure VII. 1, we can identify the initial autarky equilibrium at point R. This 
equilibrium implies that technological change will augment factor 1 (factor 2 ) at a rate 
equal to a° (b°). The removal of the prohibitive tariff will lead either to a position such as 
R’ if the elasticity of substitution is bigger than -1, or to R” if the elasticity of substitution 
is less than - 1 .
If technological change was originated at time t = 0, initial biasses on technological 
change such as those indicated by points R, R’ or R” in figure VII. 1 will produce different 
production possibility frontiers at time T. In fact, if the production function is Cobb- 
Douglas, the rate of growth in the production of yj will be given by,
y\ Q l ^ 2
r  = —  = a  —  + ( 1 -or)—  + a  a (t) + ( 1 -a) b(t)
y, O, Oz
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If there is no growth in the availability of the two factors of production between 
t = 0 and t=T , r is determined only by
r ■ a  a(t) + (l-o) b(t)
which is a negatively sloped straight line in the a(t),b(t) space. This line is denoted by NN’ 
in figure VII. 1 for the autarky case. Any point above and to the right of this line will imply 
higher levels of output at time T than those implied by the rate o f growth rA achieved when 
there was autarky at t=0. Note that depending on the technology in the R&D sector, NN’ 
and the Invention Possibility Frontier can have one or more intersections.
Also depending on the relative position of R, R’ and R” and the slopes of NN’ and 
MM’, we may have that, for a given combination of both inputs used in the production of 
yj, opening to trade could increase or decrease the total production of that final good. If 
the country is small, to study the relationship between trade regimes, the distribution of 
income between inputs at t = 0  and the production possibilty frontier resulting from induced 
technological change, all what is necessary is to study how different points on the 
Innovation Possibility frontier relate to the future production possibilty frontier.86
Movements along the Invention Possibility Frontier can be decomposed as the sum 
of two different effects: a positive output augmenting effect that goes from R to H in figure
VII.2 and a negative factor augmenting effect that goes from H to R ’.
To study these changes, equation (5) can be rewritten as,
(S’) yi(*> -  A(t) fl [Q ,,. (B(t)/A(t))Q,2]
making use of its linear homogeneity condition.
86 For this comparison, wc will assume that there is free trade at lime t -T .
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Let us define a new variable <t> 87, such that when we move along the Invention 
Possibility Frontier, changes and consequently, A(t) and B(t) also change but in the 
following way:88
( " )
a. - if <t> = <t>° [dA/d*] = 0 and [dB/dtf.] = 0
b. - if <t> < <t>° [dA/d<£] < 0 and [dB/d<f>] > 0
c. - if <t>> <f>° [dA/d<£] > 0 and [dB/d</>] < 0
Figure VII.2.
87 We can think of ^  as the absolute value of the slope along MM'.
88 In terms of this new variable, the exercise that we are developing in this section is just mapping each 
point in the Invention Possibility Frontier into different production possibility frontiers in the (yj.y^ space and 
comparing them taking the one resulting from -  jP as a reference.
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Thus, in case a we remain on point R, case b indicates a movement towards R” 
whereas in case c we approach R\
It is important to note that the relative magnitude of a change in A and B due to a 
certain change in i.e. [(dA/d^)/(dB/d4>)] is related to the curvature of the Invention 
Possibility Frontier. The more concave the Invention Possibility Frontier is, the smaller 
[(dA/d<£)/(dB/d<j>)] will be in absolute value.
Now, <f> will enter equation (5’) as a parameter, so that it can be rewritten as,
(5”) y,(t;*) -  A(t;*) fl(Qn , (B (t* ) /A (t* ))  Q 12)
Using the envelop theorem at point t=T, we get that, for a given combination of 
both inputs (Q n ,Q12). the maximum output yx that can be obtained will vary with <t> 
according to the following expression.
dyi dA dB B dA
( 1 2 ) fl(Qn , --------- 0 | 2> + ' , 2 0 i2 [— -----------] -
d</> d<£ A(t;*) d<£ A d<i>
dA y, B dB
---- 1*2 0 ,1 ] ♦ ---- 1 * 2 0 1 2
d <f> A A d<£
From the expression above, it is not possible to know directly how the yj output at 
time T  will change in response to a movement away from autarky at time t=0, for all the 
possible fixed values of y2. However, something can be said about [dyj/d^] as y, 
approaches 0. The limit of (12) as yj tends to cero,
dyj dA B dB
(13) lim ----  = .........  ~  ^ 2 ^ 1 2  + —
y1-*0 d<t> A d <t>
is negative (positive) in case of a movement downwards (upwards) along the Invention 
Possibility Frontier. Hence, for very low levels of output of the final good yj, the
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production possibility frontier at time T  will be flatter if at time t=0 there was autarky 
(free trade) and the elasticity of substitution was smaller (bigger) than -1. Consequently, 
the following proposition can be made:
Proposition 1.- If opening to trade at time t = 0 increases (decreases) the factor share of an 
input intensively used in the industry where an innovation takes place at that time, then, 
for a given level of output y2 close to the maximum attainable at time T, the maximum 
attainable level of yj will be lower (higher) if there was free trade in t=0 instead of autarky.
For higher levels of output y,, the relative position of the production possibility 
frontier at time T  for a given value of y2, will depend on parametric conditions of the 
Invention Possibility Frontier and the production function. By Euler’s theorem we know 
that:
yi B
—— - Ol.Pl + Q12P2 —
A (T )  A
y!  B 
A(T) A
o „ n ,
and substituting in (12) we get that,
dy, dA dB
(14) -------------------Qn P, t  --------  0 l2fl2
d <t> d</> d<i>
which can be negative or positive depending on the magnitude of the two terms at the RHS 
of (14), because, by the definition of ^  in (11), A(t) and B(t) change in opposite directions 
when <t> deviates from <£°. Thus, the following proposition can be made,
z At time T, total output in the yj industry can be larger if at time t = 0 there 
was a prohibitive tariff instead of free trade if and only if:
I dA dB
0  > -1 and —  On*1« 
1 d<f>
< —  o 12f>2
d <t> \
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It is important to note that these are necessary and sufficient conditions. Their
economic intuition is more obvious is we express this proposition as,
(15)
dyi
d <f>
* K 0 iff
dA/d^ Ql2^2 Ql2w2
dB/d <t> < Q nf1! Q n wi
Hence, we can say that for a given y2, with a > -l, opening to trade will lead to a 
production possibility frontier inside the one corresponding to autarky, if:
1. For a given factor share, the Invention Possibility Frontier is strongly concave, or
if.
2. For a given curvature of the Invention Possibility Frontier, the returns to input 2 
are relatively large in comparison to the returns to the input intensively used in the 
industry where the innovation takes place, i.e. factor 1.
If a  > -1, as we move away from autarky, the more concave the Invention 
Possibility Frontier is, the faster the rate o f reduction in B for a given increase in A grows. 
Thus, if the Invention Possibility Frontier is very concave, it is possible that for any y2, the 
maximum y, resulting from having autarky at t = 0 is bigger that the maximum y t that would 
result from free trade.
However, the last proposition depends on some technical conditions in the 
production of the innovation. But a stronger result than proposition 2 can be obtained, in 
which those technical conditions do not matter,
a > -1 is a sufficient condition to have [dyj/d^]<0 when we depart from
autarky at time t = 0
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The proof of this result is quite simple. As (13) indicates, when a > -1, opening to 
trade will lead to a production possibility frontier corresponding to free trade inside the 
production possibility frontier that we get at time T  if we had autarky at t  = 0. Hence, when 
a > -l, this result holds for some small values of yj. But according to proposition 2, for the 
other values of ylt an additional condition is necessary, namely,
dA /d <f> 012^2
dB/d <t> Q n f1!
According to (13), this condition is fulfilled for some values of yj. But the 
production function yj = f1 (AQn BQ12) is homogeneous of degree one and, given the 
international terms of trade, the input price ratio will be constant in the home country for 
any (ylty2) combination, and consequently, the ratio
OllPl
will be constant for any output level of yj.
In other words, if the sign of (15) is always the same for any value of (yj.y^- As a 
result of this, the different production possibility frontiers that can be obtained from the 
mapping from the Invention Possibility Frontier onto the (y^yj) space will never intercept 
each other. Thus, the map of production possibility frontiers corresponding to different 
values o f <f> along the Invention Possibility Frontier will look like figure VII.3.
Some welfare conclusions can be obtained at this point. If there is free trade at time 
T, the welfare effects of having free trade or autarky at t = 0 will depend on international 
prices. But the sign of the welfare change will depend on the elasticity of substitution 
between inputs in the industry producing yt at the time when the innovation was ordered. 
Consequently, the following result can be obtained,
225
Figure VII3.
Corollary.- For a small economy, having free trade at time t = 0 will have an adverse effect 
on welfare at time T, if an innovation to be used by its export industry is ordered at t = 0 
and used at t= T  and the elasticity of substitution in that industry is bigger than -1.
T h e  economic interpretation of this result could be the following. The theory 
proposed by Kennedy and von Weisacker suggests that, when ordering a process 
innovation, firms will try to save more on that factor o f production which has highest share 
of costs in that industry. Opening to trade involves changes in the relative prices of both 
outputs and inputs. When the elasticity of substitution is bigger than -1, the factor 
intensively used in the export industry will earn higher returns in proportion to the industry 
costs.
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In terms of the Kennedy-von Weisacker theory, if 0 - 1 ,  opening to trade will have 
the result of introducing a stronger bias against that factor when the process innovation is 
ordered. As a result of this, a t time T, as input units are transferred from the y2 sector to 
produce ylt the maximum output levels of that can be produced are  lower if the 
innovation was ordered having free trade instead of autarky at t=0.
V II.5 . SOME FINAL COMMENTS.
The previous section has shown that introducing free trade at a certain point in 
time, can produce some dynamic inefficiencies due to the induced effects produced by 
factor shares on the rates of factor augmentation that characterize a new process 
innovation in the domestic export industry. As has been discussed in the introduction, 
market imperfections such as economies of scale and externalities have been put forward 
to warn about the potential negative effects of free trade in a dynamic context.
To prove that such dynamic inefficiencies can also arise in a perfectly competitive 
context, particularly when the  production of technology is considered, has been the aim of 
this chapter. Nevertheless, this chapter has identified the direction of some economic 
effects, whose occurrence has to be considered just as a theoretical possibility. In this 
section includes some considerations that could help in the process of approaching the real 
world from our abstract assumptions.
First of all, the Invention Possibility Frontier is an analytical tool that has been the 
subject of much criticism. Very little is known about the production conditions prevailing in 
the R&D sector. However, the  most simple idea supporting the Kennedy-von Weisacker 
model, i.e. the existence of a trade off between choosing R&D projects that augment 
different factors of production at different rates, seems to be plausible enough.
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In our opinion, assuming that the choice o f R&D projects is carried out according 
to the optimization problem expressed by (8) and  nothing else, is much more questionable. 
In doing so, we are assuming that in some sense, firms in the domestic export industry have 
some kind of myopic behaviour.
Furthermore, the Invention Possibility Frontier makes endogenous the direction 
but not the rate of technical change. The rate o f  production of R&D is undetermined in 
the Kennedy-Drandakis-Phelps model.89 In fact, production and trade in technology have 
been assumed out from our model in order to isolate the effects that we were searching for 
in a simplified model.
But the production of R&D absorbs resources from the rest of the economy, and 
furthermore, technology can be an internationally traded commodity itself. We can 
incorporate these two considerations in a simple model to show how free trade in the 
presence of R&D can then have an unequivocally positive effect on welfare.
Let us consider a situation in which only two goods can be produced in two 
technologically asymmetric economies: "food" and  "blueprints". By technological asymmetry 
we mean that:
1. Given a certain endowment o f resources in each country, average
productivity in the food sector is higher in country 1, and, if all resources are 
devoted to the production of food, maximum quantities fjand f2 can be 
obtained.
89 However, Binswanger (1974) takes account of this problem.
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2. If some resources are withdrawn from the food sector and used by the 
R&D sector, the maximum amount of food produced in country 1 can be 
increased up to a certain point b*, and will decrease for higher levels of R&D. 
T o make things simple, let us assume that any amount o f resources withdrawn 
from the R&D sector in country 2 reduces the production of food in that 
country. The resulting production possibility curves a re  illustrated in figure
vn.4.
Finally we will assume that only food enters the social utility function in both 
countries.
F ig u r e  VII.4.
If there is no possibility of trade between the two countries, maximum welfare in 
each country is achieved in points A and A’. This is due to the fact that country 1 faces a
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negative opportunity cost in using some resources in the R&D sector for blueprint 
production below b*. However, after point A, that opportunity cost becomes positive and 
the price for blueprints is zero. F or country 2, it is clear that A’ is a corner social optimum.
In the case that technology and food can be traded, and if using country’s 1 
blueprints can increase food production in country 2, a Pareto superior solution like the 
one described by B and B’ can be reached. In this case, free trade makes the price of blue 
prints positive, and that makes the world’s rate of technical change larger under free trade 
than under autarky.90
Finally, although having free trade can have negative consequences on welfare at 
time T, we cannot forget that still, it is superior to autarky at t = 0. Here we have that one 
trade regime is efficient from a static point of view but inefficient in dynamic terms. In such 
a situation, to know the final net effect on welfare we require an intertemporal social utility 
function where an intertemporal social rate of discount of preferences between the two 
dates is specified.
One main conclusion can be drawn from the propositions in this chapter. Even 
when we consider the small country case and welfare comparisons can be simplified by 
taking international prices as given, the introduction of dynamics and process innovations 
in a model of international trade o f the Hecksher-Ohlin class, facilitates the realization of 
results that are opposite to the traditional main results of that class of models. Very 
specific models like the one presented here can help to identify new effects that where not 
included in traditional models o f  trade. However, most of these new results are just 
economic effects acting in different directions and, like Lyons says, "we are still a long way
90 Note that if there is free diffusion of technology, we would approach the autarky equilibrium in the
limit. This kind of effect has been recently pointed out in a game theoretic model by Jensen and Thursby (1987).
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Chapter VII: Appendix
Proof of lemma ).
If the innovation is taking place in the sector in which our dom estic country has a 
comparative advantage, i.e. industry 1, we need to check the signs of:
d
(16) ------[ W iqii/(w,q11 + w2q ,2)]
dpi
d
0 7 ) — [»2<ii2/(wiq ii+ » * iii) ldp,
taking into account the information provided by ( 10). The first one of these can he written
as:
d
---- [1/(1 + Z)]
d p ,
- Z ’
( T 7 z 2)
where
„  w2 qt2
z  = -------
wl Sll
Hence, the sign of (16) will be the opposite to the sign o f Z \  The la tter will be given
W.
(18)
» 2  qt2 
d[----------- 1
«1 fill
d P ,
q ,2 d(W2/w ,) w 2 d(ql2/ q „ )  d(wj/w,)
fill dP, w, d fw j/w ,) dP,
qn ( w2 d(qi2/qn) d(w2/w,)
qn wi d(w2/w,) dpt
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By the Stolper-Samuelson theorem we know that w2 and Wj will move in opposite 
directions when the price of good 1 changes, i.e. [d(w2/dw 1)/dp1]<0. Hence, the sign of 
(18) above will be the inverse o f the sign of (19) below,
q ,2 w2 d(q)2/q,i>
— + ----------------- < > 0  (19)
flit W1 d(w2/wl)
The elasticity of substitution between inputs 1 and 2 in the production of final good 
1, is usually defined as,
d(<h2/qil) wl / w2O -------------- ------------
d(w2/ wi) qI2/q j i
and substituting this definition in (14) above, (14) becomes
qi2
(19’) — ♦ o [q12/q n l -  [1 + a] [q12/q n ]
qn
because,
«Kqu/qn) q iV  qn
<*(»2/'>'l) " 2  /  *1
From (19’) we can conclude that, 
d
sign {------ [1/(1 + Z)]> = -[sign Z ’]= sign [1 + a] [q ^ /q n ]
dp,
and,
d I > 0 if and only if a  <-1
—- [• 'iq n / (» i q M +w2qi2)) (
dp, I < 0 if and only if a > -1
As (16) and (17) will have opposite signs, the following necessary and sufficient 
conditions completes the proof of lemma 1,
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A PPENDIX T O  PART I I I
C h a p t e r  V I I I : A  N o t e  o n  t h e  A d o p t io n  o r  N e w  T e c h n o l o g ie s  u n d e r  C o l l u s iv e  
B e h a v io u r :  a  C a s e  o f  S u ppl y -s id e  In d u c e d  D if f u s io n .
V I I I . l .  I n t r o d u c t io n .
In spite of the criticisms, the work of J. Reinganum (1981a), (1981b) and (1989) has 
opened an interesting field of research in the economic theory of diffusion. According to 
Quirmbach (1986) when he says that Reinganum’s results are due to the declining time 
profile of the prices of the new technologies and not to strategic interaction of the players, 
but one must also admit that her work has provided us with new insights into the forces at 
work in the diffusion of new technologies. In fact, the work of Quirmbach (1986) adopts 
Reinganum’s methodology to re-interpret some of her results and to obtain new ones.
One of the main contributions in Quirmbach (1986) is the consideration of the 
strategic role played by the supplier of the new technology. Although the role o f  supply 
factors in diffusion processes had been previously considered in Stoneman and Ireland 
(1982), Quirmbach is the first to study supply factors in a game-theoretic analysis of 
diffusion.
However, Quirmbach (1986) left unresolved the problem of diffusion of a new 
technology from a monopolist who sells the process innovation to a group of competing 
rivals. The diffusion patterns in this situation are complicated due to the so called "durable 
good problem" studied by Coase (1972), Bulow (1982), Stokey (1979 and 1982) and Gul 
and Sonnenschein (1986). Recently, Grindley has shown that the strategic behaviour of the 
supplier of an innovation can induce firms to adopt an innovation at different points in
2 3 7
time. This is possible because the innovator can exploit the rivalry between the firms in the 
downstream market and price discriminate over time.
In Grindley’s model there is just one innovation that can be adopted by two 
Cournot duopolists at two points in time, Tj and T2. Time is a discrete variable and this 
assumption has very important effects on the answers that he gets from the model. His set 
up is convenient to show the possible existence of diffusion processes derived from rivalry 
between two potential adopters of the innovation in an integrated context, but many of the 
rich features of the "durable good problem" are lost on the way.
This chapter is an attempt to explore the existence of alternative equilibria of this 
type. The approach taken here is similar to that of Stokey (1979) and to Ireland and 
Stoneman (1985). The former emphasizes the importance of the "absolute" time at which 
innovation occurs. The later stresses the importance of order effects. However, emphasis 
is placed here on the importance of the time gap between the points of time at which firms 
adopt.
To a certain extent, this chapter constitutes a digression from the main lines of the 
thesis. However, this digression is worth while for two reasons. Firstly, this model 
emphasises the importance of supply factors in the process of diffusion. This is an 
important aspect of the whole process of technological change and for this reason, it is a 
central them e throughout the thesis. Secondly, the possibility of more or less tacit 
collusion between suppliers and adopters of new technologies has been neglected in the 
past. However, there has always been a great political concern about the strategic use of 
technologies by countries or interests groupings in certain countries. The recent debate 
about technological dependence in Europe and the USA92 has raised this problem once 
and again. But this political concern has not been supported by any formal economic
92 See for instance Dcrtouzos M L., Lester R.K. and Solow R.M. (1989).
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analysis. Supporters of "technological independence’ have claimed that if technological 
progress in a certain industry in concentrated in one country or is under the control of a 
limited group of firms, they may restrict the supply of new technologies to competitors. 
This may be particularly important when these innovations are incorporated in key 
intermediate inputs used by many other industries as is the case of semiconductors.93 On 
the other hand, defenders of free-market policies maintain that productive efficiency 
should be the only determinant of Nvho produces what’. Competition policy will suffice to 
avoid unfair or practices restricting competition, as there is no reason to believe that 
technological winners would distort the market mechanism.
With all the necessary caveats that should accompany the formulation of 
propositions based on simple models like the one presented here, this chapter has the aim 
of raising some question marks by proving the possible existence of a certain type of stable 
collusive equilibria in the diffusion process that could distort the ’free-market mechanism’ 
of diffusion.
V i l l i .  T h e  o r ig in a l  f o r m u l a t io n  o f  t h e  p r o b l e m .
Consider the following situation proposed by Quirmbach. Assume that a Firm, F, 
produces a new technology that could be useful for two firms (1 and 2) in the production of 
some final good. These two firms are Cournot duopolists in the market for the final good. 
The effect of innovation on those two firms is the reduction of their constant unit costs of 
production. So far, no specific assumptions are made about the relative level of these unit 
costs in the two firms before the innovation is adopted.
93 Very recently, Spencer and Jones (1991) have studied the possibility of vertical foreclosure in the 
international trade of a key intermediate product when there are differences in the cost of production. The the 
best of my knowledge, this is the only case in which the problem of 'dependence', although not technological 
dependence, has been formally analysed.
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Both firms will benefit from the adoption of the new process technology because 
their unit costs will be reduced. When they adopt the innovation, both firms have a new 
technology that improves their relative position against "nature", but the relative situation 
in their market is unaltered by the introduction of the new equipment. However, 
technological change can also have an impact on that market structure if adoption is not 
simultaneous in time for the two firms. The first adopter will have a cost advantage 
relative to his starting position and his profits will be higher as long as the other firm does 
not adopt and restore initial relative positions.
Thus, the profits that one firm will make depend on its decision whether to adopt 
or not and on whether its rival has already adopted o r not. But it is also true that the 
reservation price of the innovation that the first firm adopting the innovation will have, will 
be an increasing function of the time gap, t, during which, it is the only firm using the new 
technology. On the other hand, the later adopter will have a reservation price that is a 
decreasing function of this time gap. At this stage, the questions about why and which firm 
should adopt earlier are not raised here. For the time being , it will be assumed that one 
firm will adopt first and a Nash equilibrium for this case will be identified.
It is obvious that the supplier of the innovation would be interested in obtaining 
some profits from the rivalry between the two competitors in this game, to add to those 
that he will get if both firms adopt at the same time. Intertemporal price discrimination 
would help to achieve that purpose and this is the main idea put forward by Grindley. 
However, this point has not been fully exploited in the existing literature. First, it is often 
assumed that the supplier of the innovation announces different prices at certain points in 
tim e and then, firms take their adoption decisions. The problem with this set up is the 
following: if agents are rational and time consistent in their adoption decisions, will it be 
profitable for the monopolist to supply the same good at different prices both firms at 
different points in time? In other words, will the optimal t* for the innovator be a finite 
number different from gerp?.
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Figure VIII.l.
The second objection stems from the "durable good problem" which can introduce 
time inconsistency. The problem is graphically illustrated by the example in figure VIII. 1. 
Let’s assume that the monopolist offers the good at times T, and T2 = Tj. But, if firm 1 
adopts at time 1 and pays a reservation price just below the innovator could then
maximize profits by selling the new technology to firm 2 at time T j+e, for a  small value of
c. Thus, firm 1 would not be time consistent when paying any = /=  n l(0). The only 
Nash equilibrium in this case would imply both firms adopting almost at the same time.
V III3. A  FRAMEWORK FOR SUPPLY-SIDE INDUCED DIFFUSION.
The question now is: in what type of situations could we find that the optimal r  for 
the innovator is significantly different from zero, preserving time consistency. The
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following paragraphs describe a situation in which such a case exists and explore its 
equilibrium conditions. This framework is also helpful to address some other related 
questions where "history matters".
Assume that the average cost of producing the innovation decreases with time. 
Then, a time-consistent equilibria where the optimum t is different from zero can be 
found. This assumption differs slightly from the traditional "learning by doing*. Here, it is 
assumed that the average cost of producing a second unit of the good will decrease the 
further away the date of the second sale is from the first one.
The only theoretical objection that this assumption could arise in this context could 
come from the difficulty in distinguishing the  causes that produce the results presented 
below. They are no longer due to simple temporal price discrimination because "learning 
by doing" will be a necessary condition for their existence. But as Stokey (1979) points out, 
this type of problems is common in som e other cases in which there exists price 
discrimination over time.
Agents have perfect information as regards to the cost conditions of all the firms 
involved in the case. The basic structure o f the case is similar to the one defined in the 
previous section.
Firms operate with a finite time horizon T. The innovating monopolist offers to one 
firm - the leader- a new process technology at time zero. Each firm will adopt the new 
technology whenever it is offered at a price that is such that adoption is profitable, but 
firms will try to maximize profits and their adoption decisions will be dictated by this rule 
of behaviour. This maximization condition will be reflected by a reservation price for the 
innovation. The final price obtained by the monopolist will not necessarily be the exact 
reservation price for a given t . However, there  is no "a priori" reason to believe that the 
deviation of this perceived price (probably, the result of a bargaining process) from the
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reservation price should be a function of t . Thus we can consider that the relevant 
demands for the monopolist are just a linear transformation of the reservation price. For 
the sake of simplicity, it will be assumed that both coincide.
Each duopolist buys just one unit of the new process technology. The cost 
conditions under which each unit of the innovative good is produced by the monopolist is 
given by,
0 ) TC -
ko , i f r - 0
k(r), if r  > 0, with k’<0.
Finally, let us define, that, per unit of time,
ai(r) ■ total profits to firm j when both firms have the innovation, j = 1,2.
b 1 ■ total profits to the first adopter when he is the only one who has the innovation.
b2«  total profits to the late adopter when the leader has the new technology while 
the follower doesn’t have it yet.
Note that total profits after adoption by the two firms depends on the time gap, r. 
As the price of the new technology varies with t , s o  will the average cost of production of 
the firms. The leader will have higher unit costs than the follower because he bought a 
more expensive machine than his rival. Thus, it will be assumed that d a ^ r j /d r  < 0 and 
d a ^ r j /d r  > 0. Probably, both effects tend to offset each other, the difference being just of 
second order, but for the time being this possibility will be ignored.
Assume that both firms are equal at time t = 0. At that point, the supplier 
approaches one firm offering the new technology at a price slightly below the maximum 
price at which this firm is indifferent between becoming the leader or the follower. The 
offer will be conditioned by the date when the second machine will be delivered to the rival.
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The first firm will buy the new technology at t - 0  if and only if the benefits o f  being the 
leader are larger than the benefits of delaying the purchase, i.e.,
(2) rb* ♦ (T-r) a*(r) - |»*(r) i  rb2 + (T-t) a
Figure VIII.2. *345
where
(3) mH t) «  (T-r) [a2(r)-b2] 
and
(4) a* £  a2 ; b> *  b* . (See fig. VIII.2).
Solving for nl, we get the maximum possible revenue for the monopolist from 
selling the new technology to the first adopter,
(5 ) M‘( t) -  r(b «  b2) + (T -r) [a>(r)-b2]
Hence, the maximum profits for the supplier will be.
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(6) x ( t ) -  r  (b '-b2) + (T -r) [.>(r) + .2(r)-2b2] - k„ - k (r)
Maximizing (6) with respect to r  subject to r > 0, will give us the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the existence of a r* = /  = 0.
The first order condition requires that
(7) (b>-«>) - (a*-b2) + (T-r) [«>’♦ •* ] -  k’(r)
and sufficiency requires
(8) (T-r)[ai”(r) + a2”(r)] - 2(a>’(r)+ a* ’(r)] - k”(r)  < 0
Proposition 1.- If (7) and (8) hold, there is an optimum and finite r, r*. for the monopolist 
different from zero.
Let us see what is behind the former two conditions. If we set aside the second 
order effect, (7) says that the existence of r* requires that the industry profits per unit of 
time must be larger when there is just one firm using the innovation, because the RHS, k\ 
is negative. The intuition for this result is very obvious: to have price discrimination in 
time, it has to be profitable. Note that this very obvious condition, not examined in 
Grindley (1987), already imposes some constraints on the relative values of the (bi-ai) 
terms.
The second order effect signifies the existence of an indirect effect on the 
monopolist’s "marginal revenue" (defined with respect to r), due to the changing cost 
conditions for the firms in the final good industry as r  varies. The final sign of this effect is 
not known, but its magnitude will probably-be small.
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As regards to the second order condition, note that if we neglect the second order 
condition, (1) is enough to guarantee sufficiency. For convenience, this second order 
effect will be ignored.
Up to this point, necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an 
optimum t for the monopolist different from zero have been considered. But, will this t* 
be a r  of time consistent equilibrium ? That is necessary to have Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2.- Given proposition (1), for each t*, there is a corresponding maximum value 
of [bi-a^r*)], below which t * will not produce a time consistent equilibrium.
Proof.-
Time consistency requires that it is not profitable for the monopolist to sell the 
second unit at any time before the r*. given that the first has been sold out at time zero. 
The maximum profits that he could make in that way, would be achieved by making the 
first buyer to pay while selling to the second buyer at 0 + €*0. In this way he would
make
(9) x(0) -  T*(b»-b2) + ( T - r ) ( a » - b 2) - 2 k 0 + T (a 2 -b2)
Time consistency requires that
(10) x(r*) 2s »(0)
Using (6) at t* and (9), (10) becomes,
(11) ko-k(r*) *  r ’ (a2-b2)
Given (1), the maximum r* which satisfies (11) does it when it is an equality. 
Substituting the value of (a2-b2) obtained from (11) into (6) at t , we get.
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( 1 2 )
.  ko - k(r) 
(bl-al)-k '(r') (See fig. V1II.3)
F ig u r e  V III3 .
Note that existence depends on parameters o f  both firms but time consistency 
depends only on cost conditions and the parameters relative to one firm.
Condition (11) simply states that the benefits to the supplier of postponing the 
delivery of the second unit due to cost reductions have to be greater that the profits lost by 
the late adopter while he has to wait for the innovation.
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VIII,4. Conclusion.
This chapter has considered a situation in which a patent holder sells a new process 
technology to a duopolistic market using that technology. In contrast with similar models, 
the possibility of a collusive agreement between one of the duopolists and the patent 
holder is examined. The durable goods problem makes that coalition unstable, but the 
declining cost of the new technology enables us to find an equilibrium that supports the 
coalition. As a result of this collusive behaviour, the two duopolists adopt the new 
technology at different points in time, and hence, we find a pattern of diffusion. A natural 
extension of this simple model would be the consideration of a series of innovations 
introduced at different points in time.
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Chapter IX: Conclusions
IX.1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to give an economic interpretation of the 
propositions and other results obtained in the previous analytical chapters. Given the 
theoretical nature of the models presented in those chapters, this interpretation cannot 
have the high of detailed used in the preliminary chapters. In the  first two chapters, that 
level of detail was necessary to identify the main technological characteristics of latecomer 
countries and to justify the assumptions used in the models. Nevertheless, particular 
emphasis is put in this chapter on those conclusions which can be relevant for the design of 
a technology policy suitable for a "latecomer" country. But filling the gap that goes from 
these conclusions to the detailed design of a technology policy for latecomer countries 
would be the subject of another thesis.
Throughout this chapter, it will be necessary to bear in mind that the results 
obtained in the previous chapters have been derived in the framework of simplified 
examples. The objective of those models has been to identify the existence, direction and 
possible magnitude of some economic effects which may arise in the context of the 
situations described in each particular case. Therefore, the propositions developed there 
must be considered as theoretical possibilities, whose occurrence in the real world is always 
subordinated to the validity of the assumptions upon which the m odels have been built.
Having said this, it is my contention that, despite their limitations, these results can 
be useful to the technology-policy maker. Propositions such as those produced here
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provide some fundamental elements of economic rationality, which might be used as guide­
lines in the design of technology policies.
This chapter will reproduce the basic structure of the thesis and it consists of two 
main parts. The first one deals with the results concerning licensing obtained in chapters 
III and IV. The second one is based on chapters V to VIII. Trade related issues will also 
be included in this second part of the chapter.
IX.2. Licensing of foreign technology as a means to acquire technology
In the technology transfer literature, licensing has always been considered as an 
expensive means of acquiring technology. In the early seventies, development theorists 
emphasized the inadequacy of technologies coming from developed countries to suit the 
technological demands of less developed countries.94 A second important issue also 
stressed in that literature is its the concern about the excessive prices charged on 
technology exports by developed countries.95
More recently, the emphasis has been put on the market failures and imperfections 
that appear in the markets for technology. Authors such as Teece (1981) or Caves et al. 
(1983) have pointed out these types of deficiencies because:
"both the source and the recipient countries lose if  technology transfers are 
diverted toward arm’s-length license agreements, that would otherwise have 
occurred through some joint-ownership channel“.96
These losses of social welfare have their origin in the impossibility for the licensor to fully 
extract all the monopolistic rents generated by the new technology. This is due to the 
presence of market imperfections arising from the following:
94 See for instance Merhav M. (1969) and Robinson (1979).
95 See Rafii (1984) for a recent empirical study of these issues.
96 Caves et al. (1983) page 265.
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a. - Licensing agreements usually involve "small number" bargaining conditions 
between the parties concerned;
b. - Moral hazard and opportunism problems, which are usually found in these 
types of environments where there are important information asymmetries;
c. - Uncertainty, because the performance of the new technology in a new 
economic and technical environment can not be known with certainty;
d. - Risk aversion, particularly for the licensor who risks to lose proprietary 
control over his invention;97
e. - Important transaction, search and adoption costs, which have been 
calculated at between 2 and 59 per cent of the total cost of the transaction.98
These losses usually take the form of high resource costs, particularly for the 
licensee, who has to bear most of the transaction and adoption costs mentioned above. 
However, they can also appear in more elaborated forms. Licensing contracts are often 
subject to many different forms of ancillary restraints which are nothing but contractual 
clauses to avoid the effects of those market imperfections.99 However, practices such as 
geographic restrictions to use the license or minimum price floors, have important effects
97 As Horstmann and Markusen (1986) have pointed out, the loss of proprietary control over the 
innovation can imply particularly high risks if its market value depends on brand reputation or on any other factor 
that can be damaged by the behaviour of the licensee. In those cases, risk aversion can forestall the licensing 
agreement, which may be substituted by direct investment or export.
98 See Tecce (1981).
99 See OECD (1989) for a detailed account of the different types of ancillary clauses to licensing contracts, 
there application in OECD countries and their effects on competition.
100 These results are remarkably similar to those obtained by Cheng (1984) in a dynamic control model of 
technological change.
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on the economic performance of the economies of the licensees, as they can distort 
competition substantially.
This enumeration of the shortcomings that appear in contractual forms of 
international technology transfer, has to be qualified by their positive effects. The most 
evident of these advantages is to secure the acquisition of technological knowledge at a 
lower cost and in a shorter term than by developing the technology afresh. These 
advantages have been stressed by Krugman (1979) and Jensen and Thursby (1987). In 
these models of international transfer of technology, the emphasis is put on the welfare 
consequences for the technologically advanced country, of the diffusion of new 
technologies in less developed, low labour-cost countries. But the apparently optimistic 
implications for the less developed countries that are derived from this group of models 
have to  be qualified too, because they usually underestimate the costs for the 
technologically less developed country of this form of technology sourcing.
In chapters III and IV, a quite different approach to those just mentioned has been 
taken to study some aspects of licensing. The results obtained in those chapters are based 
on game theoretic situations. These simple game structures try to emphasise the strategic 
interactions arising in an international context of technology transfer involving countries at 
different stages of technological development and with different input prices. In these 
game theoretic situations, the players interact not just in games for the development of new 
technologies, but also in normal market games played in an international trade 
environment and influenced by technological conditions. This combined setting permits 
the consideration of induced effects that come forth between the technology and market 
stages o f the game.
This approach has been adopted here in an international trade context to tackle the 
following three main questions:
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1. What are the private incentives that firms have to develop new process 
technologies domestically or to acquire them through licensing from a 
technologically more developed foreign firm ?
2. - What are the implications for the rate and direction of technological change 
of the international transfer of technology through licensing ?
3. What are the social welfare costs for a technologically less developed 
economy of acquiring technology through licensing, and what are the differences 
between the private and public incentives to access technology by that means ?
IX J .1 . R & D  vs. licensing: private incentives.
The first one of these questions has been answered in chapter III in a simplified 
context. The model presented in that chapter does not take into account the incentives to 
carry out R&D that appear in patent races. The quasi-rents that firms participating in 
patent races can obtain from being the first one in developing the innovation are not the 
main incentive driving the game. The game presented in chapter III stresses the effects of 
structural asymmetries between firms and countries, paying less attention to short-term 
effects. On the other hand, it incorporates one characteristic which is seldom present in 
models of patent races, but which is incorporated in the model presented there. This is that 
both firms get positive returns from the development of the new technology, irrespective of 
whether both firms carry out R&D or there is licensing by the innovator.
Proposition 2 in chapter III establishes that, when there is asymmetry in the 
technological abilities of the two firms, both have strong incentives to reach a licensing 
agreement instead of carrying out R&D independently. The existence of economies of 
scope in the production of the new process technology has a strong negative impact on the 
incentives to carry out independent R&D.
256
Obviously, if the short-term incentives that arise in patent races are taken into 
account, this dominance of the licensing strategy might be questioned. However, previous 
work by Fudenberg et al. (1983) suggests that the participation of a firm with a 
technological lead in a patent race may pre-empt the technologically less developed firms 
to enter the race. In a model in which the technological capabilities of firms depend on 
their accumulated experience, any lead of one competitor precludes the entry of another 
firm in the patent race. This result is obtained in an environment in which R&D success is 
stochastic. Only if the patent race has several stages or there is the possibility of altering 
the accumulation of experience, ’leap-frogging’ or changes in technological leadership are 
possible.100
Although these results have been obtained in different settings and from very 
different assumptions, both seem to indicate that technologically retarded firms have 
strong incentives to not enter patent races and to obtain technology by other means. The 
possibility of ex-ante licensing seems to be enough to stop firms in technologically less 
developed countries carrying out R&D in an independent way. This result leads into the 
discussion of the other two major questions addressed in chapters III and IV. Let us 
examine question number 3 firstly, i.e. are there differences between the private and the 
public incentives to do R&D rather than licence?
I X i J .  R&D vs licensing: differences between private and social incentives
From the outset, one of the recurrent topics in the literature on licensing has been 
the appropriateness of the prices paid for foreign technology by firms in less developed 
countries. The main problem with this question has always been the difficulty of measuring 
the value of the technology effectively transferred. As Reddy and Zhao (1990) have
100 These results are remarkably similar to those obtained by Cheng (1984) in a dynamic control model of
technological change.
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recently stated, "like other markets for intangible assets, the imperfection of the technology 
market makes its transfer price indeterminate".101 But solving this problem requires the 
definition of a social value for the license in the first place. This allows comparisons to be 
drawn between the private and social value of the patent, and indirectly, the examination of 
differences between private and public incentives to carry out R&D or to license instead.
In chapter IV, a model has been presented in an attempt to answer these questions 
for the case of process innovations. The market value o f the new technology for each firm 
using it downstream for the production of a final good and the impact o f the new 
technology on social welfare are the two yardsticks applied for the private and public 
measurement o f the value of the technology.
In a context of oligopolistic competition in which a profit maximising external 
laboratory determines the number of licenses sold and the fees paid for them, demand 
functions for the licenses are derived for the private oligopolistic sector and for a welfare 
maximising social planner. It has been proved that when the number of firms is greater 
than three, the reservation price of the social planner for any number of licenses will always 
be lower than the reservation price resulting from the oligopolistic private sector. It has 
also been proved that the market solution implies total payments for the new technology to 
the foreign sector exceeding the social optimum.
This result is a consequence of the difference between the private and social 
incentives to acquire the license. From the social point o f view, for each fixed fee quoted 
by the patent holder, there is an optimal number of licenses to be bought. But firms 
acquiring the license will be better off than those firms who do not get a license. This 
circumstance opens a competition between the oligopolistic firms striving to get a license, 
from which the patent holder can benefit. Thus, there is a sort of "common pool" effect in
101 Sec Reddy and Zhao (1990), page 299.
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the race for the license. As a result of this effect, part of the gains in social welfare brought 
about by the new technology are transferred abroad by the oligopolistic firms and a social 
planner centralising the purchase o f the license would avoid this effect.
These results suggest that one should expect to find too much licensing in private 
markets from the social welfare point of view. According to the model in chapter IV, that 
will occur more frequently and with more quantitative importance as the number of 
oligopolistic firms increases.
This brings us to the consideration of the induced effects over the social and of 
private incentives to carry out R&D that could result from the propositions derived in 
chapter IV. It is widely established that the existence of externalities in the R&D process 
impede firms investing in R&D to appropriate fully the returns from their investments. 
This is the origin of a market failure resulting in under-investment in R&D from the social 
point of view, by each and everyone of the firms in the industry.102
In principle, these results seem to suggest that the possibility of ex-ante licensing 
reduces even more the private incentives to carry out R&D. Therefore, the ratio between 
R&D spending and licensing resulting from the free functioning of market forces would be 
too low from a social point o f view. As the private incentives to carry out R&D seem to be 
positively correlated to the degree of market concentration according to Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz (1980a), the magnitude of the under-investment in R&D and over-investment in 
the purchase of licenses would be greater in less concentrated markets.103 *
102 See Kamien and Schwartz (1982), Loury (1979) or Lee and Wilde (1980) which are probably the most 
classic pieces of the literature on this topic.
103 In this sense, any move to eliminate impediments to licensing such as the Spanish example discussed in
the first chapter would be damaging to social welfare.
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However, this conclusion has to be qualified. The result suggesting excessive 
licensing from the social viewpoint presented in chapter IV, was the consequence of a 
"collective" market failure due to a "common-pool" effect arising in the competition among 
oligopolists to obtain the license. But as Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a and 1980b) have 
suggested, there are also sources of "collective" market failures in R&D competition. In 
the first one of these papers, the ex-ante rivalry among oligopolists striving to benefit from 
the monopoly rents accruing to the winner of the R&D race produces duplication of efforts 
and social squandering of resources. But R&D competition can also produce "collective" 
m arket failures originated in "common pool" effects.104 Under certain conditions 
determining the shape and slope of the reaction functions of the R&D game, an increase in 
the  R&D investment of each firm105 may result in the other competitors raising their own 
individual investment.106 Collectively, this results in over-investment in R&D, i.e. in the 
production of the innovation at an earlier date than socially desirable.
According to these results, it seems that there is a justification for public policy 
intervention modifying the R&D/licensing ratio resulting from the mechanism of market 
forces. In those cases in which concentration is not high and "collective" market failures 
resulting in an over-investment in R&D are unlikely, one should expect that the market will 
produce a R&D/licensing ratio smaller than socially desirable.
Investigating the optimal form of public policy intervention falls outside the scope 
o f this thesis. However, the framework of the analysis carried out here suggests that this
104 Sec Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980b) and Dixit (1986).
105 In the terminology of those models, this is equivalent to an increase in the conditioned probability of 
each firm of succeeding in the R&D game in the next infinitesimal time interval, given that no other firm has 
succeeded by then, or individual hazard rate of each firm.
106 According to Beath et al. (1989), this will happen in those cases in which the incentive to carry 
out R&D resulting from the 'competitive threat" as defined in chapter V, will dominate the profit incentive to 
carry out R&D.
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can be done not just directly via subsidies, but also indirectly by means of restricting or 
controlling alternative forms of access to foreign technology.107
Nevertheless, this conclusion does not take into consideration three very important 
elements suggesting the  need for more direct or indirect support to R&D:
1. - Firstly, as it was mentioned above, the accumulation of experience and
technological capabilities plays a fundamental role in the process of 
technological change. Although the concept "technological capabilities” 
includes a broad range of elements108 intervening in the process of 
innovation, which are difficult to measure, there are grounds to believe that 
indigenous R&D can contribute more to the creation of technological 
capabilities than licensing. In the particular case of Spain, Molero (1983) 
has analysed the difficulties which Spanish firms have experienced in some 
cases to  accumulate technological capabilities from the import of foreign 
technologies.
As these types of externalities are hardly internalised by individual firms, it 
is plausible to assume that public policy should act to re-establish the 
adequate balance between R&D and licensing and thus correct this market 
failure.
2. - The socially desirable levels of R&D and spending in licenses mentioned
above have not taken into account the possibility of strategic behaviour by 
foreign governments supporting their own firms in international patent 
races. In the presence of that kind of strategic public policy, Dixit (1986) 
and Beath et al. (1989) have suggested that the best domestic response
107 The Indian case is the traditional example of this indirect form of R&D strategy. See Lall (1985).
108 Sec Desai (1984) for a  typology of them.
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depends once again on the slope of the firms’ reaction function in the R&D 
game.
3.- The models developed in this thesis are not "timing models" in the sense 
that the dates of introduction of new technologies either via licensing or 
independent R&D are not explicitly taken into account. An additional 
advantage in favour of R&D as compared to licensing, could arise due to 
the fact that the winner of a patent race will enjoy earlier and for a longer 
period of time, the benefits derived from the innovation.
Finally, despite the very generic nature of these conclusions for public policy 
guidance, I think that they have the interest of bringing new and different kinds of issues 
into the traditional determinants of regulatory policies for international technology 
transfer. Furthermore, they are based on models similar to those used for the analysis of 
R&D. In this way, a link is established between licensing and R&D as sources of 
technology for a less developed country, which should be studied in a more integrated form 
in the future. A very simple example of this joint consideration of R&D and licensing as 
alternative instruments for technology acquisition is presented in the annex to this chapter.
1 X 2 3. The impact o f ex-ante licensing on the rate and direction o f technological change.
One of the main results in chapter III was related to the impact on the rate and 
direction of technological change derived from the possibility of ex-ante licensing. In was 
shown there that if there are significant differences in the technological capabilities of 
firms operating from different countries, the possibility of ex-ante licensing would have a 
double impact:
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a. - Firstly, it would bring the direction of R&D in the most developed country 
closer to those technologies which the ’low-tech’ firm would have chosen if licensing 
were not possible and firms were forced to carry out R&D independently.
b. - The possibility of ex-ante licensing may also curb the global rate of 
technological progress in the economy considered as a whole. This is the result of 
eliminating a technologically less advanced competitor in the R&D game.
If there is just one firm doing R&D and having full control of the rate  and direction 
of technological progress: the more advanced firm has less incentives to carry out R&D; 
and the licensing mechanism induces it to produce technologies which are  closer to the 
needs of its competitor. On one hand, one could talk about a certain kind of 
"specialisation"109 in the production of technology in the technologically m ore developed 
country. However, the elimination of competition in R&D, even if it is technologically 
inferior, places the licensor in a situation of "virtual monopoly" in the production and sale 
of the new technology. This result has interesting implications for both types of countries.
IX2-.3: l----------Implications for the technolomcaltv less developed country: the appropriateness
o f the technology  transferred.
After producing a substantial amount of literature, the debate on the suitability of 
the technology transferred to the less developed countries is still open.110 One of the main 
difficulties in this debate has been the definition of what is meant by "appropriate
109 An extreme case of this was published in the press after these conclusions had been written. Rodime 
Pic., the Fife based company who was the pioneer of the 3.5 inch hard disc drives, announced late in September 
that is was ceasing operations in its plants in Scotland and Singapore. The company will continue existing as an 
intellectual property company after reaching licensing agreements with Matsushita Electric Industrial and Hitachi. 
The company reached that decision after an out of court settlement with IBM in which it was paid USS 13 mill. 
The company also has licensing agreements with companies such as Fujitsu, Conner Peripherals and Alps Electric.
110 See Robinson A. (1979).
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technology". In chapter III, "appropriateness" for a certain firm or country111 of a new 
process technology is identified with the cost reduction that this new technology will 
produced when applied by that firm or in that given country.
From this perspective, the results in chapter III seem to minimize the importance 
of the appropriateness of the technology transferred internationally, in particular for 
countries with m ore similar cost conditions. When there is licensing, the firm undertaking 
R&D obtains returns from the cost reduction derived from the application of new 
technology for the production of a final good downstream, but also from selling the new 
technology to the less developed firm.
This introduces a certain trade off for the more developed firm concerning the 
direction of technological change: the closer the new technology is to the one which the 
low-tech firm would have chosen if there was no possibility of licensing, the lower will be 
the returns obtained from the exploitation of the new technology through production 
downstream; but if the technology developed for licensing does not reduce costs in the low- 
tech country, the firm in the latter country will not be willing to buy the license. Therefore, 
the firm developing technology for licensing will always modify its choice of R&D projects 
to meet the needs o f the licensee, at least to a certain extent, even if that reduces its 
returns from the market downstream.
Therefore, for public policy purposes, the problem of the appropriateness of the 
technology transferred will be less relevant when the cost conditions that firms face in their 
respective countries are similar. In this sense, economic processes such as European 
market integration could have an indirect but positive effect upon the direction of 
technological progress in Europe from the point of view of net importers of technology as 
Spain or Ireland. Higher integration of financial markets and labour mobility could
111 This identification of technological suitability can be maintained if we admit the existence of a certain 
kind of direct relationship between country and firm competitiveness.
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approximate cost conditions throughout Europe, thus making technologies developed in 
the more developed economies such as Germany more "appropriate" for technologically 
less developed countries.
For Third World Countries the situation is very different. We must remember that, 
according to OECD estimates, 75 per cent of the world licensing takes place among the 
most developed countries,112 which are  presumably those with more similar cost 
conditions. This implies that the relatively low weight of Third World Countries as 
demanders o f new process technologies does not contribute much to address the direction 
of technological change in favour o f these countries. Therefore, the problem of the 
appropriateness of the technology transferred remains an important one for them.
IK-2-3.2.--------- Implications for twhnolopsgity more developed countries.
One of the most interesting results of the technology transfer literature in the last 
decades is originated in Krugman (1979), which deals with the effects of technology 
transfer upon the international distribution of income. According to this strand of the 
literature, international technology transfer has a negative impact on the relative income 
levels of the country where the new technologies are produced. As international diffusion 
of those technologies takes place towards lower cost regions, the comparative advantage of 
the "innovating" country is eroded.
The political implications of this type of argument have been very important. In 
the Uruguay Round of the GATT, technologically more developed countries and the USA 
in particular, have stressed the importance of protecting intellectual property rights, which 
in fact would introduce restrictions to the  technology transfer to the South.
112 See Vickery (1986).
265
The results obtained in chapter III concerning the impact of licensing on the global 
rate o f technological change have some implications for this issue. The main policy reading 
that derives from Krugman is that the North can maintain its share in the world’s 
distribution of income only if the rate of technological change is enough to offset the 
adverse effects derived from the international diffusion o f technology. But proposition 3 in 
chapter III shows licensing of technologies to technologically less developed countries 
would reduce the global rate of technological change.
If there is just one world producer of R&D who licenses innovations to other firms 
in foreign countries, the world "output" of technology is substantially reduced. But 
diffusion still takes place thus deteriorating income levels at home. This suggests that only 
if licensing allows full extraction of rents derived from the  initial relative innovation can 
income levels of the North can be maintained. Given the difficulties in fully extracting the 
rents derived from an innovation through licensing, which were mentioned at the beginning 
of this chapter, this is unlikely to occur. Therefore, a situation of "world technological 
monopoly" seems to be intrinsically unstable.
1X3. T he international diffusion of new process technologies.
From a structural and long-term perspectives, it is commonly agreed that the major 
benefits that technological change produces in the economy come from the diffusion of 
innovations across industries over time. The benefits that can be obtained in the short run 
from being the first innovator are probably the major factor driving innovation. From a 
social point of view, and in particular in the case of process innovations, the most 
important benefits derive from the adoption by many producers of the new technology 
which will allow cost reductions and improvements in productivity and international 
competitiveness. Consequently, technology policy m akers in technologically less developed
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countries should pay attention to the international patterns of adoption and diffusion of 
new process technologies.
The second group of models presented in this thesis have the objective o f  studying 
the relative incentives to adopt a new process innovation in countries facing asymmetric 
cost conditions. Those models are not based on "technology-gap"-types of arguments, but 
on the strategic behaviour that international competitors with different cost conditions will 
have with respect to the adoption of a cost reducing process innovation.
There is an underlying question which is common to all these models: will market 
forces generate sufficient private incentives to alter the pattern of adoption of new process 
technologies ?
It is necessary repeat here once more that cost asymmetries like those introduced 
in chapters V and VI do not keep any fixed correspondence with the degree of 
technological development of countries. In principle, a technologically more advanced 
country could have lower or higher average costs of production than a less advanced one. 
It would all depend on the technology and the relative cost of factors of production. In this 
sense, the results obtained in those chapters are independent of the "technology-gap" 
between the two countries.
In principle, models similar to those presented in chapters V and VI could also be 
used to study the relative incentives to do R&D in countries with different cost conditions. 
This would be perfectly possible if we assume that technologies are developed by a  third 
country selling R&D projects to the best bidder. However, I think that these types of 
models are best suited for the study of relative incentives to adopt new technologies rather 
than to consider R&D. The study of incentives to carry out R&D under different cost 
conditions cannot be independent of the technological capabilities to do R&D in both 
countries. Countries also differ in their abilities to adopt innovations. Transaction or
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adaptation costs can be quite different in countries with different degrees of technological 
development. However, these differences are likely to have a lesser impact on their 
incentives to adopt than on their incentives to do R&D.
A proper study of diffusion would require working with market structures more 
complex than the duopolies used in the thesis. But this would imply working at the same 
time with four different groups of firms: those which have adopted the innovation and 
those which have not adopted it at a certain point in time, in at least two different 
countries. This difficulty complicates the analysis considerably. For this reason, the 
models in chapters V and VI are basically models of adoption, because they do not tell 
much about the pattern of diffusion of the innovation throughout the industry in both 
countries.
Nevertheless, they still provide some information about diffusion. At any given 
point in time in the process of diffusion, there will always be one marginal firm in each 
country which could be the immediate next adopter of the innovation. Although the 
complete pattern of diffusion will depend on factors such as the existing number of firms in 
the industry in each country, the models of adoption presented here tell us something 
about the piecemeal sequence of diffusion.
This part of the thesis includes four different types of results:
1. - First, and most important, it studies the relative incentives that firms facing 
different cost conditions have to adopt new technologies depending on the type of 
market competition and on the nature of the innovation (i.e. the direction of 
technological change and the different cost reductions brought about by the 
innovation);
2. - The influence on those incentives of the existence of a sequence of 
innovations;
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3.- The impact on the patterns of adoption/diffusion of the existence of a
supplier of the innovation, who could have a strategic behaviour;
4.- The consideration of demand asymmetries and restrictions to international 
trade.
1X3.1. Incentives to adopt, market competition and the direction o f technological chang:.
The simple model presented in chapter VI has highlighted the importance of the 
direction of technological change, for the pattern of adoption of process innovations by 
firms operating from domestic markets, with different cost conditions. For instance, it has 
been proved that if the innovation maintains the absolute cost differential between both 
firms it will always be adopted earlier by the firm in the low cost country; but, if the 
innovation maintains the relative cost differential between the two firms, it will be adopted 
first by the high cost firm.113
This result suggests that the production of innovations and their diffusion are not 
independent phenomena. The pattern of adoption will depend on the nature of the new 
technology and, to the extent to which the selection of R&D projects is influenced by local 
conditions, early adoption can be influenced by the location of R&D production. In any 
case, having control over the direction of technological change is crucial for influencing the 
international pattern of adoption.
All these conclusions call for a higher degree of integration in the study of the 
conditions of the supply of innovations and the analysis of processes of international 
diffusion of new technologies. But for those purposes, a better understanding of the 
conditions of production of technological knowledge is required.
113 Sec proposition I in chapter VI.
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Another important factor determining which firm will have more incentives to 
adopt a new process technology earlier is the type of competition prevailing in the market 
for the final product. When product differentiation and Bertrand conjectures are 
introduced in the model, the set of innovations that would be adopted earlier by the 
initially high cost firm is reduced substantially. Although there are some types of 
innovations which are always adopted earlier by that high cost firm, more intense rivalry 
(Bertrand conjectures) seems to delay adoption by the high cost firm.
As it was shown in chapter V, the relationship between adoption and market 
competition is not a simple one. Demand conditions and conjectural variations can shift 
the direction of the effects of different forms of market competition upon the pattern of 
adoption. However, that relationship certainly exists and this fact calls for increased 
coordination between technology and competition policies.
1X3.2. Technological leadership and sequences o f innovations.
As it was mentioned in the first part of this chapter, Fudenberg et al.(1983) have 
indicated that, in the context of patent races, the existence of different stages in the R&D 
process makes possible "leap-frogging" or alterations in technological leadership.
In the context of diffusion models with a sequence of innovations, Vickers (1986) 
has suggested that under Cournot conjectures, it is rather likely to observe changes in the 
firm obtaining the new technology earlier and, consequently, to have changes in 
technological leadership. This proposition, which does not seem to fit well with observable 
reality has been scrutinised in chapter V.
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The results obtained in that chapter seem to suggest that this rather optimistic 
expectation about the market-force induced permutations in technological superiority 
collapse when the basic model is modified. Indeed, when elements such as free diffusion, 
irreversible R&D costs o r the influence of past events are included in the model, the 
possibility of changes on technological leadership, in terms of which firm has the lowest 
production costs, becomes more remote.
Nevertheless, these types of models can help us to learn more about the processes 
of diffusion. By modifying the assumptions of the basic model, it is possible to learn how 
alternative assumptions influence the different types of incentives firms have to adopt the 
innovation. This is possible to the isolation of what was called direct and induced effects in 
that chapter.
The study of the impact of isolated factors entering the sequence of innovations 
could be useful for technology policy making. For instance, if diffusion is facilitated by 
some means after the first adoption, the influence of the existence of a sequence of 
innovation tends to disappear. This is important because ceteris paribus, the existence of a 
sequence of innovations increases the incentives that the high cost firm has to acquire the 
next new technology in the sequence.
IX J J . The influence o f supply side considerations.
Chapter VI and chapter VIII include some consideration of the influence that the 
supplier of the technology can have on the pattern of diffusion of the innovation in the 
industry downstream.
In chapter VI, an independent profit maximising R&D laboratory is introduced, but 
leaving aside any kind of strategic behaviour. At was mentioned above, the introduction of 
supply-side considerations always requires some assumption about the cost of producing
2 7 1
different alternative new technologies. In order to eliminate any bias due to cost 
advantages in favour of certain technologies which would be adopted earlier by one firm, a 
"neutral" cost structure is assumed. The purpose o f this exercise is to study if, even when it 
is cheaper to produce those innovations that could be adopted earlier by either firm, the 
supplier would choose to produce technologies which are adopted earlier by one firm.
Proposition 2 in chapter VI shows that, under those circumstances, an independent 
monopolist will tend to produce innovations that would be adopted earlier by the low cost 
firm. This is due to the possibility of extracting more rents from that firm than from the 
high cost firm in the sale of the innovation.
This result has implications for public policy. If a public authority wants to promote 
the domestic development of an innovation, it should pay attention to where this 
innovation will be adopted earlier. The domestic social benefits from R&D will be 
maximised if the home economy gets not just the rents derived from selling the innovation 
but if  the first adopter of the innovation is a domestic firm. In a situation like the one 
described in section VIA, the government of the high cost country has less incentives to 
foster the development of an innovation by a local independent R&D producer than the 
government of the low cost country.
Obviously, the government in the high cost country would have more interest in 
having a different type of innovation developed, i.e. one that would be adopted earlier by 
its local firm. However, given the "neutral" cost structure, the public authorities would 
need to  induce the R&D producer to deviate from its profit maximising choice of R&D 
project, and this will have some domestic social costs.
The situation in the last chapter is quite different. There, a strategic interaction 
between one potential adopter of the innovation and its producer is considered. The 
objective there is to study the existence of a stable coalition between the first adopter and
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the monopolist supplying the technology in order to delay adoption by the second adopter. 
Proposition 2 in chapter VIII shows that the declining cost of producing the technology can 
eliminate the instability introduced by the "durable goods" problem.
Given that both potential adopters could reach this collusive agreement with the 
supplier of the innovation, the importance of any non-market link, perhaps politically 
induced, could have a great importance in the distribution of the benefits of this solution 
among the players involved.
1X3.4. Some trade considerations.
To complete the  study of relative incentives that firms with different cost conditions 
have to adopt an innovation earlier, chapter VI introduces demand asymmetries and trade 
policy considerations. It shows how differences in the domestic market size, but 
particularly transportation costs and tariffs, modify firms’ incentives to adopt.
This suggests that trade policy can be an important tool for diffusion policy. The 
importance of this type o f instrument seems particularly relevant for the high cost country. 
Indeed, even if the low cost country raises tariffs equal to those set by the high cost country 
to become the first adopter, diffusion conditions can improve in the high cost country. 
Some innovations th a t would be adopted earlier by the low cost firm when there are no 
tariffs would be adopted earlier by the high cost firm if there is a positive and equal tariff 
rate in both countries.
But the influence of trade policy on technology is not limited to the diffusion stage. 
Chapter VII shows how different trade regimes can have induced effects on the direction 
of technological change. The traditional dilemma between static and dynamic efficiency is 
presented in that chapter in the following context: which is the optimal trade regime from 
the point of view of the  dynamic evolution of the production possibility frontier ?
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When there is leaming-by-doing, the future possibilities of production in one 
country will be conditioned by the nature of technological change. But the direction of 
technological change depends on the relative returns to the factors of production and these 
will depend on the existing trade regime. If we accept that the direction of technological 
change will be influence by the current distribution of income between factors of 
production, the trade regime will indirectly affect the direction of technological change. 
R&D will tend to minimise the use o f those factors of production receiving higher 
proportions of national income. When the  economy goes from autarky to free trade, the 
factor share of the input intensively used in the domestic export industry increases, under 
certain conditions of elasticity of factor substitution. Therefore, under free trade, R&D 
selection will discriminate against projects using the factor of production intensively used 
in the export industry. As a result, the new production possibility frontier under free trade 
might not include production possibilities th at could have been attainable if the selection of 
R&D projects is made under autarky conditions.
All these results indicate that the  introduction of technology and dynamic 
considerations challenge conventional recommendations of international trade theory. 
Under some conditions, technology policy objectives could make advisable the introduction 
of restrictions or controls over free trade. However, this could only be done after assessing 
the costs of that policy measure in the short run in terms of static efficiency.
The main conclusion which can be drawn from these observations is that economic 
policy makers should consider trade, technology and competition policies as related 
instruments for industrial policy. A public policy towards business considering all these 
policies as independent, with different and perhaps conflicting objectives, is bound to be of 
very limited efficiency.
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Chapter IX: Appendix
In section IX.2.2. above, we discussed in rather general terms the possible existence 
of m arket failures in the different ways of acquiring new technologies. More specific 
results can be derived if we integrate the analysis of licensing and R&D in the same 
analytical framework.
For instance, in the discussion on this issues included in this chapter, the relative 
incentives for the firms or the social planner have been compared. However, we could 
inquire about the likelihood of the existence of cases in which the private sector chose to 
do R& D  to develop a given technology, while from a social point of view, it would have 
been optimal to acquire that technology through licensing. In o th er words, is it possible to 
find the  private sector carrying out R&D, under circumstances in which a social planner 
would have rather preferred to license an existing technology from abroad? (O r vice- 
versa).
Let us see this problem in a very simple model. Let us assume that the market 
determ ines the investment in R&D carried out by each firm, d , or the fee paid for the 
foreign technology, r, as it was done in chapter IV. Let call,
Srad .  consumer surplus if there is R&D,
Sue ■ consumer surplus if there is licensing,
G  -  revenues to the winner of the patent race,
L  m revenues to each loser of the patent race, 
x* ■ revenues to a firm operating with a license, 
x  -  revenues to a firm operating without a license.
All these magnitudes are discounted values.
275
If there is licensing, k licenses will be sold. In that case, the probability o f  each one 
of the n existing firms of getting a license will be (k/n). If there is a patent race, each firm 
will have a probability of wining it equal to (1/n).
From a private enterprise point of view, the net profits of doing R&D would be,
(1) [ l/n ]G  ♦  [ (n - l) /n JL -d
The expected profits when there is licensing are
(2) x* - r « x  = [k/n] (x*-r) + [(n-k)/n] x
Therefore, the private sector will prefer to do R&D if and only if
(3) [1/n] G + [(n-l)/n] L - d > x * - r  = x  = [k/n] (x*-r) + [(n-k)/n] x
From a social point of view, it will be optimal to have the technology developed 
through R&D if and only if the total social welfare derived from carrying out R&D is 
greater than the total social welfare of obtaining the same technology buying a license from 
abroad, in both cases after deducting the costs of obtaining the technology. That is, if and 
only if,
(4) Sr*d - Sue + G + (n-1) L - k(x*-r) - (n-k)x + rk - nd > 0
A market economy would be acquiring a new technology in a way which is not the 
optimal one from the social point of view either if
(5) Sr*d - Sue + G + (n-1) L - k(x*-r) - (n-k)x + rk - nd > 0 and
(6) [1/n] G + [(n-1 )/n] L - d  < x* - r 
or
(7) Surd - Sue ♦  G ♦ (n-1) L - k(x*-r) - (n-k)x + rk - nd < 0 and
(8) [1/n] G ♦ [(n-1 )/n] L - d > x* - r
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In the first case, (5) and (6), we have a situation in which the market decides to 
license a technology that, from a social point of view, should be developed with domestic 
R&D. In the other case, (7) and (8), the private incentives lead the firms to do R&D, but a 
social planner would have chosen to buy a license from abroad.
Sufficient conditions for these two types of results are the following,
(9) rk > nd > Site - S rad and
(10) Skc- S rad > nd > rk respectively.
These sufficient conditions allow us obtain some results without taking into account 
explicitly the value of d. Assuming that the innovation reducing production costs in t is not 
drastic in Arrow’s sense, it can be shown that the value of the difference between the two 
consumer surpluses is
(11) « (k-1) (2(a-c) + (n-2k + 2)«] /  2(n+ 1)2
where a is the intercept of a linear demand function with the Y-axis as in the preceding 
chapters.
Using the values of r and k calculated by Kamien and Tauman (1986), for relatively 
large values of n,114 the rk product is equal to,
(12) ni (n+2) (a-c) /  ( n + 1)2
Substituting (11) and (12) in the sufficient conditions (5) to (8) above it is evident 
that, for large values of n, we will never have that
Sue - S rad  > nd > rk
is never possible.
114 Forn  2: 2[a-c]/|f-l]
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In other words, if n is large enough, we will never find the market doing R&D to 
produce a technology which, from a social point of view, is optimally acquired via licensing. 
However, the contrary may occur and the private sector will be using licensing while it is 
optimal to do domestic R&D. This is not always necessarily the case because under some 
circumstances it is possible that rk > nd.
For smaller values of n, parametric conditions determine the direction of the result, 
but there is no certainty about the impossibility pointed out above.
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a u th o r 's  p r io r  w rit te n  c o n se n t.
Rep roduction  o f this thesis, o th e r than as perm itted under the United K ingdom  
C opyrigh t Designs and Patents A c t  1988, o r  unde r specific agreement with the 
copyright holder, is proh ib ited.
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